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ABSTRACT

STRANDED STRANGERS: ETHIOPIAN REFUGEES AND THE QUEST
FOR URBAN CITIZENSHIP IN NAIROBI, KENYA
Derese G Kassa
May 10, 2013
There is a burgeoning literature on Right to the City much of which is inspired by the
pioneering works of Henry Lefebvre who wrote about urban citizenship for all
inhabitants of the city, access to rights and resources in the city, and political
participation in the management of urban affairs. This study explores whether the Right
to the City approach can help explain the dynamics of state- refugee relations in the urban
centers of Africa. Hence, I took the case of Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi (the capital city
of Kenya) to answer the following research questions: a) How do Ethiopian urban
refugees negotiate aspects of urban citizenship in Nairobi?, b) How adequate is the “right
to the city” approach to explain the everyday struggle of Ethiopian urban refugees for
rights and resources?, and c) What kind of urban policy measures can African cities take
to manage conflict driven urbanization?
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The research is a qualitative case study where a total of 30 urban refugees and a total of
20 community leaders and representatives of local and international civil society
organizations working on refugee matters were interviewed. The interviews captured,
described and discussed the respondents’ own ideas, opinions and experiences. I also
reviewed international, national as well as urban level policy and strategic documents of
Kenya when it comes to documenting and regulating international urban refugees.
After the introduction, the second chapter dwells on a thorough discussion of the
literature on citizenship and social justice, in general, and urban citizenship in particular.
Following the third chapter on methodology, I embark on discussing the major findings.
In a nutshell, I found out that urban refugees exist and interact on two different social
spaces. On the one hand, they are actively involved in the production of urban space by
employing their skills, money, time and social networks. On the other hand, refugees
operate under very restrictive and discriminatory state policies that often deprive them
basic liberties and freedoms. They, therefore, meet two of the criteria of Lefebvre’s
concept of urban citizenship i.e. inhabitance and the production of urban spaces.
However, they fail to meet the third criterion i.e. political rights to participate in the
governance of the city. In short, they are stranded strangers who produce complex social,
economic and political practices difficult to qualify in such conventional terms like
“refugee”, “immigrant” or a “citizen”.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Overview
In today’s era of globalization, cities have become arenas where the notion of citizenship
is re-scaled. Many are revisiting Henry Lefebvre’s writings on the Right to the City.
However much of this scholarship ignores African cities and their particular experience
with the influx of refugees from conflict ridden neighboring countries. In most African
cities, urban refugees operate on a difficult terrain of multiple identities ranging from a
‘refugee’, an ‘illegal’ immigrant, an ‘immigrant’ and/ or a city inhabitant. In so doing,
urban refugees contest and disrupt the conventional definitions of citizenship. Exploring
these practices will contribute to the ongoing discussion and scholarship about urban
citizenship. It will also have policy relevance to those who work on the issue of urban
refugees in Africa.

This dissertation is a case study of Ethiopian urban refugees in three (3) selected
neighborhoods of Nairobi (the capital city of Kenya) that addresses the following specific
research questions. First, “How do Ethiopian urban refugees negotiate aspects of urban
citizenship in the city of Nairobi?” Second, “How adequate is the “right to the city”
approach to explain the everyday struggle of Ethiopian urban refugees for rights and
resources in the city of Nairobi?” And finally, “What kind of urban policy measures can
1

African cities take to manage conflict driven urbanization and use it as a positive force
for social change?”

Accordingly, a total of thirty (30) in-depth interviews with Ethiopian refugees and twenty
(20) key informant interviews were conducted with Kenyan officials, representatives of
international organizations, NGO and community leaders. The study also reviewed
relevant national policy documents and legislations of Kenya in relation to urban and
refugee matters. In empirical terms, the main objective of this study is to shed light on
how refugees negotiate aspects of urban citizenship in the host city. Theoretically
speaking, however, the study aims to abstract whether Lefebvrian arguments for right to
the city are useful heuristics in the case of African cities where the alien other is the
refugee.

This introductory chapter fleshes out the overall picture of the study. It begins by
discussing the process of urbanization in Africa, the link between urbanization and forced
displacement, and state-refugee relations in African cities. Subsequently, the chapter
pivots to discuss the fundamentals of the “urban citizenship” literature and the rationale
to re-appraise it in the African context. It then stipulates the major research questions and
objectives of the study. Finally, the chapter ends by describing the significance of the
study and the way the chapters are organized.

2

1.1 Introduction
The world is urbanizing in a rapid pace. Currently, “half the world’s population lives in
urban areas and by the middle of this century all regions will be predominantly urban”.
(UNHABITAT, 2008:11) The rate of urbanization is even higher in the global South
much of which is attributed to exorbitant population growth rates and the rural urban
migration of people. The same report indicated that Africa’s total population hit the one
billion mark in 2009, almost 40 per cent of which now live in urban areas. In the future,
Africa will witness “a total population increase of about 60 per cent between 2010 and
2050, with the urban population tripling to 1.23 billion during this period.”
(UNHABITAT, 2010:11) But there is more to urbanization than just the demographic
concentration of people in cities.

In fact, modern day urbanization occurred in much of Europe, North America and Asia
following a shift from predominantly agrarian economies into industrial and service
economies. But many of Africa’s cities emerged either as colonial outposts of
administration or port cities where surplus is extracted and shipped over to the colonial
metropolis. Post-independence,
The Africanization of the public service and the expansion of para-statal agencies
led to a high rate of new employment creation in urban centers, particularly in the
capital cities. (Mabogunjie, 2005:6)

Nevertheless, the decline of African cities soon begun following the oil crisis in 1973 and
many African governments could no more sustain their nascent urban bases. The debt
crisis set in and many African countries embarked on the infamous Structural Adjustment
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Programs of the IMF and World Bank. The 1980s are dubbed as the lost years of Africa.
According to Mabogunjie (2005:6),
Everywhere, it was a period of harsh economic realities in which an increasing
proportion of the population was compelled to operate within the informal sector
economy and many were pushed below the poverty line.

Today, rampant poverty is a major feature of cities in Africa. African cities are known for
their sprawling slums and shanty settlements. What makes urban poverty very visible is
that it sits right next to relative wealth and affluence. There are some quarters of the
African city which are very well kept, with standard housing and public amenities in
contrast to slum areas where housing is substandard, and basic amenities like electricity
and clean water are not readily available.

While African urbanization is predominantly explained through natural population
growth and rural-urban migration, the impact of conflicts and conflict driven
displacement on African cities is seldom explored. This is more so in the case of refugees
who are not citizens of the host country or the city in question but whose settlement and
‘stay’ impacts the host city in a number of ways. Consider east Africa where countries
have been unstable and caught up in long and grinding civil wars. Up until 1991,
Ethiopia’s 30 year old civil war unleashed thousands of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees
in neighboring Sudan and Kenya. Very recently (1999-2000), Eritrea and Ethiopia were
engaged in full scale border war leading to a second round of refugee outflow. Somalia
has long descended into a complete state collapse since the fall of the Siyad Barre regime
in 1991 making it the foremost contributor of refugees in the Horn of Africa. The Sudan
got a brief hiatus from the North-South civil war following the Naivasha Comprehensive
4

Peace agreement (2005), which led to the South Sudan referendum in January 2011.
Otherwise, the civil war in South Sudan and the recent Darfur crisis contributed to the
refugee bulge in east Africa and the massive flight of refugees into cities like Addis
Ababa, and Nairobi.
There are a number of reasons why refugees prefer to migrate to towns, sometimes on a
second leg journey from a refugee camp to the capital city of a host country. Some of the
reasons include, “security threats, lack of adequate education and medical services,
limited livelihood opportunities and harsh climatic conditions.” (Pavanello et al, 2010:12)
Upon arrival in cities, many of these refugees do not stay put but rather rent rooms, try to
find job opportunities, open up businesses or go to school. In so doing, they try to support
themselves, their immediate family members and kinfolk while processing their
resettlement or immigration in Europe and America. They also contribute to urban
economies even though most are involved in the informal sector of the economy.

The case of urban refugees, in general, and the transformation they bring about in host
cities are, to say the least, uncalled for by host countries. This is because the very notion
of a ‘refugee’ is premised on a spatial and political category that we often refer to as the
‘nation-state’. Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention defines a refugee as,
A person who owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.

The definition makes it clear that a refugee is defined by his country of origin and his/her
inability to go back to that country of origin, instead of rights or privileges that a host
5

country would be willing to offer him or her. Hence, most refugee hosting countries in
the South keep refugees in refugee camps.

According to Kibreab (2003:60), some of the reasons for encampment by host nations
include,
(1) precluding refugee integration into host societies by minimizing or preventing
economic, social, and cultural interaction with nationals; (2) avoiding or
minimizing perceived risks to national and societal security by controlling refugee
movements and activities; and (3) avoiding or minimizing competition over
scarce resources such as land, pasture, water, forest produce, housing, schools,
transportation, and employment opportunities in both the formal and informal
sectors.
Obviously, urban refugees bear the brunt of such hostile policies from national
governments. According to Kibreab, urban refugees are “the most neglected and abused
group throughout the developing countries” whose “basic fundamental human rights are
often flagrantly violated by the security forces of the countries concerned.” (Kibreab,
2003:60) Beating these odds, however, they succeed to penetrate into capital cities and
venture in a number of economic activities. A number of studies ((Sienkiewicz, 2007),
(Campbell, 2006), (Kibreab, 2003), (Jacobsen, 2002)) have now been conducted among
urban refugees where the contributions of urban refugees to the host city’s economy are
duly recognized.

For instance, Sienkiewicz (2007:7) argues that, “If states altered their existing policies
and enabled displaced persons to work, then governments would benefit.” Campbell
(2006:407) did a thorough study of Somali refugees in Eastleigh Nairobi concluding,
As such, these urban refugees, like other migrants and traders, now have vested
economic interests in Eastleigh. While war may have brought many refugees to
6

Eastleigh in the first place, peace negotiations alone will not necessarily take them
all back home.
Jacobsen (2002:594) also argues, “A policy that sought to incorporate long-standing
refugees into the host society would increase the human security of everyone living
there.”

Clearly, these arguments try to persuade host city governments and countries to embrace
urban refugees, benefit from their skills and resources and promote an “integrationist”
policy than segregating and prohibiting them into remote camps. But integration is easier
said than done. Embarking on such a project requires more than issuing identification
documents, business or driving licenses or enrolling the children of urban refugees to
public schools. Rather it requires: a) grappling with the notion of ‘citizenship’ both at the
national and urban level, b) assessing the social capital of urban refugees and its
economic relevance in the host cities, and c) studying host-refugee relations while
studying the potential impact of an integrationist approach to urban refugees.

Accordingly, this study takes the case of Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi (the capital city of
Kenya) to inquire, research and arrive at conclusion on the following issues.

1. The study looks at the concept of “citizenship”, its normative and theoretical
origins as well as the changes and alternations it underwent in time. It also
explores in greater depth on how the concept of “citizenship” is re-scaled and requalified at the “urban” level. It does so by paying discriminate emphasis on the
“urban citizenship” or “right to the city” literature which begun with the
7

pioneering works of Henry Lefebvre (1967/8) and is now gaining more traction
and currency.

2. The study looks at the case of Ethiopian urban refugees in Nairobi to consider
whether the debate about “urban citizenship” speaks to the African experience of
cities or not. It looks at the strength and weaknesses of the “right to the city”
approach when applied to the case of refugees in African cities. It also narrates
about the anomalies and the exceptional dynamics of urban processes in Africa. In
so doing, the study challenges some of the premises of the “urban citizenship”
literature espoused by scholars many of whom base their analysis on the
experience of western cities.

3. The study brings up practical policy recommendations to better state-refugee
relations and urban governance. These recommendations were made by urban
refugees themselves, local and national level government officials, and civil
society activists who work on urban refugee issues in Nairobi.

The following two sections (1.2 and 1.3) preview the theoretical discussion about urban
citizenship and the need to re-appraise it in the context of Africa. The bulk of this
analysis is done in chapter 2 of the study. However, it is important to summarize it as a
precursor or a foreground to the discussion about the research questions and objectives of
the study.
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1.2 Right to the City/Urban Citizenship: The Fundamentals
Through the thickness of daily life and local, mostly informal politics, cities can
accommodate and enable the unbundling of the tight articulation of the citizen
and formal state politics. Saskia Sassen1
There is a lot of theoretical debate about what the term ‘citizen’ entails. According to
Varasnyi (2006:231) “the etymology of the word ‘citizenship’ reveals its urban origins:
there is a clear connection between the word citizen and the word that we now translate in
English as city-state.” Nevertheless, the term citizenship “has been hegemonically
associated with membership in a national political community.” (Purcell, 2003:571) But
even within the confines of the nation-state, defining citizenship has always been a
controversial issue.
The oldest version of citizenship comes from a liberal social contract reading. Here a
citizen is defined in terms of rights and privileges the individual claims from his/her state,
vis-à-vis the duties and responsibilities he or she has to that respective state. For Holsten
and Appadurai (1996:190) a liberal rendition of citizenship is dependent “only on
membership in the nation-state” and an “array of civil, political, socio-economic, and
cultural rights people possess and exercise.” Obviously such a basic, formal and rights
based definition of citizenship has come under fire from others who harp on
communitarian and ethical belongingness to the nation.
Civic republicans uphold that the citizen is more than a voter or a tax payer; he or she
“would have to devote the better part of his or her time and energy to public concerns.”
1

Saskia Sassen((2006), Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages,
Princeton University Press.

9

(Dagger, 1981:718) For civic-republicans, therefore, citizenship is public vocation to be
pursued and mastered by individual members in a given cultural and political community.
Here, the city is implied as a community whose cultural and political boundaries are coterminus. In fact some like Dagger (1981) argue that the city in its diversity and multiculturalism is eroding the civic and communitarian bases of citizenship at the national
scale. The city, for most civic republicans, is now not “more than a bewildering
agglomeration of streets and buildings and nameless faces.” (Dagger, 1981:718)
Still others defy the primacy of the nation-state to construe a political community;
arguing that we are all human beings who belong to one global community with certain
universal, basic and human rights. Hence, they argue for cosmopolitan citizenship.
According to Baubock (2009:475), cosmopolitan citizenship refers to “duties of solidarity
that human beings have towards others across state borders and national identities
(Nussbaum 2000, Appiah 2006).”

While many are skeptical about the notion of

cosmopolitan (some even talk of global) citizenship, civic republicans are very cynical
about a cosmopolitan project. For the latter, cosmopolitan citizenship “fails to specify the
concrete rights and duties which bind citizens in relations of close cooperation within
bounded communities.” (Linklater, 1998:27) Hence, cosmopolitan citizenship “fails to
engage those (people) in any effective form of shared rule.” (Linklater, 1998:27)
Each of these strands of thought has their fair share of criticisms. Liberalism is charged
for ignoring the fact that in many cases the nation-state trumps the rights of various racial
or cultural minority groups, castes, women or classes within its confines. Civicrepublicanism fosters a homogenous political community with shared values and
commitments which is not practically the case for many nation-states. Cosmopolitanism
10

rides roughshod over the reality that communities should share histories, resources, and
institutions within the bounds of a given geographic territory to conceive each other as
fellow citizens. Also, many argue that someone has to be excluded as an ‘alien’ or a
‘foreigner’ for the citizen to exist. Hence the idea of global citizenship is oxymoronic.
The task of defining citizenship has become even more complicated owing to
globalization, where countries and cities have become arenas for: a) global migration of
skilled and unskilled labor, b) the global articulation of capital and investment, c) the
global production, distribution and consumption of goods and services, and d) heightened
exchange of information and technologies. These processes have reduced the power of
the nation-state by displacing it upwards (to global and supranational entities like the
EU), downwards (to sub-national entities regions and cities) and outwards (retrenchment
of the public sector due to privatization). (Purcell, 2003) The urban scale has now
become one prominent site where citizenship is re-scaled and re-qualified.
The attempt to comprehend such new relations between cities and citizenship has now led
to the ‘discovery’ of Henry Lefebvre’s prominent theoretical works under the rubric of
the ‘right to the city’ literature. A philosopher and urban sociologist, Lefebvre first
coined the term ‘the right to the city’ in 1968 in his book “Le droit a’ la ville”. The book
“describes the negative impact that the capitalist economy has on cities, converting the
city into a commodity serving only the interests of capital accumulation.” (Mathivet,
2010:21) As an antidote, Lefebvre proposes that “that inhabitants demand control over
the construction of urban spaces.” (Mathivet, 2010:21)
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Lefebvre’s right to the city book points out the need to reconfigure citizenship at the
urban level. Three important points stand out in Lefebvre’s work about urban citizenship.
First, his approach is revolutionary in that he “rests urban citizenship on inhabitance as
opposed to the nation-state scale.” (Purcell, 2002:106) As Purcell and Baubock clearly
put it, Lefebvre’s notion of urban citizenship does not depend on ius soli (being born in
the territory) or ius sanguinis (descent from citizen parents) but rather ius domicile
(inhabitance in the city). This is remarkable for Lefebvre nullifies the Kantian rendition
of the stranger –the ‘alien’, the ‘immigrant’, or the ‘refugee’ -by giving any or every
dweller equal political rights. Similarly, Harvey and Potter (2009:42) define urban
citizenship as “the rights of immigrants, transients, and strangers to participate in local
politics”.
Secondly, the Lefevbrian notion of urban citizenship emphasized the right of people to
appropriate space which, in the words of Purcell, is the “full and complete usage of the
city”. It means inhabitants can “live in, play in, work in, represent, characterize and
occupy urban space.” (Purcell, 2002:106) To borrow one of Edward Soja’s article titles,
Lefebvre’s bundle of rights were all meant to negate Margin/Alia – the exclusion of
alleged aliens. Thirdly, the right to the city implies the right to directly participate in the
democratic management of the urban space. Here again, Lefebvre makes a radical
departure from the liberal democratic version of representative democracy. He posits
representation alienates the citizen. Instead, Lefebvre underscores that urban citizens
should exercise their right to difference meaning the right to claim rights, to struggle and
conflict with the powers that be while managing one’s own city. Hence urban citizenship
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“does not refer to a legal status, but to a form of identification with the city, to a political
identity.” (Dikec, 2009:76)
1.3 Urban Citizenship in Africa: Rationales for Re-appraisal
It is clear that the right to the city literature is very much focused on the experiences of
western cities. (Lefevbre, 1968; Dagger, 1981; Baubock, 2003, 2009; Dikec, 2009;
Fainstein, 2009; Harvey, 2003, 2009; Holston and Appadurai, 1996; Isin, 2002) Almost
all authors assume that ‘national citizenship’ is unraveling in western cities for the
following reasons. First of all, western cities are increasingly connected and globalized.
Secondly, there are scores of diverse, legal as well as ‘illegal’ immigrants in these global
cities that challenge (or as Purcell argues ‘destabilize’) the Liberal Democratic
Westphalian (LDW) definition of citizenship. But the right to the city literature does not
take into account the experience of non-western nations, in general, and non western
cities, in particular. Richard Falk (2000:6) captured how narrow the debate about
changing forms of citizenship is by stating:
It needs to be appreciated more than is generally the case that this discourse
on citizenship, and its changing character, remains an essentially Western
experience that has not taken existential hold in non-Western societies nearly to
the extent as have such other quintessential Western conceptions as territorial
sovereignty, international diplomacy, the rule of law, and even human rights.
This particular study departs from the experience of western cities. It explores whether
the right to the city approach could help explain urban dynamics in a non-western city
context. True, African countries are increasingly urbanizing. African states are also
increasingly affected and influenced by global flows of capital, technology, information
and people. Cities like Johannesburg, Nairobi, Cairo and Addis Ababa are increasingly
networked with regional and global systems of commerce and diplomacy.
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Nevertheless, African cities and countries have certain particularities. Most cities in
Africa are still surrounded by a large swathe of rural or agrarian populations, and are the
targets of massive rural-urban migration. African states, in many instances, have
problems of political representation, participation and coercion. (Clapham C, 1985;
Bayart, 1989; Ake, 1986; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Diamond, 1999) Also civil
society is limited in scope; its autonomy is undercut either by the state or foreign donors.
(Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999; Gibbon et al 1992; Chole and Jibrin 1995; Mkandawire
and Olukoshi 1995)
Studying the right to the city and its applicability to urban spaces in Africa will be useful
for a number of reasons. First of all, urban theories have always been Eurocentric
epistemic projects. Most of them were fetched from social practices and processes that
unfolded in the western world. Hence they are more adept to explain, analyze or put in
perspective western urban processes. Yielding their heuristic and analytical value to the
African context means we need to compare the commonalities and anomalies between
African cities and their Euro-American counterparts. Robinson (2004:571) is right to
point out that one way of disrupting this “western” and “non-western” divide in urban
theorizing would be “to parochialize those accounts of cities which pose as universal.”
For instance, she mentions that, “Louis Wirth’s account of ‘the’ urban way of life was
profoundly dependent on experiences of European and American cities – if not simply on
Chicago” (Robinson, 2004:571) Exploring processes of urbanism in Africa can be one
way of making the western experience stand “as just another region in the world, neither
exemplar nor leader in new ways of being urban.” (Robinson, 2004:571)
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By the same token, the right to the city literature was developed and widely written about
mostly from the perspective of western cities. The theory can spare itself from a
universalist impulse and sloganeering (which is already happening in urban social
movement circles) by anchoring itself in particular contexts like African cities. A caveat
is important here. This would not stifle the attempt to develop ‘grand’ or ‘meta’ theories
on urbanism or cities in general. To the contrary, it should lead to better theorizing. In
the words of Robinson, “If efforts to develop understandings of city life could track
across different contexts”, then “the resources for understanding cities everywhere would
be enlivened.” (Robinson, 2004:575)

Secondly, the right to the city literature offers a background where the modern city is
reduced to become a city of capital, and not of citizens. Its repeated call for urban
citizenship is targeted at reducing the power of global capital and the neo-liberal state that
use cities as their respective ‘command centers’. (Lefebvre, 1968; Dikec, 2009; Fainstein,
2009; Harvey, 2003, 2009) Africa, on the other hand, offers a different scenario of urban
(and by extension global) integration. One feature of Africa’s urbanization is the massive
migration of displaced refugees-the common folk- from one country to another. Most
African cities are swelling in size due to the influx of refugees from war torn neighboring
countries, rather than capitalists. Nairobi, for instance, has been hosting a large number
of urban refugees from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Sudan, the DRC, Rwanda and
Uganda over the last four decades. Looking at urban refugees in African cities will
therefore help us understand how people struggle for rights and resources in urban Africa
‘bottom up’.
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Thirdly, the liberal, democratic and Westphalian versions of the ‘state’ and the ‘citizen’
are seldom applicable in the context of African cities. Discussing the case of South
African and Botswanan cities, Nyamnjoh (2007:74) frames this unique context stating;
“Even when legal rights are extended to migrants, racial and ethnic minorities; they have
not always been able to claim them”. In fact, “disaffected nationals, in conjunction with
the state, direct their resentment against immigrants and ethnic minorities.” (Nyamnjoh,
2007:74) While many western cities speak of illegal immigrants, rising sentiments of
xenophobia and racism against these ‘aliens’; African cities now speak of urban refugees.

Incidents of harassment, violence and xenophobia by the public are common news items
from countries like South Africa, Kenya, and most of the Maghreb countries in North
Africa. (Simone A, 2001; Nyamnjoh, 2007.2006; Nyaoro, 2010) Authorities, especially
the police, are known for harassing refugees; asking for bribes and presents from
refugees; and detaining refugees arbitrarily and under false pretence. (Nyaoro, 2010;
Nyamnjoh, 2006) In short, urban refugees are the alien inhabitants of the African city.
Hence we should ask: What does right to the African city then mean? And, how do
refugees struggle to access rights and resources amidst such hostility? To answer these
questions, one should look at “the hierarchies and relationships of inclusion and
exclusion informed by race, ethnicity, class, gender and geography that determine
accessibility to citizenship in real (my emphasis) terms.” (Nyamnjoh, 2007:79)

Last but not least, any discussion about urban citizenship in Africa would bring new
concepts such as “liminality” and “transience” into the literature on the right to the city.
Urban refugees often use African host cities as transit corridors for international
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migration, as opposed to legal or illegal immigrants who land in western cities to settle in
permanently. This ‘suspended’ nature of their stay in host cities renders them to a
situation of ‘liminality’. They consider themselves as sojourners (waiting to emigrate out
of host cities) but also demand rights and resources as legal inhabitants of the host city.
Kihato (2007:8) summarized the case of refugees from Ivory Coast living in
Johannesburg stating:
The social space that is occupied by immigrants in Johannesburg is one that defies
clear definition. Indeed it is a liminal space in which a population is caught
between and betwixt an often idealised past and an imagined future. This liminal
condition is articulated not only by their own perceptions of their dislocation in
South African society, but by their imagining of a future ‘back home’ or outside
of the continent. This has a profound impact on questions of belonging, and
citizenship. Migrant narratives, the nature of their associational life, and their
relationships to home and host country, constantly reconfirm their unrootedness
and transience in their everyday lives in Johannesburg.

Given all these, we can safely argue that the right to the city theory would gain a lot by
taking the African case into account.

On the other hand, employing the right to the city approach using the case of urban
refugees will contribute a lot to the study of forced displacement and urban refugees in
Africa. The first contribution will be in reorienting the scholarship about refugees in
Africa from an “encampment centered” approach to an “urban centered” approach.
There is a dearth of information about ‘urban refugees’ in Africa who cross international
borders and land in host cities. In contrast, refugees who cross border zones and settle in
refugee camps receive a lot of research and policy attention. According to Weaver, these
camp refugees “enjoy a level of technical and socioeconomic assistance and
infrastructure superior to urban refugees who have self settled in cities of the host
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country.” (Weaver, 1988:459) Accordingly, Kibreab (1996:131) dubbed ‘urban refugees’
as people that “the eye refuses to see”. Anita Fabos (2003:1) built on this notion of
invisibility stating,
Indeed, the association of African refugees with camps is so overwhelming that it
is often the first image that comes to mind for perhaps the majority of people who
are not refugees.
In its own modest way, this study aims to bring to light the struggles of urban refugees
and give them some visibility.

Secondly, the current approach to the treatment of refugees in Africa focuses on
providing basic services in camps until such time comes that refugees get permanently
relocated in a third (usually western) country. Such a temporary and service providing
approach to refugees departs significantly from international declarations and policy
instruments that bestow various rights on refugees. Some of these rights include: a) the
right to possess property (UN, Article 13,1951), b) protection of the “industrial, artistic,
literary and scientific works of a refugee” (UN, Article 14, 1951), c) the right to gainful
employment in the host country, d) right to public education and housing (UN, Articles
21 and 22, 1951). The right to the city approach will therefore be useful since it
reintroduces a rights centered discourse to study urban refugees.

Thirdly, a rights centered discourse would help us consider whether we can speak of
urban citizenship regimes in Africa. And if so, it will help us contemplate what the remits
or parameters of urban citizenship for African refugees ought to be like. It could be the
case that urban refugees value and prefer to have certain rights to the city as opposed to
others. For instance, Kihato (2007) found out that Ivorian refugees in Johannesburg only
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focused on economic rights as opposed to political rights. She stated, “Many do not
necessarily want political rights, but they do want rights to economic opportunities”.
(Kihato, 2007:10) This study would trace if there are similar patterns amongst Ethiopian
urban refugees in Nairobi or not. Exploring these processes would help discover whether
we can speak of right to the city in generic terms, or as specifically outlined or
contextualized portfolios of rights.

Last but not least, the policy and political implications of the right to the African city has
already become a topic of research and discussion among African scholars. Parnell and
Pieterse (2010) pioneered this project of appropriating the right to the city literature. They
state, “Curiously, the notions of urban citizenship, with its assumptions of universality,
have been little applied to the fundamental development questions of how cities of the
South might be imagined or governed.” (Parnell and Pieterse, 2010:148) This lacuna,
they argue, is “apparent by the absence of an articulated rights-based agenda for cities of
the South.” (Parnell and Pieterse, 2010:148) For them, “the concept of the rights based
city offers innovative ways of advancing debate about the developmental state” as
opposed to “neoliberal governmentality.” (Parnell and Pieterse, 2010:148)

Pieterse and Parnell’s model lays out a “generation of rights”. The first generation of
rights focuses on individual rights for voting, health, education. The second generation of
rights focuses on household services like housing, water, energy and waste management.
They then speak of rights to the city, as the third generation of rights, which include
things like public safety, social amenities, and public transport. Parnell and Pieterse
share Lefebvre’s suspicion and skepticism about representative democracy and the neo19

liberal state. But their call to “build state capacities and deliver economic opportunities to
the poor or to redistribute from the rich” does not tally up with Lefebvre’s deep seated
suspicion about any state project. (Parnell and Pieterse, 2010: 150) Here again, one
should be able to ask whether a developmental state is better placed to cater to groups
like urban refugees than the neoliberal state. And if so, its potential implications for city
planners and policy makers in African cities ought to be studied. To sum up, the Right to
the City approach could break fresh ground: by making the case of urban refugees more
visible, by reorienting the focus of refugee studies on rights and power relations, and
articulating new trends of thought on rights to the city in Africa.

1.4 Research Questions and Objectives
This far I have established how rapidly Africa is urbanizing partly due to the inflow of
refugees from neighboring countries in conflict. I also discussed about the unique set of
circumstances that urban refugees find themselves in while interacting with the policies
of the host state (on the one hand) and regular citizens of the host country (on the other).
This was followed by a discussion about citizenship, in general, and urban citizenship, in
particular. The “urban citizenship” literature begins by discussing how the process of
globalization forced the nation state to relinquish its power both to supra and sub national
levels. Cities have now become arenas where citizenship is redefined. Hence there is an
increased interest in Henry Lefebvre’s discussions of urban citizenship as the rights of all
inhabitants to appropriate and use urban spaces; and to directly participate in the
management of these urban spaces.
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However, the right to the city approach pays a discriminate emphasis to the experiences
of western cities ignoring non-western cities and how citizenship and rights are being
defined in those areas. African cities are urbanizing rapidly due to the influx of refugees
from civil wars in neighboring countries. Both individually (as active human agents) and
collectively (as urban enclaves of ethnic refugees): these urban refugees have managed to
be involved in economic activities, to access public goods like education and health
services, and transform urban neighborhoods. Urban refugees negotiate a difficult terrain
of multiple identities ranging from a ‘refugee’, an ‘illegal’ immigrant, an immigrant and/
or a city inhabitant. But very little is researched about the conditions of urban refugees, in
general, and how urban refugees are contesting formal definitions of citizenship, in
particular. To borrow from Harvey and Potter (2009:42): can we speak of urban
citizenship in Africa as “the rights of immigrants, transients, and strangers to participate
in local politics?” There is a lot of merit in asking this question but some deserve
mentioning.
First of all, the right to the city theory could spare itself from universalist impulses and
sloganeering by anchoring itself in contexts like African cities 2. For instance, looking at
urban refugees will help us understand and explain how people at the margins struggle
for rights and resources in African cities as opposed to the global elite. It would bring
new concepts such as “liminality” and “transience” into the literature on the right to the
city.

It would also illuminate “the hierarchies and relationships of inclusion and

exclusion” that “determine accessibility to citizenship in real terms.” (Nyamnjoh,
2

This is already happening amongst international outfits who work on urban development
issues in the South. For instance UNHABITAT organized a World Urban Form in Rio
dealing with a theme “Right To The City-Bridging the Urban Divide”.
http://www.unhabitat.org/categories.asp?catid=584
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2007:79) On the other hand, the right to the city theory would help inform and enrich the
scholarship on forced displacement, in general, and urban refugees, in particular. To sum
up, the right to the city theory could break fresh ground: by making the case of urban
refugees more visible, by reorienting the focus of refugee studies on rights and power
relations, and articulating new trends of thought on right to the city in Africa.

Hence, this particular study aims to answer the following three major research questions
by taking the case of Ethiopian refugees in selected neighborhoods of the capital city of
Kenya, Nairobi3. The first research question reads, “How do Ethiopian urban refugees
negotiate aspects of urban citizenship in the city of Nairobi?” The second research
question reads, “How adequate is the ‘right to the city’ approach to explain the everyday
struggle of Ethiopian urban refugees for rights and resources in the city of Nairobi? The
third major research question reads, “What kind of urban policy measures can African
cities take to manage conflict driven urbanization and use it as a positive force for social
change?” Table one (1) illustrates these three major research questions.
Table 1. Major Research Questions

1. How do Ethiopian urban refugees negotiate aspects of urban citizenship in the city of
Nairobi?
2. How adequate is the ‘right to the city’ approach to explain the everyday struggle of
Ethiopian urban refugees for rights and resources in the city of Nairobi?

3. What kind of urban policy measures can African cities take to manage displacement
driven urbanization and use it as a positive force for social change?

3

The reasons why the city of Nairobi and Ethiopian urban refugees in Nairobi are
selected for this study will be discussed in greater depth in the methodology chapter
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These research questions could be translated into five research objectives. Accordingly,
1) This study aims to explore the adequacy of the right to the city literature in a nonwestern urban context.

2) The study also investigates refugee-host city relations taking the particular case of
Ethiopian refugees in the city of Nairobi.

3) The study looks at the educational, religious and social institutions of the
Ethiopian refugee community and explored how refugees bank on these and other
social networks to survive and thrive in Nairobi. The study also inquires whether
refugees use their social capital to negotiate and secure other economic and
political rights in the host city.

4) The study focuses on the enterprises and business establishments owned by
Ethiopian refugees, looking at how these enterprises benefit from both the refugee
community and Kenyan citizens of Nairobi. It also attempts to shed light on
whether the participation of refugees in economic activities translates into
bargaining power to access other rights to the city.

5) Last but not the least, this study provides a brief historical analysis of Kenya’s
national policy on the issue of refugees. It attempts to trace how the refugee
inflow started in the country, in general, and in Nairobi, in particular. It also tries
to capture the dynamics around the initiation, development and ratification of
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Kenyan policy regimes regarding urban refugees, both at the national and local
level.
For summary purpose, however, one can reduce these specific objectives into two major
objectives. Empirically speaking, the main objective of this study is to shed light on how
refugees negotiate aspects of urban citizenship in the host city. It explores how urban
refugees employ their knowledge, resources and networks to appropriate and manage the
urban space. This process entailed negotiating and accessing rights, resources and power
within the host city. Theoretically speaking, however, the study reflects on whether
Lefebvrian arguments for right to the city are useful heuristics in the case of African
cities where the alien other is mostly the refugee, instead of the immigrant.
1.5 Significance of the Study
I have already stated under section 1.3 that much of the literature on cities, globalization
and its footloose circulation of labor, capital, technology and goods in cities is derived
from the experiences of Western Europe and North America. In contrast, we have the
African continent which is rapidly urbanizing but is least studied. Even more, the
potential link between conflicts, urbanization and inhabitants’ right to the city has not
been adequately studied. This study therefore has some theoretical contribution by way
of qualifying the process of urbanization in Nairobi, charting refugee-host community
relations, and looking at how refugees use their human, financial and social capital to
negotiate more ‘rights to the city’.
Secondly, the study aims to reflect on how the city of Nairobi is coming to grips with the
issue of urban refugees by looking into international, national and city wide policies and
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legal instruments. In addition, it captures the actual praxis (lived experience) of staterefugee relations on the ground. Particularly, interviews with refugees and their
community leaders, as well as Nairobi’s legislators and officials yielded useful
information on which policies worked and which ones did not. Eventually, the study does
present a set of policy recommendations that would help facilitate the relationship
between the city of Nairobi and urban refugees.
Methodologically speaking, there were many advantages to conducting a case study. First
of all, case studies provide a deep understanding of how a certain social process has
influenced or affected a given group, community, nation, etc. According to Schutt
(2009:428) “What distinguishes case study research is the emphasis on understanding the
case as a ‘whole’”. The researcher may “focus on different parts of the case during
analysis, but the researcher’s primary concern is fitting the parts together-understanding
the interrelations among the elements that make up the whole case.” (Schutt, 2009:428)
Secondly, case studies “are friendly to employ a wide range of interconnected
interpretive practices, hoping always to get a better understanding of the subject matter at
hand.” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003:5)
1.6 Organization of the Study
Chapter 2 provides a thorough review of the literature on citizenship and the emerging
debate on urban citizenship. It also draws a distinction between the relatively new
discussion about “right to the city” and the older theoretical debate about social justice in
the city indicating that the debate about urban citizenship frames the notions of inclusion,
participation and decision making not within the frameworks of a liberal-democratic
state. To the contrary, Lefebvre’s works stand out as critique of liberal democracies.
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Chapter 3 describes the methodology of the study. It sets out with a summary of the
general and specific research questions already discussed in this introductory chapter. In
this chapter, I have also argued why I consider a qualitative case study is ideal to address
the research questions I raised. The chapter then delves into a discussion of the data
collection methods, the sampling procedures and analysis of the data gathered from the
field.
Chapter 4 is the first part of the data analysis. It begins by providing a more detailed
analysis about the profile of urban refugees, and their reasons for migration. It then
discusses about the challenges and opportunities the city of Nairobi offered to them upon
arrival. It then delves into a discussion about the different livelihood schemes of urban
refugees outlining how refugees use their skill set, their capital, and their community
networks to engage in gainful employment. The chapter ends by looking at the various
religious, cultural and educational institutions established by Ethiopian refugees and
inquires the role and relevance of these institutions to refugee life.
Chapter 5 zooms into the more crucial issue of state-refugee relations first by looking at
the generation of international, continental and national protocols and laws that the
Kenyan state subscribed to officially. The chapter looks into the pros and cons of these
protocols and legislations followed by refugees’ own reflections about the Kenyan State,
the Nairobi city council and their relationship with the law enforcement agencies of the
State.
Chapter 6 is a critical summary of how urban refugees are “governed” in Kenya. It begins
be revising the major findings of the study both in chapter 4 and 5. It then utilizes the
arguments of the “right to the city” approach itself to consider whether the “urban
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citizenship” literature speaks to the experience of urban refugees in Nairobi. These
discussions lead to the final section of the chapter which underscores the need to have a
critical look at power and governance at the “nation-state” level in Africa since it is
directly, if not more influentially, involved in the urban governance of refugees. In other
words, section 6.4 stands out as a critique of the emphasis that “the right to the city”
literature proffers at the “urban” level.
Chapter 7 deals with specific policy recommendations that urban refugees, government
officials and civil society leaders working on urban refuge matters forwarded as useful
entry points for better policy and governance of urban refugees.
Chapter 8 concludes the research by recapturing the original research questions,
providing a synopsis of the major theoretical debates on urban citizenship, and comparing
the empirical findings of the study alongside the theoretical premises of “right to the city”
literature. It ends by pointing out areas for further exploration and study.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Overview
This chapter engages the literature on citizenship in more detail. The first section starts
out by reviewing the origin of the term “citizen” and the major strands of thought in
explaining what it means. Accordingly, it outlines the liberal social contract, civic
republican and cosmopolitan citizenship theories. It then elaborates Henry Lefebvre’s
work on “right to the city” followed by recent works on “urban citizenship” many of
which were inspired by Lefebvre’s work. It then draws a distinction between the
contemporary works on urban citizenship and the older theoretical debate about social
justice in the city. It ends by pointing out how the debate about urban citizenship frames
the notions of inclusion, participation and decision making beyond the frameworks of the
liberal-democratic nation-state.
2.1

Cities and Citizenship

2.1.1 Citizenship and the State: Brief Background
The term citizen emerged in “the course of the constitutional upheavals of the
seventeenth century” when the opponents of the Stuart monarchy in England began to
“seriously question the powers of the Crown” describing themselves “as free born
citizens than as subjects to their king.” (Skinner, 2003:11) A citizen is hence a free entity,
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as opposed to a slave or a subject whose freedoms are curtailed and confined by a
sovereign other i.e. a slave master or a monarch. Skinner calls this Westphalian notion of
citizenship as neo-Roman where, “To be free as a citizen requires that the actions of the
state should reflect the will of all its citizens.” (Skinner, 2003:15)
This narrative about freedom, and the free citizen was soon critiqued by the antirepublican and pro-monarchical writings of Thomas Hobbes (1649-1651). For Hobbes,
liberty has nothing to do with dependence on others or independence from others.
Freedom, he argues, is taken away from people “only by identifiable acts of interference
on the part of external agents.” (Skinner, 2003:15) So when the law coerces us to do
something by “arousing fears about the evil consequences of disobedience”, we are not
acting “unfreely in obeying it.” (Skinner, 2003:16) We are not becoming slaves of the
sovereign law. Rather, we are like “the man who throws his goods into the Sea for fear
that the ship would sink.” (Skinner, 2003:16) Arguing so, Hobbes strongly criticizes the
belief that “subjects in a popular common wealth enjoy liberty.” (Skinner, 2003:16)
Obviously, Hobbesian calls for Leviathan were met with furious repudiations. Skinner
quotes the incisive work of Algernon Sidney (1694), who responded back to Hobbesian
affirmations of coercion by a sovereign (usually a monarch) and its consistency with
liberty as totally illogical. He argued that one cannot accept, “those men or nations are
not slaves, who have no other title to what they enjoy, than the grace of the prince, which
he may revoke whensoever he pleaseath.” (Skinner, 2003:16) Sidney continued, “if it be
liberty to live under such a government, I desire to know what is slavery.” (Skinner,
2003:16)
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These arguments about freedom, citizenship and slavery circled on two major points.
First, there has always been controversy on the degree of coercion that the state should be
allowed to exercise on its members. How do we strike the balance between sufficient
coercion to ensure public safety, law and order (on the one hand) without stifling on the
human and civil liberties of individual citizens( on the other hand)? Secondly, beginning
from the 17th century experiments of republicanism, liberty and citizenship are defined in
negative terms i.e. freedom from the coercive and stifling powers of the state. The
philosophy of liberalism, Skinner argues, is rooted in this negative undercurrent of
liberty. Protagonists (Skinner, 2003:20) argue,
If liberty is the ideal to be cherished, and if law is the principal means by which it
is undermined, and then we have a powerful reason for controlling the state in the
name of maximizing our freedom as citizens.
Only recently, liberalism has turned into a positive rendition of liberty where the state is
redefined as the institution which can improve people’s lives, redress inequalities and
render equity and some sort of social justice.

TH Green and Bernard Bosanquet

pioneered this project. Green, for instance, argues that “to speak of the freedom of a man
is thus to speak of the state in which he shall have realized his ideal of himself.” (Skinner,
2003:21) Hence, the state assumed the role of ‘hindering hindrances’ such as “free and
compulsory education (because ignorance is hindrance), health care (because disease is
hindrance) and state pensions and welfare (because poverty is hindrance)”. (Skinner,
2003:23) Interestingly, liberalism (in its broad philosophical stroke) oscillates between a
minimalist (negative) rendition of the state and a maximalist (positive) rendition of the
state.

If we are to look at these two signposts and deduce their narrative about

citizenship, the minimalist approach borders a libertarian narrative of a citizen (low taxes,
less regulation, a watchman state). Whereas, the maximalist narrative borders the
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progressive/liberal rendition of a citizen (high taxes for equity, more regulation, an
enabling state).
2.1.2

Theories of Citizenship

Contemporary debates about citizenship do spring from the classic debate about the
powers of the state vis-a- vis the rights and duties of citizens. Obviously, the oldest
renditions of citizenship are the liberal social contract theories. These approaches argue
that citizens primarily are rights holders. TH Marshall, in his seminal work Citizenship
and Social Class suggests that “the citizen/state relationship is an inter-subjective one”
where both the state and the citizen are entities “possessing interests, resources, and
capacities” of their own. (Poggi, 2003:42) But such a formal, legalistic approach to
citizenship has been quite problematic. Holsten and Appadurai (1996:190) give us a
critical summary of why the liberal definition of citizenship lacks rigor and salience.
They state,
Although in theory full access to rights depends on membership, in practice that
which constitutes citizenship substantively is often independent of its formal
status. In other words, formal membership in the nation-state is increasingly
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for substantive citizenship. That it is
not sufficient is obvious for many poor citizens who have formal membership in
the state but who are excluded in fact or law from enjoying the rights of
citizenship and participating effectively in its organization. This condition also
applies to citizens of all classes who find that their preferences for a desirable or
proper form of life-for example, with regard to sexual or religious practices-are
not adequately embodied in the national-public sphere of rights even though the
communities in which they live may overwhelmingly approve them.
The first critique of the formal and legalistic definitions of citizenship comes from civicrepublicans who argue that legal status is “the basis of citizenship, but it was not the
whole of the matter.” (Dagger, 1981:720) For civic republicans, the citizen is more than a
voter or a tax payer; he or she “would have to devote the better part of his or her time and
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energy to public concerns.” (Dagger, 1981:718) Hence citizenship is a “public vocation”
that “carries with it a responsibility to act with the interests of the community in mind.”
(Dagger, 1981:718) Such communitarian renditions of citizenship which emphasize
ethical membership, active participation and the pursuit of a ‘common good’ (or the
“national interest”) by individual citizens usually lament the loss of this ‘pristine’ form of
citizenship. The culprit, many uphold, is liberalism. Dagger (1981:720), for instance
argues,
Liberals have tended to regard political participation principally as a means of
protecting and furthering one's private interests, and as something, therefore, that
is neither worthwhile in itself nor part of the citizen's responsibility.
A more recent approach towards citizenship which actually attempts to defy the territorial
and political confines of the nation state is the literature on ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’.
According to Baubock (2009:475), cosmopolitan citizenship refers to “duties of solidarity
that human beings have towards others across state borders and national identities
(Nussbaum 2000, Appiah 2006)”. The debate about global or cosmopolitan citizenship
echoes Roman teachings of Stoicism where “every person was thought of as born into
and hence a citizen of two republicae: a particular city-state and the greater cosmopolis.”
(Bowden, 2003:353) If these two loyalties conflict, Bowden states, “citizens’ duties to the
cosmopolis would always prevail” (Bowden, 2003:353).” Many questioned this loyalty to
the human race (as a global community) as impractical due to such simple factors as
distance. Hill (2000:66) quotes Henry Shue’s analogy to make this point,
I am the pebble and the world is the pond I have been dropped into. I am at the
centre of a system of concentric circles that become fainter as they spread .My
duties are exactly like the concentric ripples around the pebble; strongest at the
centre and rapidly diminishing toward the periphery .Any duties to those on the
far periphery are going to diminish to nothing, and given the limited resources
available to any ordinary person, her positive duties will barely reach beyond a
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second or third circle. We generally imagine our primary, secondary and tertiary
duties to others as ranked geographically.

In short, critics argue that distance regulates our reaction to fellow other human beings.
But enthusiasts like Nussbaum responded stating, “‘our task as citizens of the world will
then be to “draw the circles somehow toward the center”, making all human beings more
like our fellow city-dwellers’.” (Bowden, 2003:355). The literature on cosmopolitan
citizenship faced stiff resistance from the traditional schools of thought on citizenship
which posit that “the modern conceptions of citizenship are anchored in the world of the
bounded community.” (Linklater, 1998:23) Hence, “it loses its precise meaning when
divorced from territoriality, sovereignty and shared nationality.” (Linklater, 1998:23)

For civic republicans, cosmopolitan citizenship,
Not only fails to specify the concrete rights and duties which bind citizens in
relations of close cooperation within bounded communities, but at a deeper level,
it fails to engage them in any effective form of shared rule. (Linklater, 1998:27)

From their ethical vantage point, therefore, cosmopolitan citizenship is an oxymoron. In
a similar vein, Nyamnjoh (2007:74) comments that cosmopolitanism seems “confined to
rhetoric, making it difficult in reality to feel at home away from home.” He continued,
No amount of questioning by scholars, human rights advocates and immigrants
immersed in the reality of flexible mobility seems adequate to de-essentialize the
growing global fixation with an “authentic” place called home.”
Baubock (2009) has recently developed his ‘stakeholder theory’ on citizenship. He begins
by recognizing merits in the liberal social contract tradition stating,
In a world separated into distinct political communities, a recognized status of
membership in at least one of these communities is a general precondition for
individual autonomy and well-being. (Baubock, 2009:478)
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He quotes Hannah Arendt’s famous phrase that citizenship is ‘the right to have rights’
(Arendt 1967, p. 269).But there is more to citizenship by way of “active participation or
representation in the making of laws.” (Baubock, 2009:479) He then recommends what
the two criteria of qualifying individuals for citizenship. Individuals eligible for
citizenship should be those “who (a) depend on that community for long-term protection
of their basic rights.(dependency criterion) or (b) are or have been subjected to that
community’s political authorities for a significant period.” (Baubock, 2009:479) It is not
clear how Baubock’s definition of a stakeholder is far from the liberal narrative of
granting citizenship to people born in the country or to those who can be “naturalized”
over the course of time.

2.1.3 Re-scaling Citizenship: Cities and Globalization
According to Varasnyi (2006:231) “the etymology of the word ‘citizenship’ reveals its
urban origins: there is a clear connection, for instance, between the word citizen and the
word that we now translate in English as city-state.” Nevertheless, “throughout the
twentieth century the term ‘citizenship’ has been hegemonically associated with
membership in a national political community”. (Purcell, 2003:571) For Purcell, this
Liberal Democratic and Westphalian (LDW) version of citizenship is now being
‘destabilized’ owing to global transformations. He discusses

‘global economic

restructuring’ of the modern world where: a) finance and capital mobilization is
articulated on a supra-national level, b) the production of goods and services is globally
articulated, and c) the massive migration of both skilled and unskilled labor is taking
place at a global level.
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Politics is also being rescaled at both supra-national and sub-national levels. The famous
European Union experiment and the devolution of authority and resources to the local
tiers of political administration, Purcell argues, indicate that there is significant reduction
in the power of the nation-state. All of these processes affect the way citizenship is
defined. He argues, “state power is being displaced upward, downward and outward, and
the national scale state is losing its status as the dominant centre of political authority and
political sovereignty.” (Purcell, 2003:571) This means, “A citizenship regime in which all
citizenships flow from legal membership in a national-state scale is more open to
configuration.” (Purcell, 2003:571) This notion is widely shared by other authors like
Engin Isin (1997), Saskia Sassen(1996, 1998), Holsten and Appadurai(1996).
For Holsten and Appadurai(1996:189), globalization is driving “a deeper wedge between
national space and its urban centers”. They continue, “There are a growing number of
societies in which cities have a different relationship to global processes than the visions
and policies of their nation-states may admit or endorse (Holsten and Appadurai,
1996:189).” They argue the politics of London, Los Angeles, or Mogadishu is oddly
placed in the politics of the United Kingdom, America or of Somalia. Another way of
looking at how cities have become centers for new forms of citizenship is the disjuncture
between formal and substantive citizenship. Formal citizenship refers to “membership in
the nation-state and the substantive to the array of civil, political, socio-economic, and
cultural rights people possess and exercise.” (Holsten and Appadurai,1996:190). They
boldly state that “formal membership in the nation-state is increasingly neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for substantive citizenship” in the city.
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Faced with its diverse and global city constituents, the nation-state has vacillated between
policies that make “citizenship more exclusive” and others that make “citizenship more
inclusive.” (Holsten and Appadurai, 1996:190,191) Both approaches are not without
misgivings. In the first case, Holsten and Appadurai hold, “localism can generate
xenophobic violence.” (Holsten and Appadurai, 1996:191) But “the elimination of local
community as the ground of citizenship” also “tends to preclude active participation in
the business of rule” and replace the “civic ideal with a more passive sense of entitlement
to benefits.” (Holsten and Appadurai, 1996:191) Cities therefore represent the spatial and
political scale, where the “tired identity of formal, national citizenship” is unraveling.
(Holsten and Appadurai, 1996:195) Some like Isin(2002), are optimistic about this
process while many others are weary(Dagger, 1981). Isin(2002:312), for instance, argues,
The modern project of the nation state emphasized unity and sameness over
difference and diversity. The rise of multiculturalism as a political force is a sign
of the failure of that modernist project. The cities and regions of the future must
nurture difference and diversity through cultural pluralism.
Dagger (1981:721), on the other hand, laments that “the greater size of cities, their
political fragmentation, and the mobility of their citizens” have all contributed to the
“loss of civic memory” and active citizenship in today’s American cities. In its present
shape, Dagger argues, the city has not come “to be something more than a bewildering
agglomeration of streets and buildings and nameless faces”. These contestations on
identity, citizenship, and cities have often led to violence.

Holsten and

Appadurai(1996:200) concluded, “ If the city is a special site for such formations and
reformations of citizens, it can also be a special war zone, a space in which these
processes find expression in collective violence”. These may take forms of “urban
terrorism from the extreme right and left, racist attacks, Islamic bombings, gang
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shootings, death squads, riots, vandalism etc.”(Holsten and Appadurai, 1996:200) In
short, the global urbanization of violence shows that cities have now become the major
sites where forms of identity and citizenship are coming to close contacts and clashes.

2.2 The Right to the City
2.2.1 The Right to the City: A Cry and a Demand
The drive to comprehend such new relations between cities, identities and citizenship
have now led to the ‘discovery’ of Henry Lefebvre’s prominent theoretical works under
the rubric of the ‘right to the city’ literature. A French sociologist, Lefebvre first coined
the term ‘the right to the city’ in 1967 in his book “Le droit a’ la ville”. As he defines it:
The right to the city, complemented by the right to difference and the right to
information, should modify, concretize and make more practical the rights of
the citizen as an urban dweller (citadin) and user of multiple services. It would
affirm, on the one hand, the right of users to make known their ideas on the space
and time of their activities in the urban area; it would also cover the right to the
use of the center, a privileged place, instead of being dispersed and stuck into
ghettos (for workers, immigrants, the ‘marginal’ and even for the ‘privileged’).
(translated in Kofman and Lebas 1996: 34)

Le droit a’ la ville “describes the negative impact that the capitalist economy has on
cities, converting the city into a commodity serving only the interests of capital
accumulation.” (Mathivet, 2010:21) Gilbert and Phillips (2003:316) note that Lefebvre
was calling for a radical “re-appropriation of everyday life by social and political actions”
against forces of capital and state power in 1968 France. However Lefebvre’s
formulation of the right to the city has relevance to contemporary realities where
“processes of economic globalization increase, the same capitalist logic of development
persists and exacerbates the struggle for social and environmental justice in the city.”
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(Gilbert and Phillips, 2003:316) For Lefebvre, the right to the city is to be claimed
through the right to difference, which is “the right to claim, to struggle and to redefine the
relation between domination and appropriation.” (Gilbert and Phillips, 2003:317) In
short, Lefebvre proposes that “that inhabitants demand control over the construction of
urban spaces.” (Mathivet, 2010:21)

In his other book The Production of Space (1973) Lefebvre introduced three main ways
of understanding space i.e. “perceived, conceived and lived spaces.” Elden and Brenner
elaborated on this schema of Lefebvre stating that it unites “physical, mental and social
space”. Perceived spaces, that Lefebvre also calls ‘territorial practices’ and ‘territorial
representations’ include : “the physical, material spaces of state territory, from the
borders, fences, walls and barriers erected to mark its external limits.”(Brenner and Eden,
2009:365) Conceived spaces , whom he also calls ‘representations of territory’ refer to,
“a range of imagined senses of the body of a nation translated into political practice,
including maps and charts; abstract ways of representing territory cartography, and
otherwise diagrammatically.”(Brenner and Eden, 2009:365) Thirdly, lived spaces refer to
the individual and social experience of living through the physical and mental world of
spaces. For Purcell, lived space represents “the complex amalgamation of perceived and
conceived space. It is the everyday life of the city dweller.” (Purcell, 2003:577) Brenner
and Elden (2009:367) conclude,
The power of Lefebvre’s analysis is that he offers a way to think state, space, and
territory together; to conceptualize them through the relations between practices,
representations, and lived experience; to see them as historically interrelated
rather than determined; and to enable a powerful set of conceptual categories to
be utilized in grasping both their historical lineage and their contemporary
deployment.
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For Lefebvre, such political activism and struggle to re-appropriate and fashion the urban
space can only happen when a new form of city-zenship develops. He is quick to point
out that “the traditional and formal meanings of citizenship as the source of obligation (to
pay taxes, declare goods, and military service etc) offer a little more than the right to
vote.” (Gilbert and Phillips, 2003:319) However, he continues the activities of the
representative “will unlikely be controlled by the voters.” (Gilbert and Phillips,
2003:319) Hence, an implicit charge that the Liberal Democratic and Westphalian model
of democracy has actually marginalized and excluded most of the urban folks. In lieu,
Lefebvre recommends a new bundle of citizenship rights including “rights that have been
vulnerable to state and market domination: right to information, to expression, to culture,
to identity in difference (and equality), to self management (autogestion), and to the city.”
(Gilbert and Phillips .2003:319)

Fernandez (2007:207) summarizes this disjuncture

between the liberal contract narrative of rights and Lefebvre’s formulation stating,
If Rousseau distinguished between politics and the social pact, considering
politics to be a mere circumstantial effect of the ‘general will’ underlying the
social pact, Lefebvre proposed a contemporary formula for social citizenship,
expressing a ‘social project’ which requires a new political contract between the
state and citizens in order to reduce the gap between state and government, and
between the institutional power and the power of civil society.

2.2.2 Urban Citizenship: Re-qualified and Re-scaled
We have already discussed that Lefebvre’s formulation of the right to the city is a critique
of liberal democracy and its mechanisms of electoral representation. Mark Purcell makes
an interesting link between the ‘right to the city’ literature and the normative theories
about cities and citizenship. Purcell (2003:577) argues, “Lefebvre’s right to the city
model rests urban citizenship on inhabitance, instead of loyalty to the national-state
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scale.” For Purcell (2003:577), Lefebvre imagined that these inhabitants have “two
major rights: 1) the right to appropriate urban space, and 2) the right to participate
centrally in the production of urban space”.
The first bundle of rights are actually about the “the full and complete usage of the citythe right to live in, play in , work in , represent, characterize, and occupy urban space in a
particular city.”(Purcell, 2003:578) They are more about the “use value” of cities than
their “exchange value”. Purcell links this to Lefebvre expose of the city as an oeuvre i.e.
a human vocation, a piece of art fashioned and refashioned by its inhabitants. Secondly,
Purcell (2003:578) argues, the right to participate “implies the right to play a central role
in the decision making process in the production of the urban space”.

Such an

arrangement gives people the right to global cities where for instance an “Angeleno
dweller could be a formal citizen of Mexico, a citadin (citizen-denizen) of Los Angeles
and, not a formal citizen of the United States.” (Purcell, 2003:580) In short, Lefebvre requalifies citizenship (what it should substantively entail) and re-scales it as well (making
the urban as the most important scale of political practice.)
Baubock elaborates how Purcell’s notion of urban citizenship is different from formal
citizenship. Nation-states, he argues, “have three basic mechanisms for allocating
citizenship: ius soli (birth in the territory), ius sanguinis (descent from citizen parents)
and naturalization.” (Baubock, 2003:149) By contrast, Purcell’s formulation of a citadin
is automatically based on “ius domicili as the basic rule for allocating membership in the
city.” (Babcock, 2003:149) Such practices, Baubock argues, existed in the past where, for
instance, “In 1975 Sweden introduced the vote for all non-citizens after three years of
legal residence in local and regional elections and in referenda.” (Baubock, 2003:151)
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According to Baubock, all the Nordic countries have followed Sweden’s footsteps since
then. In Germany, Baubock adds, “the text of the Basic Law does not explicitly tie the
local franchise to citizenship.” But the German Constitutional Court (1990) “repealed
legislation in Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein that would have introduced voting rights
for non-citizens at the level of district election.” (Babcock, 2003:151)
While Purcell embraces the notion of ‘urban citizenship’-or rather citadinship-, he also
criticizes Lefebvre’s concept of an ‘inhabitant”. He argues, “To my mind, the key
weakness in Lefebvre’s concept is that he conflates his idea of ‘inhabitant’ with the
category ‘working class.’” (Purcell, 2002:106) Such formulation, for Purcell, narrows
down the political agenda of the ‘inhabitant’ within the confines of class struggle. For
Purcell, the “inhabitant” should be able to challenge “the racist city, the patriarchal city,
or the hetero-normative city, all of which confront inhabitants in their daily lives.”
(Purcell, 2002:106) But he is convinced that “the analytical and political power of the
idea of inhabitance” helps us understand “better how politics of identity and difference
will articulate with an urban politics of the inhabitant.” (Purcell, 2002:106)
Not everyone is enthusiastic about Purcell formulation of the right to the global city. For
instance, Varasanyi (2006:233) points out that much of the urban citizenship literature is
inspired by “changes taking place in the European Union”. The question is how
applicable would this literature be in the case of other regions of the world where a supranational integration project like the European Union is not underway? Secondly, she
points out that the practical application of the ‘urban citizenship’ literature is not looked
at. She (2006:234) posits, “In an extremely literal sense, where should boundaries be
drawn around the city?”, and “who belongs within (and is a citizen) and who is excluded
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of the city?” Baubock (2003:156) iterates the same issues stating, “There are reasons to
be skeptical towards the idea that urban citizenship could simply bypass the national level
and become a basis for building institutions of global democracy.”

Baubock(2003:156) also criticizes the ‘global city’ literature of nodes and international
networks between cities stating, “A network is not a polity; it is not a community sharing
its own institutions of government and common interests in a broad range of public
goods.” Even more, he stated, “The populations of New York, London and Tokyo may
have similar interests, but they do not have many common interests that would call for
bringing

them

together

under

a

single

government”.(Baubock,2003:156)

Plyushetva(2009:93) takes a different take on ‘the right to the city’ approach that its strict
adherence to the criteria of inhabitance could be counterproductive because, “there is
nothing to prevent those with political power and financial means to also shape the urban
space according to their needs.” Hence she recommends that the ‘right to the city’
approach can yield just outcomes when “only those claiming their core citizenship
rights.” (Plyushetva, 2009:93)

2.2.3 The Right to the City: Alterations and Confusions
The ‘right to the city’ literature is now a rallying point of grassroots organizations,
international coalitions and urban activists who struggle for social justice, inclusion and
equity in the city. For instance UNHABITAT organized a World Urban Forum on “Right
to the City” in 2010. Also, Habitat International Coalition (HIC) was a forerunner in
introducing the World Charter on the Right to the City. The Charter, Mathivet states, is
based on three fundamental axes. First comes, “The exercise of full citizenship, namely
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the realization of all human rights to ensure the collective well-being of inhabitants.”
(Mathivet, 2010:25) The second premise is “The democratic management of the city
through the direct participation of society in planning and governance.” (Mathivet,
2010:25) Thirdly, the Charter invokes “The social function of the city and of urban
property, with the collective good prevailing over individual property rights.” (Mathivet,
2010:25)

Recognizing that there are now “cities without citizens”, ‘right to the city’ now represents
“the struggle of invisible city dwellers that have been robbed of a space where they can
develop and live with dignity.” (Mathivet, 2010:25) Much of this struggle is against “the
ways that neo-liberalism and the privatization of land use have turned our cities over to
developers.” (Marcuse, 2010:87) Or in David Harvey’s (2003:941) words,
A few hedge funds, exercising their inalienable right to make a profit by
whatever means, rage around the world speculatively destroying whole
economies. They destroy our cities with their speculations, reanimate
them with their donations to the opera and the ballet while, like Kenneth
Lay of Enron fame, their CEOs strut the global stage and accumulate
massive wealth at the expense of millions.

For Harvey and others, this is clearly wrong and he concludes stating,
The creation of a new urban commons, a public sphere of active democratic
participation, requires that we roll back that huge wave of privatization that has
been the mantra of a destructive neo-liberalism. (Harvey, 2003:941)

Recently, however, there is a lot of excitement on the part of global policy makers ( such
as UNESCO, UNHABITAT etc) and international financiers( e.g. the World Bank);
narrating their own version of what they meant by right to the city. For Fawaz (2009:831)
these contemporary formulations dwell on a “normative framework of redistributive
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justice” significantly departing from “the way ‘the right to the city’ has been used by
theorists.” For instance, a recent UNESCO/UNHABITAT report adopted a very
minimalist definition of the right to the city. Interestingly, the document
(UNHABITAT/UNESCO, 2009:16) starts by defining what the right to the city is not,
instead of what it is. It continues arguing,
Claiming the right to the city does not confer specific rights (such as ‘city rights’
of the Middle Ages—to hold and receive income from the markets, tolls, and
taxes, or modern rights to specific urban services). Nor does it translate into
national claims to the urban level so that urban citizenship replaces or negates
national citizenship.
Instead, the report defines the right to the city as one that “enables all inhabitants and
communities—whether women or men, established residents or incomers—to access in
liberty and freedom the benefits of city life.” (UNHABITAT/UNESCO, 2009:36) It also
“confers responsibilities on city inhabitants to support (emphasis mine) governments in
facilitating those rights.” (UNHABITAT/UNESCO, 2009:36) One can easily tell that the
radical, participatory and empowering aspects of Lefebvre’s writings and his critical look
on the liberal democratic state are being watered down here. The right to the city is
applied only as a convenient lexicon (a buzz word for that matter) to mean having rights
in the city and considering the state as the guarantor of these rights.

Even more, the experiences of developing country cities are studied under the rubric of
the right to the city literature, “especially in Colombia and Brazil where more inclusive
and participatory processes of planning are invoking the ‘right to the city’ in their
formulation.” (Fawaz, 2009:832) Most of these studies are however “directed towards
reforming existing state models of governance thinking of strategies and legal
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frameworks that can render them more inclusive.” (Fawaz, 2009:832) According to
Earle(2010:8), “the diffusion of the term( right to the city) has led to a wide arrange of
definitions” and confusions too. At its most minimal, Earl continues, “The idea is
‘reduced to the right to be maintained in the city – that is, to be housed and serviced’”.
But “the original idea was far more transformative, calling for ‘a radical restructuring of
social, political, and economic relations, both in the city and beyond.” (Earle, 2010:8)

But still, there are many who approach the notion of rights and the city from a critical
angle. Carasco(2010) for instance writes that government control needs to be abated if
public spaces in the city are to be truly public. She (2010:3) argues,
It is naïve to believe that the government will cease their arbitrary prohibition of
speech as long as it continues to own physical public forums, for it has
persistently refused its management and use as communal space, and shows no
signs of intending to do so. ..If the right to the city is truly to become a right rather
than a privilege, if no one is to have the right to exclude –not even the
government-, then traditional public spaces must become communal space where
every individual conserves the right not [to] be excluded from the uses or benefits
of resources.
To conclude, Lefebvre’s work is undergoing a lot of mutation and transformation as it is
used to qualify different processes, policy actions and narratives by different actors in the
city. The following section, however, draws a clear conceptual distinction between the
right to the city literature and the older and much wider discussion about social justice in
the city. It shows that right to the city approach offers an alternative and a critique of the
traditional just city debate grounded mostly in the experience of western cities.
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2.3 Justice and the Right to the City
The limits of just and unjust are very difficult to set down; like the middle state
between health and illness, between the appropriateness and inappropriateness of
things, between the false and the true, is difficult to mark.
Voltaire
2.3.1 Liberalism and the Just City
There are many words that we leisurely use but are difficult to pin down or define.
Justice is one such term. A casual use of the word may entail positive connotations such
as ‘doing right’, ‘providing for the needy or the underdog’, ‘redressing inequality’,
‘punishing wrong doers’, and/or ‘ensuring public safety’. The issue of social justice
gained some traction in urban studies in the works of David Harvey, Manuel Castells,
Richard Senett, and lately, Susan Fainstein. Otherwise, much is not written about justice
per se. However, almost all theoretical perspectives about urban problems imply one or
another model of justice. So do their respective policy recommendations.
The oldest argument on urban injustices comes from the liberal tradition. Dreier,
Mollenkopf and Swanstrom’s Place Matters provides an epic summary of this tradition.
The liberal thesis begins by asserting that place (where we live in the city) “affects our
access to jobs and public services (especially education).” (Dreier et al, 2001:2) Hence
those who live in poor and dilapidated neighborhoods of the city get low quality
education and training opportunities; find it difficult to find decent jobs; to earn and save
adequate income for a living. For liberals, therefore, “rising inequality is the major
problem” of modern cities.” (Dreier et al, 2001:17) By way of remedies, most liberals
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posit a bundle of policy recommendations which can be grouped into three major themes:
a) reversing the suburban bias in urban development, b) ensuring human capital
development in the inner city, and c) attacking income poverty in a regional/metropolitan
fashion. In short, the liberal tradition considers the state as the major actor in alleviating
poverty and inequality, mainly through political, redistributive and remunerative
interventions organized at metropolitan levels.
One of the most elaborate liberal renditions on the just city comes from Susan Fainstein
(2010). In her book, Fainstein (2010:23) speaks of three major concepts underpinning
social justice in the city. These are “1) democratic processes and just outcomes, 2) the
criterion of equity, and 3) the criterion of recognition”. That democracy comes at the
forefront of the discussion about justice is not surprising. We assume that one major form
of addressing issues of representation, participation and decision making in cities is via
democracy. In fact, the quest for urban justice often comes as a quest for democracy.
According to Fainstein (2010:24),
Demands for transparency, inclusion, and negotiation in public decisions were a
reaction to the top-down, technocratic approach underlying governmental
programs such as urban renewal, exclusionary zoning, and placement of toxicproducing facilities.
In short, the place and role of democratic governance is one major issue around which the
concept of the just city model revolves.
Nevertheless, assuming that democratic participation would in itself redress injustice
would be so simplistic and wrong. In fact, some of the world’s most unequal societies
are democracies (e.g. India, Brazil, USA, South Africa etc.). So are their cities (e.g. New
Delhi, Rio di Janiero, New York, Johannesburg etc.). Hence, the theory of deliberative
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democracy or its planning derivative, communicative planning theory, have profound
weakness in assuming that “reasoned discussion will produce just outcomes.”
(Fainstein,2010:29) Unless the social and economic roots of inequality are tackled, as
Fainstein(2010:30) argues, “democracy and justice are frequently at odds in unequal
society.” Secondly, there are instances where just economic outcomes resulted from
democracies which were not very deliberative. Fainstein(2010:34)mentions of instances
“like the European welfare states and the New Deal where major reforms were
introduced without the direct participation of the public”. In short, democratic processes
should yield equitable outcomes. Otherwise they become nominal exercises i.e. matters
of form than substance.
Equity, for Fainstein(2010: 36), entails “the distribution of both material and

non-

material benefits derived from public policy that does not favor those who are already
better off at the beginning.” She continues (2010: 36) to point out that pro-equity
regimes look at urban development programs and “ask: a) who benefits from them, b)
and to what extent?” So equity does not only imply distribution of benefits but doing so
on a vertical axis (from the ‘haves’ to the ‘have nots’). Here Fainstein(2010:37) draws a
line between her liberal version of justice to the utilitarian view of “the greatest happiness
of the greatest number.” She criticized utilitarianism for “it does not ask how the sum of
satisfactions is distributed among individuals” (2010:37).
Thirdly, the notion of justice in the city would have to deal with diversity. Fainstein (a la
Nancy Fraser) points out that much of urban politics is about ‘recognition’ as much as it
is about ‘distribution’. In fact, the liberal tradition of urban justice comes under fire from
post-structuralists for its ‘liberal atomism’ and ‘economism’. The critiques of liberalism
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uphold that “recollections of persecution of one group by another based on race,
nationality, gender will not simply go away because of economic equality.” (Fainstein,
2010:45) While the post-structural emphasis on ‘other’ forms of injustice rather than
economic inequality is noteworthy; its recommendations for a just city are not clearly
pronounced. In fact in some of its versions, post-structuralism may lead to “essentialism,
unproductive conflict, and new forms of oppression rather than to mutual respect.”
(Fainstein, 2010:47)
To sum up, Fainstein holds that a just city has to deal with issues of democratic
participation and decision making; economic empowerment and distribution; cultural
tolerance and cosmopolitanism. It is quite difficult to arrive at an optimal mix of all these
orientations and map out what a just city would like, mainly because of the
interrelatedness of the concepts themselves. Democracies may bestow greater liberties on
citizens without addressing inequality. Or we may have undemocratic regimes generating
growth and tackling poverty without recognizing citizens’ basic human, political or civil
rights (e.g. a Chinese city would be an ideal example here).
2.3.2 Neo Liberalism and Urban Justice
Beginning from the late 1970s, the idea of alleviating poverty and inequality through
government interventions began to lose luster. The critique of that argument developed
within the rubric of neo-liberalism. Boudreau et al state that “Historically, neo-liberalism
was a reaction to both the widely experienced authoritarian practices of the mid 20th
century and the Keynesian-fordist regime of accumulation.” (Boudreau et al, 2009:24)
The authors continue that the person who “most visibly symbolized these policies was
NYC mayor Rudy Guliani.” (Boudreau et al, 2009:23) Fred Siegel’s The Prince is a
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narrative of Giuliani’s neo-liberal reforms in the city of New York. For Siegel, New York
City’s problem was not its concentrated poverty, and staggering inequality. Instead it was
the city government itself.
Siegel argues, “Between a unionized work force, rapidly expanding social services and
the need for public work projects, the city was forced repeatedly to raise taxes and
borrow.” (Siegel, 2005:7) Giuliani’s reforms, therefore, aimed at downsizing
government. Among other things, he decided, 1) to cut the size of government, 2) to cut
taxes to attract jobs, 3) to consolidate or eliminate city departments and introduce
competition with the delivery of services, and 4) to work with the State Legislature that
the city gets a fair share of state revenue. (Siegel, 2005:24). And on social issues like
crime, work and education, Giuliani’s neo-liberal reforms departed from the older liberal
efforts.
About education, Giuiliani said,

“Let us be honest. Money has become the biggest

dodge for explaining the failure of our school system. It is almost a mantra: If we only
had more money.” (Siegel, 2005:116) He also cut welfare spending stating, “Welfare
drained the city of not only money but also social capital. It robbed people of dignity and
hope all of which can be found in a job.” (Siegel, 2005:153) On crime, Giuliani argued
that, “Government couldn’t serve the substitute for the family in instilling the values of
citizenship.” (Siegel, 2005:142) However, he increased policing expenses and adopted
stringent “broken windows” policing “which took seriously neighborhood complaints
about the disorder created by the so called victimless crimes.” (Siegel, 2005:143)
Were neo-liberal reforms antidotes to the economic and social crisis of cities? Many
would reply with an emphatic no! Boudreau et al argue (2009:25),
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The process of neo-liberalization has entailed much creative destruction not only
of prior institutional frameworks and powers but also of division of labor, social
relations, welfare provisions, and technological mixes, ways of life and thought,
reproductive activities, attachments to the land, and habits of the heart.
They narrate Toronto’s experiments under “an uncompromising neoliberal PC premier of
Ontario, Mike Harris.” (Boudreau et al, 2009:54) Harris’s government introduced
stringent neo-liberal reforms under the motto, “common sense revolution”. The
‘revolution’ (Boudreau et al, 2009:59) introduced reforms which:
1)resulted drastic welfare cuts, 2)targeted squeegee kids and panhandlers, 3)
eliminated public housing programs, 4) attacked public work unions, 5)
dismantled and underfunded the education system and civil society
organizations, 6)reduced and redesigned local governments, 7) amalgamated
hundreds of local governments, and 8) loosened planning restrictions.
True to their Canadian inklings, the authors concluded, “Welfare cuts, no public housing,
and lower labor standards all mean Canada is being Americanized.”(Boudreau et al,
2009:63)
Going back to Fainstein’s just city model, it seems neo-liberalism was a disaster in all the
three criteria she listed i.e. democracy, equity and diversity. The elimination and
amalgamation of local governments, as well as the lay off and restructuring of thousands
of government workers implies that representation, participation and local decision
making powers were under assault. Power was relinquished to the upper most echelons of
power and class. Hence, these neo-liberal reforms undermined democratic ideals.
Welfare, housing and education cuts all mean that neo-liberal reforms have actually
increased inequality within cities. In the name of generating growth and self-reliance, the
poor became victims stripped of the little support they used to receive from their city
governments.
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Diversity has not been directly undermined but it now has ‘perverse’ market logic to it.
Boudreau et al (2009:91) write, “In the context of neoliberal market regulated everyday
life, cultural differences are being commodified. Multiculturalism is reduced to the
celebration of ethnic foods.” It cannot however continue as a “as a good-weather motto
for a multiethnic metropolis” in cities like Toronto which are now sharply
“geographically and socioeconomically divided along class and racialized lines.”
(Boudreau et al, 2009:98) Boudreau et al are right in pointing to us that the problem is not
ethnicity or color per se, but the problem is definitely colored.
2.3.3

Urban Justice and Progressive Alternatives

Just as the old liberal tradition of direct and increased government action to welfare and
redistribution was challenged by the neo-liberals, the neo-liberals now come under fire
from progressives who challenge the normative, political and policy orientation of neoliberalism. Imbroscio(2010:1), for instance, states,
Over the past two decades two related but distinct orthodoxies have taken hold
within the academic study or urban America. Both are grounded in elements of
philosophical liberalism. And both are deeply misguided.
First comes, urban regime theory, which holds that “the local state is left too weak to
accomplish the complex policy tasks required to govern the city effectively. Therefore
local public officials need to form governing coalitions with private capital”. (Imbroscio,
2010:3) It is these coalitions that Stone calls regimes. Imbroscio calls the next tradition
liberal expansionism i.e. the argument that “the social and economic problems of the
inner cities can only be solved by “crossing the city line” or playing the outside game”.
(Imbroscio, 2010:5) Imbroscio criticizes Stone’s taxonomy of regimes as limited and
based only on the assumption of a public-private divide of political and policy spheres.
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In lieu, he recommends alternative regimes where: a) local states can be accumulators, b)
communities can be accumulators, and c) small scale entrepreneurs can be accumulators.
Liberal expansionism did not escape his piercing criticisms either. (Imbroscio, 2010:2333) Among others, Imbroscio argues neo-liberal reforms rarely explain why inner city
and community focused development interventions ‘failed’; rather they conclude failure.
Secondly, arguing that there is nothing to build in the inner cities and poor minority
neighborhoods smacks of elitism( that Imbroscio calls liberal condescension) and
reminds one of Oscar Lewis’s infamous “ culture of poverty” thesis. Neither did suburbs
and edge cities effectively solve problems of poverty and inequality. Hence the liberal
rush towards regionalism and the urge to disperse poor people from inner nods of
concentrated poverty, for Imbroscio, is misguided.
Imbroscio(2010:43-47)

recommends

Local

Economic

Alternative

Development

Strategies (LEADS) which, he states, should have the following “building blocks”. First
is “community economic stability”- a condition where localities possess job
opportunities. Second is “public balance sheets” that tally the social costs and benefits of
private sector development and disinvestment decisions. Third, comes “asset
specificities” i.e. the need to emphasize the “importance of capital immobility for vibrant
local economic development.” Last but not least is what Imbroscio dubs “economic
localism”. In short, Imbroscio’s alternative development strategies encourage generating
capital which is immobile enough to sustain and benefit local communities.
Here again, one would question how organic, egalitarian and united communities are to
advance economies of scale and to survive and thrive in highly competitive, corporate
capitalist economy. It also remains to be seen whether such endeavors will be democratic
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and inclusive or institutions of patronage, corruption and nepotism by the powerful few.
Last but not the least, one would wonder how ‘local’ is local in todays global and
interconnected financial and real economy. While the normative and political appeals of
these alternatives are tempting; their feasibility falls under a big question mark. Wouldn’t
such pragmatism be a reason why all liberals have now become Petersonians?
2.4

Beyond the Just City: Right to the City
We have moved into an era where we are called upon to raise certain basic
questions about the whole society. We are still called upon to give aid to the
beggar who finds himself in misery and agony on life’s highway. But one day,
we must ask the question of whether an edifice which produces beggars must
not be restructured and refurbished. That is where are now.
Martin L King (1968)

Where would Lefebvre’s right to the city approach be placed given the previous
discussions about urban in/justice and its liberal, neo-liberal and progressive readings?
Lefebvre’s tradition is a critique of the liberal outline of urban justice very much in the
line of political economists such as David Harvey. Critiquing Fainstein’s outline of just
city (comprising tenets of democracy, equity, and diversity); Harvey and Potter (2009:40)
state that “ideals of justice and practices of political power have marched along very
much hand in hand!” So this project of developing ideal types of a just city ignores the
economic and socio-political context within which injustice itself emerges, develops and
is instrumentalized.
For example, what qualifies for injustice in a slave owning or feudal society is very much
different from injustice in a modern industrial capitalist society. So shall vary the types of
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justice that the oppressed, marginalized or exploited in each of these societies seek from
the establishment. Harvey and Potter (2009:41) underscore, “the difficulty with all
idealist specifications of rights and justice, including Fainstein’s Just City, is that they
hide this connection.” This is more so for John Rawl’s famous theory of justice where he
“constructs a “veil of ignorance” concerning the position we might occupy in the social
order and asks how we would specify a just distribution in the light of that
ignorance.”(Harvey and Potter, 2009:41) In reality, however, no individual or group in
society wears a veil of ignorance when experiencing injustice and when it demands
redress. And it is that demand for redress; that uprising against the legal, economic as
well as political scaffoldings of the neo-liberal state that Lefebvre defines the right to the
city. According to Mustafa Dikec(2009:74)
The right to the city “does not imply a ‘clean’ and quaint city where the “good
citizens” mingle on its streets, crowding its beautiful parks, and living there
happily ever after. As Lefebvre (1996:195) argues, it does not abolish
confrontations and struggles. On the contrary!
Furthermore, Lefebvre states, “The right to the city cannot be considered a simple
visiting right or a return to the traditional city.” (Dikec, 2009:75) Dikec(2009:75) brings
our attention to Kant’s formulation of the stranger in Perpetual Peace, where Kant
argues, “ There is no room for the stranger to claim a right, but simply to enjoy a right to
visit or pass through.” Lefebvre is arguing exactly the opposite! He is arguing that both
residents and strangers in the city should have active political rights to access and
appropriate urban space; participate in the decision making process about its
management; and make or remake it after their hearts’ desire! The right to the city
approach, therefore, goes beyond calls for a just city. According to Dikec (2009:76),
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The right to the city, therefore, is not simply a participatory right but, more
importantly, an enabling right, to be defined and refined through political
struggle. It is not only a right to urban space, but to a political space as well,
constituting the city as a space of politics. Urban citizenship, in this sense, does
not refer to a legal status, but to a form of identification with the city, to a political
identity.
In the words of Peter Marcuse(2009:246), the Just City approach “is an important
concept that leads in new and much needed directions for thinking and acting on urban
problems”, but it should “be expanded to develop and achieve what the Right to the City
calls for: the right to full, free, creative life for all.”
On her part, Fainstein fires back at the Marxist critique of justice as “the ideologized,
glorified expression of the existing economic relations.” (2010:40) She quotes Geras to
assert that “First, Marx’s characterization of capitalism as robbery is itself about justice.
His critique of capitalism is in the name of justice. His concern is for distributive justice.”
(Fainstein, 2010:41) She adds that the discomfort of Marxist positivists for a normative
perspective of justice in capitalist society is obvious. For them, justice can only be
realized when private property ownership is totally abolished and when the ‘exploitation’
of one human being by another stops. This very argument, Fainstein responds, is itself
highly normative and value laden. It could be a ‘desirable’ state of affair, but not
‘feasible’ in the present order of things. Harvey and Potter (2009:46) interject here
arguing, “This is precisely the point at which Fainstein’s conception of the Just City
falters. From the start it delimits its scope to acting within the existing capitalist regime of
rights and freedoms.”
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Overview
This chapter discusses the rationale behind a qualitative case study. It begins by
explaining the reasons why the city of Nairobi is selected to study the case of Ethiopian
urban refugees. It then revises the major research questions of the research followed by
specific research questions posed during the data collection process. The third section
provides an overview of qualitative research methodology justifying why I found it more
suitable to answer the above mentioned research questions. The following sections offer
brief discussions about the case study design; the data collection instruments, as well as
the sampling techniques and procedures that were used in the field.
In a nut shell, I took the case of Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi (Kenya) mainly because
Nairobi boasts the highest concentration of urban refugees in Africa from neighboring
countries like Ethiopia. It therefore offered an ideal context to explore state-refugee
relations in greater detail. I also chose qualitative methodology since it allows capturing
processes of state-refugee relations in ways which elicit the meanings that respondents
(informants of the study) attach with these processes. It also provided a range of data
collection techniques which complement each other such as, a) observation, b) analyzing
texts and documents, c) interviews, and d) recording and transcribing.
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I decided to conduct case study for the design is favorable to conduct empirical inquiry
on “a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context.” (Yin, 1984:23) As far as
sampling is concerned I used the urban refugees list of Kenya’s prominent nonprofit
organization, Refugee Coalition of Kenya (RCK), to screen, select and approach thirty
(30) refugee respondents. This total sample size was apportioned evenly between three
different neighborhoods (“wards” in technical parlance) that have the highest
concentration of urban refugees in Nairobi. Accordingly, five men and women were
interviewed from each ward. Their informed consent was solicited and their personal
details are completely anonymized to maintain confidentiality. When it comes to Kenyan
government officials and civil society leaders, I used snowball sampling where my
contacts recommended a group of stakeholders or key informants I should reach out and
interview on the field. Accordingly a total of twenty (20) respondents were interviewed
from line government bureaus, local and international organizations that work on urban
refugee issues.
Interviews proved to be very useful and exciting data collection instruments for the
following reasons. First, they aptly captured, described and discussed the respondent’s
own ideas, opinions and experiences. Second, they offered flexibility where I was able to
rearrange the order of questions or issues to be discussed impromptu while interviewing
an informant and probe for more information. Last but not least, the interviews generated
more valid accounts since I could observe the gestures, tones and reactions of informants
in situ through face to face interaction with refugees.
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3.1 Site Selection: Why Nairobi? Why Ethiopian Refugees?
I have already indicated that internal conflicts in African countries result a massive flight
of civilians from war torn countries into neighboring countries and cities.

East Africa

has seen its share of violence and instability. For almost 30 years civil war was raging in
Ethiopia where hundreds and thousands of refugees fled to neighboring Kenya until 1991.
Later in 1999, Ethiopia and Eritrea started a border war which lasted until 2000 and saw
the massive flight and eviction of both Eritreans and Ethiopians from the respective
countries. A significant number of these refugees fled to Nairobi too. Somalia’s state
collapse since 1991 made it the highest most contributor of refugees in the region. Also
the civil war between North and South Sudan produced thousands of refugees some of
whom fled south to Kenya. The situation is so dire that a recent report on the refugee
crisis in the Horn of Africa indicated that “there are a total of 824,000 refugees and some
3.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the East and Horn of Africa.” (UNHCR,
2010:7)
It is important to note that the only stable country in East Africa has been Kenya which
hosted refugees from the region. Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya, has also become one
major recipient of refugees from neighboring countries. Today the city of Nairobi boasts
one of the biggest (if not the biggest) number of urban refugees in East Africa. According
to Pavanelo et al(2010:7), “official figures suggest there are around 46,000 refugees in
Nairobi (UNHCR 2010), however unofficial estimates are nearer 100,000.” Not only the
sheer size but also the diversity of Nairobi’s urban refugees is striking. The same authors
report that “Official and anecdotal information indicates that the Somali population is the
largest followed by Ethiopians, Congolese, Sudanese, Ugandan and Rwandese, while
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smaller refugee groups residing in Nairobi include those from Eritrea and Burundi.”
(UNHCR, 2010:7)

Ethiopians comprise the second largest nationality of urban refugees in Nairobi following
Somalis. According to UNHCR, “12,257 refugees and asylum seekers of Ethiopian origin
have taken up residence in Nairobi.” (UNHCR, 2009b) Despite the magnitude of urban
refugee inflow and the socio-economic and political dynamics they create in African
cities, very little research is conducted about them. (Sienkiewicz, 2007, Campbell, 2006,
Kibreab, 2003, Jacobsen, 2002, Pavanello et al, 2010) Even more, no study has thus far
been conducted on Ethiopian urban refugees in Nairobi. This study aims to close that gap.

3.2 Major and Specific Research Questions
I have already discussed the major research questions of this study under section 1.3.
However it is imperative to reiterate them here and flesh out the more specific research
questions. These specific research questions were very useful starting points to develop
the data collection instruments i.e. the in-depth and key informant interview formats.
Table 2 illustrates them in more detail.
Table 2 List of Specific Research Questions

I. How do refugees negotiate aspects of urban citizenship in the city of Nairobi?
a. How do Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi relate to the Kenyan state, and its law
enforcement agencies and departments?
b. How do Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi and their Kenyan counterparts understand,
60

qualify and explain their status of inhabitance in Nairobi?
c. Are Ethiopian refugees engaged in economic activities and the mobilization of
capital? What are these businesses? How are they established? What do they
make and sell?
d. How do these enterprises marshal the capital, skilled labor and networks from the
Ethiopian refugee community? And how do these institutions impact both
refugees and the host community?
e. What type of religious, educational and other cultural institutions are initiated and
organized by Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi? How do these institutions impact
both refugees and the host community?
II. How adequate is the ‘right to the city’ approach to explain the everyday struggle
of Ethiopian urban refugees for rights and resources in the city of Nairobi?
a. What are the bundles of political rights that urban refugees in Nairobi enjoy?
And how do these differ from the rights of citizens and legal immigrants?
b. What are the bundles of economic rights that urban refugees in Nairobi enjoy?
And how do these differ from the rights of citizens and legal immigrants?
c. Do urban refugees have the right to live in and use urban public spaces in
Nairobi? If so, how? If not, why not?
d. Do urban refugees have the right to participate centrally in the production of
urban space? If so, how? If not, why not?
e. How far can the urban citizenship literature on western cities (aiming at the
inclusion and participation of immigrants and strangers) explain the situation of
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urban refugees in nonwestern cities?
III. What kind of urban policy measures can African cities take to manage
displacement driven urbanization and use it as a positive force for social change?
a. What are the laws and policies of the Government of Kenya (GoK) as well as
the city of Nairobi regarding urban refugees? What are the pros and cons of these
national and local policy instruments?
b. What kinds of policy recommendations could be made to improve the
provisions as well as the implementation of these policies?

3.3 Qualitative Research Methodology: Overview
Silverman (2001:11) provides a good summary of what qualitative research methods
include. They involve: “1) observation, 2) analyzing texts and documents, 3) interviews,
and 4) recording and transcribing.” These methods can be combined or used in different
contexts. For instance, while in-depth interviews entail an individual informant, focus
group discussions involve multiple participants being interviewed and discussing an issue
determined by the researcher. There are two major reasons why a qualitative case study
became appropriate for this research. These are: a) the epistemological assumptions
underlying qualitative studies and b) the relative strength (instrumental validity) of
qualitative research methods to answer the research questions better than quantitative
methods. (See section 3.4)
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The dominant epistemological stance that underpins the use of rigorous quantitative
methods (like surveys) is positivism; an assertion that reality has an independent,
objective existence outside the observer and is ready to be discovered, aggregated and
studied.

The qualitative research tradition, on the other hand, is founded on

interpretivism; an assertion that “reality and meaning are constructed from the actions
and reactions of society’s constituent members, the individuals.” (Bryman, 2004:17)
Positivists assume that “a) the world is independent of and unaffected by the researcher,
b) facts and values are distinct, and c) observations are the final arbiter in theoretical
disputes.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:16) Interpretivists, on the other hand, argue that “a)
the researcher and the social world impact each other, b) facts and values are not distinct,
and c) the methods of natural sciences are not appropriate because the social world is not
governed by law-like regularities.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:17) It is this interpretivist
tradition of qualitative methods that makes them more amenable for this particular study.
Creswell (1994) provides some basic assumptions of a qualitative research design. As
was stated above, qualitative research is concerned primarily with “process-rather than
outcomes or products.” (Creswell, 1994:145) Similarly, I intend to capture how Ethiopian
urban refugees are negotiating urban places and urban spaces in the case of Nairobi, the
city with largest number of refugees in east Africa. Secondly, Creswell points out that
qualitative research is usually interested in “meaning-how people make sense of their
lives, experiences and their structures of the world.” (Creswell, 1994:145) In a similar
vein, this study does not hypothesize about the experiences of urban refugees in Africa
per se. Rather it aims to explore the urban refugees’ own reflection of their experience.
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Thirdly, qualitative research involves “fieldwork where the researcher physically goes to
people, setting, site or institution to observe or record behavior in its natural setting.”
(Creswell, 1994:145) Accordingly, I travelled to Nairobi and conducted fieldwork from
the 14th of July 2012 to the 11th of October, 2012. Last but not least, qualitative research
is “inductive where the researcher builds abstractions, concepts, hypotheses, and theories
from details” (Creswell, 1994:145). Glaser and Strauss (1967) named this process
analytical induction where concepts and theoretical categories emerge from the data
itself.
3.4 The Case Study Design
Yin (1984:13) argues that our choice of a research design is very much dependent on
three important factors, namely “1) the type of research question posed, 2) the extent of
control an investigator has over actual behavioral events, and 3) the degree of focus on
contemporary as opposed to historical events.” For instance, experiments are amenable to
“how” and “why” kind of questions; but they require control over behavioral events; and
also focus on contemporary events. On the other hand, case studies are amenable to
“how” and “why” research questions; they do not require control over behavioral events;
and usually focus on contemporary issues or events. Yin (1984:23) defines the case study
design as follows,
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real life context; when the boundaries between the context
and the phenomenon are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of
evidence are used.
The case study design involves “systematically gathering enough information about a
particular person, social setting, event or a group to permit the researcher to effectively
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understand how it operates or functions.” (Berg, 2001:225) There is therefore ample
latitude as to what counts for a “case” in a case study design. For this study, I gathered
information on a particular group of people i.e. Ethiopian urban refugees in the city of
Nairobi.

Case studies can also be broader or narrower in terms of their scope of analysis. For
example, the researcher “may confine his or her examination to a single aspect of an
individual’s life (say medical records)” or “assess the social life of an individual and
their entire background, experiences, roles and motivations.” (Berg, 2001:225) In this
case, the study has a much broader scope exploring such matters as 1) state-refugee
relations, 2) the social networks of Ethiopian urban refugees, 3) business and economic
activities of the refugees in Nairobi and, 4) the various policy regimes on state-refugee
relations in Kenya. A caveat is important here. Case study is “not actually a datagathering technique, but a methodological approach that incorporates a number of data
gathering techniques.” (Berg, 2001:225)

According to Berg (2001:229), case studies can be classified into three different types
namely “intrinsic, instrumental and collective case studies.” Intrinsic case studies are
undertaken when the “researcher wants to better understand a particular case.” (Berg,
2001:229) It is conducted when the unit of analysis portrays some “particular trait,
characteristic or problem” which was not explored before. Instrumental case studies, on
the other hand, are conducted “to provide insights into an issue or refine a theoretical
explanation.” (Berg, 2001:229) In situations like this, a case study is only considered as
supporting evidence, or “a background against which the actual research interests will
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play out.” (Berg, 2001:229) The third type is collective case studies where several
instrumental cases are selected “to allow better understanding or perhaps enhance the
ability to theorize about a broader context.” (Berg, 2001:229)

Looking at this classification of case studies, this particular study is an instrumental case
study which aims to contribute to a better theorizing of the right to the city approach. It
aims to do so by investigating the particular conditions of urban refugees, who are
neither in camps nor living as legal immigrants of an African city. It is trying to illustrate
whether the right to the city literature can be expanded or developed to incorporate the
case of non-western urban experiences. The study is not intrinsic since I am not looking
at the case of urban refugees for its own purpose but as a case to think about theory.
Neither am I conducting multiple case studies to better explain a theoretical argument.
Hence it is not a collective case study.

Case studies have their own limitations. Silverman (2001) points out one major
shortcoming of qualitative methods including the case study approach. Researchers
“seldom provide the criteria or grounds for including certain instances and not others. As
a result, it is difficult to determine the typicality or representativeness of instances and
findings.” (Silverman, 2001:222) Secondly, there is “the common concern about case
studies that they provide little basis for scientific generalization.” (Yin, 1984:21) Thirdly,
many argue that case studies “take too long and result in massive, unreadable
documents.” (Yin, 1984:21) But each of these limitations or concerns about case study
methods can be addressed in ways that boost the internal validity of the case study
design. I took the following measures to avoid these pitfalls.
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As far as sampling is concerned, section 3.5 stipulates the sampling techniques, frames
and procedures of the study. It elaborates on how respondents are selected in ways
commensurate with the research objectives and questions. This can help address the risk
of “anecdotalism” or “cherry picking” that skeptics of qualitative research techniques are
quick to point out. Secondly, I stress that “case studies, like experiments, are
generalizable to theoretical propositions than to populations or the universe.” (Yin,
1984:21) In other words, the researcher’s goal in a case study design is “to expand and
generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical
generalization).” (Yin, 1984:21)

Thirdly, the qualitative data could be organized into a coherently descriptive and tightly
analytical frame if the analysis does not lose sight and track of the basic research
questions the study set out to answer. As such, the major research questions are the
overarching thematic umbrellas under which the bulk of the interviews are coded,
discussed and analyzed. Such thematic analysis is complemented by a comparative
analysis of patterns tracing and matching across groups (e.g. Kenyans versus Ethiopians,
female versus male urban refugees, officials versus refugees, NGO representatives
versus government officials etc.)
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3.5 Data Collection Techniques
3.5.1 Semi-structured Interviews
I interviewed a total of thirty (30) urban refugees in Nairobi. Creswell (1994:151)
defines interviews as “face-to-face or one-on-one interaction” between an informant and
an interviewer. Interviews are very useful “ a) when informants cannot be directly
observed; b) when the information collected can provide historical information and c)
when the researcher wants greater ‘control’ over the line of questioning”. (Cresswell,
1994:151) Usually the interviewer would have a checklist of interview topics or a
structured outline of questions that help him or her conduct the interview. Semi
Structured interviews refer to those interview formats which use such guidelines.
Despite their advantages, interviews can also be limiting because they usually provide,
“a) “indirect” information filtered through the views of the interviewees, and b)
information in a designated ‘place’, rather than the natural field setting.” (Creswell,
1994:151) The researcher’s presence in the field setting may also bias responses.
Despite the limitations mentioned above, there are three major reasons why semi
structured interviews were useful for this data collection purpose. First, semi structured
interviews capture, describe and discuss the respondent’s own ideas, opinions and
experiences. They provide a “deeper understanding of social phenomena than what
would

be

obtained

from

purely

quantitative

data.”

(Silverman,

2000:89)

Bryman(2004:320) states that the emphasis in interviews is on “how the interviewee
frames and understands issues and events-that is what the interviewee views as
important in explaining and understanding events, patterns, and forms of behavior.” This
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merit makes interviews more useful to understand city-refugee interactions in Nairobi
compared to structured surveys where response categories are strictly coded.
Secondly, the interview process is flexible. It is possible to rearrange the order of
questions or issues to be discussed impromptu while interviewing an informant. The
researcher can probe for more information or ask clarifications from the respondent.
There also is the chance to observe people’s facial expressions and gestures while
conducting the interview. This flexibility enables the interviewer to have “greater
control over the environment.” (Sarantakos, 1998:266) This applies to almost all
qualitative data collection techniques where, “the researcher is the primary instrument of
data collection.” (Creswell, 1994:145) Data is “mediated through this human instrument,
rather than through inventories, questionnaires, or machines.” (Creswell, 1994:145)

Thirdly, conducting semi structured interviews is instrumental since it reflects the
theoretical position of this study. It involves looking at “actual patterns of social
interaction not just verbalized reports or post hoc traces of interaction.”(Bulmer,
1984:210) Interviews are verbalized reports but the researcher can observe and study
patterns of social interaction in situ through a face to face interaction with refugees.
Hence interviews are “subtle and negotiable social encounters” between the researcher
and respondents, which offer much more insights than, for instance, questionnaires.
(Bulmer, 1984: 211)

One challenge in conducting interviews, or any qualitative research, is the insideroutsider dichotomy between the researcher and the ‘researched’, which is characterized
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by unequal power relations between the two. Often communities view the researcher as
an outsider and more powerful individual. Accordingly, people sanction their actions,
opinions, and feelings while interacting with this inquisitive outsider. Sideaway
(1992:403) argues in this line stating, “So often in journeys to the Third World, we move
towards the top of a social hierarchy in a society that we often do not well understand,
and the results can be problematic”. This outsider-insider divide can only be bridged if
the researcher takes time to stay in the community, takes part in their daily activities, and
manages to establish good rapport. To this end, the researcher spent a total of 12 weeks
in Nairobi.

However, it is difficult to completely do away with this unequal relation between
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (or between the ‘researchers’ and the ‘researched’) despite
efforts to break the barriers. In my opinion, it is impossible to realize what is called ‘total
immersion’ in any research context. What a researcher can do is to be ‘reflexive’ and
admit that his or her knowledge and analysis of the research process cannot be complete
and objective but “partial” and “situated.” (Mauthner and Doucet 2003) Linda McDowell
(in Rose, 1997:1) argues in this line stating that “we must recognize and take account of
our position, as well as that of our research participants, and write this into our research
practice.”
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3.5.2Key informant interviews
In addition to in-depth interviews with refugees, the researcher also conducted key
informant interviews with representatives of three major groups. First were Kenyan
government officials in: a) the Province and City Hall of Nairobi, and b) the Ward
managers of Kilimani, Eastleigh North and Eastleigh South regions. The total number of
Kenyan officials interviewed was seven (7).
Secondly, the researcher conducted key informant interviews with representatives of both
local (Kenyan) and international NGOs who work on the issue of urban refugees in
general and Ethiopian refugees, in particular. The third group of key informant
interviewees was officers in the UNHCR and the International Organization for
Migration (IOM). Both of these organizations are actively involved in processing the
documentation, support, immigration and naturalization process of urban refugees in
Nairobi. I conducted a total of 7 key informant interviews among these two groups.
Finally, the researcher conducted six (6) key informant interviews with Ethiopian
community leaders who are active in religious, civic or community associations. This
brought the total number of key informant interviews conducted to twenty (20)
individuals. Table 3 provides a summary of the key informants sampled and interviewed.
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Table 3 Sample Matrix for Key Informant Interviews
Sample Categories

No.

1

2

Kenyan

Civil

Government

and

Officials

NGO leaders

Organizations

Community
Leaders

Nairobi Province Danish Refugee UNHCR

Elders

Administration

(3 informants)

Social

Council

Affairs International

Department

IOM

of Rescue

Nairobi Province

3

Society International

Ethiopian
Orthodox

Committee

Church Official

City Council of Refugee Point
Nairobi

Ethiopian
Evangelical
Fellowship
Pastor

4

Pumwani

Ward Refugee

Official

Coalition

of

Kenya

RCK-Oromo
Refugee
Community
Representative

Easteligh
5

North “Hakki Jamii”

Ward Official

( Kenyan Human
Rights
Organization)

6

Eastleigh

South

Ward Official
7

Kilimani Ward
Official
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3.5.3Document Reviews
Prior (2008:111) states that documents in social research “always enter into social affairs
in two modes: 1) as receptacles of content, and 2) as agents in networks of action.”
Traditionally, however, social scientists focused more on the collection and analysis of
documents per se than using them as agents or actors of action. By documents, I am
referring to “books, reports, letters, texts, photographs, biographies and autobiographies,
as well as documents including statistical data which are typically regarded as a resource
for the social science researcher.”(Prior, 208:112) Accordingly, this study reviewed
international, national as well as the urban level policy and strategic documents of Kenya
when it comes to hosting, documenting and regulating international urban refugees. The
review gives a background about the policy regimes, actors and institutions involved in
refugee affairs in Kenya.
Table 4 Themes and Sources of Document Review
Policy Theme

Sources

National and Urban Policies on

1.United Nations Protocols and Conventions on

Refugees
Migration

and

International Refugees
2.Kenyan Ministry of Provincial Administration
and Internal Security
3.Kenyan Department of Refugee Affairs
4.City Council of Nairobi
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3.6 Sampling Techniques
3.6.1 Sampling in Qualitative Research
Sampling is required in both qualitative and quantitative studies, simply because the
“researcher cannot observe or record everything that occurs.” (Ritchie and Lewis,
2003:77) We often speak of probability and non-probability samples in social science
research. Probability sampling is considered as the most rigorous approach to sampling
since “every element in the study population is chosen at random and have a known
probability of selection.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:78) Qualitative research methods,
however, rely on purposive sampling where the “sample units are chosen because they
have particular features or characteristics which will enable detailed exploration and
understanding.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:78)

Purposive sampling has two major

advantages. First, it helps us “ensure that all the key constituencies of relevance to the
subject matter are covered.” Secondly, “some diversity is included (within each of the
key criteria)” so that the impact is properly understood. (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:80)
Probability sampling, on the other hand, usually measures the incidence and prevalence
of a given social phenomenon. It does not lend itself to qualitative research which is more
concerned about theoretical or analytical generalizations than statistical generalizations.
One key feature of purposive sampling in qualitative research is its flexibility. Glaser and
Strauss (1967) coined the term theoretical sampling to qualify this process. Here,
researchers “sample incidents, people, or units on the basis of their potential contribution
to the development and testing of a theoretical construct.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:79)
This process can continue until the researcher reaches “data saturation” or a “point when
no new insights would be obtained.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:79) Others (Maxwell,
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1996; Patton, 2002) speak of theoretical sampling as opportunistic sampling where the
researcher takes advantage of unforeseen opportunities as they arise during the course of
fieldwork. Another important feature of purposive samples is heterogeneity or what
Patton (2002) calls maximum variation sampling where “there is a deliberate strategy to
include phenomena which vary widely from each other.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:79)
Accordingly, this case study purposively sampled three different groups of people. These
are: 1) Ethiopian refugees and community leaders in Nairobi, 2) Kenyan government
officials at the national, city, and ward levels, and 3) leaders of international
organizations as well as civil society organizations. Gender, age, administrative location
and official positions were considered while selecting key informants to ensure some
heterogeneity or diversity in the sample pool. On the other hand, I was flexible to identify
and sample individuals or groups which prove to be useful on field work. For instance,
NGO representatives and some officials were sampled using snowball sampling.
Table 5 Major Sample Categories in the Study Design
No.

Sample Categories

1.

Ethiopian refugees and community leaders in Nairobi

2.

Kenyan Government Officials at national, city, division, and location levels

3.

Representatives

of

Civil

Society

Organizations
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Organizations

and

International

3.6.2 The Sample Matrix of Interviews
Nairobi is a chartered urban province which has 8 administrative divisions (also known
as Constituencies) and 50 wards. The wards are the lowest tiers of administration for the
city. Previous research (Pavanello, 2010) indicates that Ethiopian refugees are
concentrated in the Kamukunji and Westlands divisions of Nairobi. Furthermore, two
wards in Kamukunji (namely, Eastleigh North, and Eastleigh South) and one location in
Westlands (namely, Kilimani) are where the majority of Ethiopian refugees have settled
in. Given this settlement pattern of Ethiopian urban refugees, I purposively sampled and
interviewed a total of 30 Ethiopian respondents (both female and male) from these 3
administrative wards (10 respondents in each location). Table 6 illustrates the breakdown
of our refugee informants by gender, age and administrative location.
Table 6 Sample Matrix of In-depth Interview Informants by Wards, Gender and
Age
Eastleigh

Eastleigh

North

South

Killimani

Age

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

18-29

2

2

2

2

2

2

30-44

2

2

2

2

2

2

45-

1

1

1

1

1

1

10

Total

10
10

G.Total

30
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3.6.3

Sampling Frames and Procedures

Usually, the sample frames for qualitative research develop in two major ways: 1)
through existing sources like administrative records and published lists, and 2) in
specifically generated schemes (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:90). A good example of
specifically generated schemes could be households screen where door to door short
interviews are conducted “to check if the household has an individual who belongs to the
group or not.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:91) Or we could develop our sampling frame
“through an organization” which “provides services to or represent particular
populations.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:93) A third technique of generating a sample
frame is what is commonly known as “snowball sampling” where “people who have
already been interviewed are asked to identify other people they know who fit the
selection criteria.” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:94)
I used two of these purposive sampling techniques for different sampling categories. In
the case of Ethiopian refugees, the sampling frame was derived through the
organizational list of a local NGO known as Refugee Coalition of Kenya (RCK), which
provides various services for urban refugees in Nairobi. Secondly, snowball sampling
was used to contact key informants from a) Kenyan officials, b) local NGO
representatives, and c) representatives of international organizations. I asked my key
informants to lead me to other bureaus and organizations which they thought would
provide more information and insight.

Also, I directly contacted religious and

community leaders of the Ethiopian community.
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3.7 Ethical Issues and Considerations
A number of ethical issues come to the fore when planning to conduct research that
involves human subjects. First of all, I sought informed consent from all the participants
in the study and read out the content of the consent form to the informants. Participants
were given information about “the purpose of the study, who the research team is, how
the data will be used, and what the participation will require of them.” (Ritchie and
Lewis, 2003:67) Secondly, I granted anonymity and total confidentiality meaning “the
identity and the opinions of those taking part would not be known outside the research
team” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:67) All of the names and personal details of my
informants are therefore not mentioned to protect participants’ anonymity. I also altered
certain aspects of the data in order to protect refugees who yielded sensitive information
to avoid their being identified by a third party once this study becomes available for the
general public. In addition, the data generated from this study was not archived or
passed on to a third party- an individual, institution or a data bank-to ensure
confidentiality. Thirdly, I was careful not to raise and ask questions which “might
uncover painful personal experiences” and may cause harm to the informant (Ritchie
and Lewis, 2003:68). The questions in both the in-depth interview guideline and the key
informant schedules (See the Appendices) were coined in a broad and exploratory
fashion. This helped me avoid asking pointed questions that dwell on sensitive or
personal experiences of the informants themselves.
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3.8 Data Analysis
There are a number of ways to analyze qualitative data. Yin (1994:103) outlines some of
these methods, namely: “putting information into different arrays, making a matrix of
categories and placing evidence within such categories, creating data displays (e.g.
flowcharts) or putting information in chronological order”. This study attempted to
decipher emerging patterns and concepts from the data by analyzing the interviews,
discussions and documents into different thematic arrays. Here, the specific research
questions are the overarching arrays or thematic umbrellas under which the bulk of the
interview data was coded, discussed and analyzed.

This type of analysis -developing themes, patterns and concepts from a mix of
categories,- should not be construed similar to what is commonly known as “open
coding” (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Open coding is an integral part of the “grounded
theory” methodology that sets out to build categories from qualitative data and
culminates at developing a theoretical assumption from the data. This study is different
since it uses the right to the city approach as a theoretical framework and explores
whether some of its premises apply to the case of African (or non-western) cities or not.
Hence, the pattern of data analysis in this study could be named as “structured coding”
as opposed to “open coding”.
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CHAPTER IV
BEYOND THE POLITICAL: THE MAKINGS OF AN URBAN REFUGEE
Overview

This chapter is the first part of the data presentation and analysis. It begins by providing a
detailed analysis about the profile of urban refugees, and their reasons for migration. It
then discusses the challenges and opportunities the city of Nairobi offered to them upon
arrival. Subsequently, it delves into a discussion about the different livelihood schemes of
urban refugees outlining how refugees use their skill set, their capital, and their
community networks to engage in gainful employment. It also reviews the major
challenges of urban refugees while doing business or trying to eke out their subsistence
through various income generating economic activities. It then looks at the various
religious, cultural and educational institutions established by Ethiopian refugees inquiring
about the role and relevance of these institutions to refugee life. The chapter ends with a
synthesis that casts the major findings in light of the major arguments put forward by the
urban citizenship literature.
4.1. “Urban” Refugees: What is in the name?
They all came from different parts of Ethiopia and for so many different reasons. Their
reasons for leaving their country of origin and seeking a “refugee” status in Nairobi make
us interrogate the term “refugee” itself. That is why this chapter begins by boldly stating
that the definition of a “refugee” goes well beyond the political. I first asked
80

refugees when they arrived in Nairobi and also inquired about their reasons for fleeing
from Ethiopia. The range of responses was wide.
Out of the 30 interview informants I purposively sampled, eleven of them stated that they
lived in Nairobi from 1 to 5 years. We can call these refugees recent sojourners. While 10
of them indicated that they have stayed in Nairobi for more than 10 years. We can refer to
these refugees as pioneer refugees. There is some significant variation in terms of the
years the veterans spent in Nairobi. Two of my respondents mentioned that they have
lived in Nairobi for 20 years while 4 of them indicated that they have spent 11 years in
Nairobi. The number of people who stayed from 6 to 10 years is not very far from the rest
either. Around nine (9) people indicated that they have lived in Nairobi from 6 to 10
years.
It is commonplace to assume that urban refugees are predominantly political refugees
who fled their country for fear of political persecution. But the findings from the
interviews rebutted that assumption from the outset. I have therefore created three
categories of response to aggregate the predominant reasons behind the refugees’ flight
into Nairobi.

4.1.1 Economic Refugees
The most recurrent theme or reason why refugees left to Kenya is for economic reasons.
These economic reasons have three different aspects. There are some who left to Nairobi
to further migrate into West European and North American countries as economic
immigrants. This subgroup is the most predominant among the remaining two other
subgroups of economic refugees. One of my informants stated his reason as follows:
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The main reason I moved from Addis Ababa to Nairobi was my desire to
relocate to Canada. My aunt who lived in Nairobi told me that there is a better
chance of migrating to Canada since the Canadian High Commission in east
Africa is only located in Nairobi. I accepted her advice and flew over to
Nairobi.

In addition to Canada, the United States of America is a major country of destination that
most Ethiopians aspire to get into from Nairobi. Some of these refugees come to Nairobi
by themselves. Others come as family to process immigration into the US from Kenya.
One of my respondents was very concise when asked why he ended up in Nairobi. He
replied, “I came here to get a visa and migrate into the United States”.

Another

respondent stated,
I came here to process immigration into and settle in America. I came with four
family members and lived with them for three years. Unfortunately, I was denied
entry visa to the United States. I settled in Nairobi permanently and began to work
as a waiter in a local cafeteria.
Still, there are some refugees who have applied for immigrant visa into these West
European and North American countries and are hopeful that they would soon leave
Nairobi. A female informant who came to Nairobi in 2006 stated “I came to live with my
sister. Later, she left to America and I decided to stay here and apply for a US visa. I am
still waiting for the outcome of my immigration application into the US.” Another
respondent also indicated that his mother and sisters have already settled in the States and
that he is waiting to do so too.
There is a second sub group of economic refugees who came to Nairobi to migrate
mainly into South Africa. The researcher discovered from the interviews that illegal
human trafficking of people from Southern Ethiopia to South Africa is taking place.
Respondents indicated that there is a cartel of illegal traffickers located inside Ethiopia
and their agents are placed in Nairobi, Kampala (Uganda), Dar Es Salam( Tanzania),
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Maputo( Mozambique) and Johannesburg. This network hosts people in the transit cities
like Nairobi and traffic them illegally across the borders of these countries en route to
South Africa. One of my respondents’ narrated his tragic experience as follows:
The reason why I came to Nairobi was to go to South Africa and find a job. In
2009, I left Nairobi and travelled to Mombasa4. Then we embarked on a small
boat from Lamu port to sail to Tanzania. We paid 3000 US dollars to illegal
traffickers who pledged that they will take us all the way down to South Africa.
The journey begun in the evening and took a whole day and evening before we
got to Zanzibar. They hid us in Zanzibar for three days and we began to cross
over to mainland Tanzania. But the Tanzanian Naval Forces captured us on the
Indian Ocean. They detained us in mainland Tanzania, robbed all the money that
we had and later handed us over to Tanzanian immigration officials. The
Tanzanian officers detained us for two days and ordered us to leave the country in
10 days.
I had no money and knew no one in Tanzania. I went to an Ethiopian evangelical
church in Dar Es Salaam and asked for their help. They paid 3 days rent for me to
stay at a local lounge. But the lounge owner was so considerate and she allowed
me to stay there and have free food and drinks from the hotel. She finally gave me
around 30000 Kenyan Shillings (estimated to be 300 USD) and advised me to go
back to Kenya. I paid 25000 Kenyan Shillings to travel all the way back to the
Mombasa Kenyan border. I jumped off before the security checkpoint and
circumvented the line to go into the Kenyan border and hop on the bus again. I
finally arrived in Mombasa and took another bus to come back to Nairobi again.

The third subgroup of economic refugees in Nairobi is the ones that migrated in search of
jobs and better living conditions in Kenya itself. One of my respondents responded, “I
came here to find a job and work”. Most of these refugees keep mentioning about the
stories they heard about how good life is in Nairobi, that business opportunities are
available in the city and about the chances of migrating to the West.

A female

respondent from Addis Ababa put it as follows, “While I was in Addis Ababa, all I used

4

Mombasa is a major port city and tourist destination on the Indian Ocean coastland of Kenya.
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to hear about Nairobi was great news! At one stage, I decided to cross the Kenyan border
to enjoy a new life”. Another respondent from the eastern part of Ethiopia stated,
I grew up in one of the eastern provinces in Ethiopia. When I completed high
school I moved to Hawassa5 to live with my aunt. I used to hear good things about
Moyalle6Kenya whenever my aunt’s friends come to our house. One day I took
the bus and went to Moyalle Kenya without telling anybody. I crossed the border
and came to Nairobi after a while.

To conclude, I found out that most of my informants arrived into Nairobi for economic
reasons. Many wanted to use it as a transit corridor to the West. Others eyed South Africa.
And still others resorted to settle in Nairobi permanently looking out for employment and
business opportunities which they presume are easier to access in Kenya than Ethiopia.

4.1.2 Political Refugees
Ironically, only ten (10) respondents stated that they left the country due to clear and
eminent political threats to their lives. On the other hand, thirteen (13) respondents
indicated that they left the country for economic reasons and the remaining seven (7)
individuals left for personal and family related reasons. Seven of the ten respondents who
stated political reasons for their departure from Addis Ababa recount their association
with Ethiopian opposition parties. Some stated that they were members in the Ethiopian
opposition party, namely the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) that ran against
the incumbent party in 2005. Following disputes about the election outcome and the
outbreak of protests, the incumbent regime began to detain and arrest members of the
5

Hawassa is a city located on the banks of Lake Awassa in the Rift Valley region south
of the Capital, Addis Ababa.
6
“Moyalle Ethiopia” and “Moyalle Kenya” are Ethiopian and Kenyan towns located on
the official border line and the tarmac road connecting the two countries. They face each
other.
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opposition, in which case, many fled to neighboring Kenya. One of the respondents
narrated his case as follow:
I used to work as a police officer in Addis Ababa where I was denied salary
increment and promotions repeatedly! The main reason for their rejection was that
I did not sympathize with their party and was not a card carrying party member of
the incumbent regime. They tried to cajole me into becoming a member but I
refused repeatedly. Finally, they detained and released me after the 2005 national
elections. This made me leave my country in the same year.

Another respondent who was a student activist during the 2005 national election states
his reason for departure as follows:
I was a student of Information Technology at the College of Commerce in Addis
Ababa in 2005 when the killings happened after the elections. I was active during
the student riots, and soon realized that I was in risk. I and four (4) other friends
of mine decided to flee from the country since the threat from the government
security people was getting tougher. After we secured assistance from the Red
Cross, we managed to cross the Kenyan border. Finally, we were assisted by the
UNHCR to reside in Kakuma7.

4.1.3 Social Refugees
Surprisingly, I also found refugees who migrated into Nairobi neither for economic nor
for political reasons. These individuals left their country of origin because of personal
and/or family related matters. For instance, I met some who came here for reunions with
their boy or girl friends. One of my informants stated, “I came here to visit my girlfriend,
and I decided to live with her.” Another male respondent narrated his unique experience
as follows:
The main reason that made me leave my country was love. I was a first year
student of Addis Ababa University when my girl friend came to Ethiopia from
Germany. We enjoyed ourselves. I completely abandoned my study and begun to
spend the whole day with her.

7

“Kakuma” is the second largest refugee camp in Northern Kenya that hosts a lot of
Ethiopian refugees
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After a few months, she proposed the idea of crossing the Kenyan border. I totally
agreed since I knew that I am not going to pass my college exams anyway. We
flew into Mombasa8 and stayed in a hotel for a month. But in just three weeks, we
realized that we did not have any money to get by. Disagreements begun and we
broke up. Unfortunately, she started dating tourists in Mombasa for money. I
advised her to move to Nairobi to start a new life, but she refused. Finally I
decided to come to Nairobi and began to work as a conductor in a “matatu”9.

One of the female respondents also has a unique story of flight into Nairobi. Her primary
reason for fleeing into Nairobi was the marital crisis she underwent. Here is an excerpt
from her response
I gave birth to my first son while I was in high school. We got married with the
father of my son afterwards. But he abandoned me and our son and left to United
States. I was frustrated and depressed when this happened. I left my job and
wanted to leave to Italy. A person promised to facilitate my travel to Italy and
took 10000 Ethiopian Birr (estimated around 1000 US Dollars) from me and
disappeared. A Somali friend of mine advised me to go to Nairobi saying it would
be much easier to travel to South Africa or Europe from here. I then left my son
with my parents and crossed the border to Kenya.

The researcher stumbled on a similar kind of story but this time from a male respondent.
This particular individual was a university lecturer in one of Ethiopia’s universities who
left the country due to stress and frustration from a failed marriage. He narrated his
condition as follows:
The reason why l left the country is because of family problem. My wife left me
for a British national and left to the UK with my only son. It was such a
devastating blow to my life. I could not focus on my career and life in Ethiopia. I
left my job and decided to leave the country.
Even more, I found social refugees who left for Nairobi because of parental, sibling or
peer influence. Most of them were told that it is easier to secure immigration visa to
8

Mombasa is a major port city and tourist destination on the Indian Ocean coastland of
Kenya.
9
“Matatus” are the famous city buses of Nairobi that carry 25 to 40 passengers. They are
known for their colorful make up and blustering music.
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western countries from Kenya. Others were told that business opportunities are plenty in
Nairobi. A female respondent recounted her experience as follows,
My friend used to nag me to leave the country in order to have better
opportunities. One day, she told me that she was ready to cross the Kenyan border
and urged me to accompany her and other two friends. I decided to go with her
without telling my parents.

4.2 Reception and Assistance in Nairobi
Given the large concentration of refugees from all over East Africa in Kenya’s refugee
camps (“Dadaab”10 and “Kakuma”), I presumed a significant number of informants may
have landed in these camps. To my surprise only 3 of them indicated that they lived in
camps before coming to Nairobi. In contrast, 27 of my informants indicated that they
flew or drove straight into Nairobi crossing the Ethio-Kenyan border. All of the three
respondents stayed in the “Kakuma” camp bordering Ethiopia in northern Kenya.
“Kakuma” is located in a very arid and inhospitable area with very few amenities like
clean water, health and educational facilities. One of the refugees stated why he left
saying, “I was in “Kakuma” for two months. It is a malaria infested area and I could not
adjust to its hostile weather condition. So I decided to move to Nairobi”.
Camp refugees get direct assistance from the UNHCR but they are far more
disadvantaged than those who live in cities who access better housing, food, health and
educational services in Nairobi. One of the community leaders who lived in Nairobi for
more than 20 years summarized the history of refugee camps in Kenya as follows:

10

“Dadaab” is a refugee camp found in the North Eastern part of Kenya bordering
Somalia.
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“Walda” was the first ever refugee camp founded in the North Western border of
Kenya with Ethiopia post 1991. It was around 60 Kilometers away from Moyale
Ethiopia, the southernmost town of Ethiopia edging the Kenyan border. Around
60,000 refugees fled to Walda from Ethiopia. But they were vulnerable to stealth
attacks (including murder) by agents of the Ethiopian government who crossed
the border in Ethiopia and infiltrated the camp.
After repeated outcries from the refugees, the Kenyan government was forced to
build another refugee camp known as Tikka further inland (25 kms away from
Nairobi) and relocate the refugees for protection purposes. But here, refugees
began to run away from the confines of the camps and started to settle in urban
areas and intermingle with the local Kenyans. The Kenyan government now
became concerned about security matters and closed the Tikka camp. Finally,
another large refugee camp was built for Ethiopian refugees in a place called
Kakuma which is 1000 Kilometers away from Nairobi.
The respondent described the predicament of encampment by stating,
Yes, you can get free shelter and monthly food rations from the UNHCR but the
quality of the houses and the camp is so terrible. There is also the fear that the
Ethiopian government brings in agents who spy on refugees; or may even attack
those that they consider are security threats to the regime. So the issue of public
safety is a big problem in the camps.
But still, the Kenyan government has the encampment strategy as the centermost piece of
its refugee policy. An official of the Danish Refugee Council in Kenya, summarized this
as follows,
In Kenya, the policy of the Department of Refugee Affairs encourages refugees to
stay in camps. You can give refugees basic services like food, water, shelter,
health and education services if they are confined into camps. It is also easier to
register and provide security for them if they are found in camps. But the camps
in Kenya are not ideal at all! When Dadaab was formed, for instance, the numbers
of refugees in the camp were around 90000 people. As we speak today, our
bureau estimates that there are more than 479000 refugees in the camp! Daddab is
the biggest refugee camp in the entire continent now. This staggering number of
people, mothers and vulnerable children in one huge camp makes it very
complicated to deliver relief and humanitarian assistance to camp refugees.
The official continued to outline the specific disadvantages of encampment including: a)
serious congestion, b) inadequate basic services, c) environmental degradation because of
large population concentration, d) the lack of security and public safety in the camps (for
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instance, banditry and violence against women are commonplace in the camps), d)
refugees do not have any voice or influence on camp management affairs, and e)
discrimination against minorities is prevalent. Asked to elaborate on his last point, he
brought an example where in Daddab camp where the majority of the refugees are
Somalis; he met Ethiopian girls who were forced to wear veils to be able to study in a
primary school. These girls were Christians, not Muslims. For these and other reasons
most refugees prefer to migrate into urban areas. But the government of Kenya was not
ready to welcome them to the cities. A Kenyan researcher on refugees and internally
displaced persons (IDPs) explained the situation by stating,
Camps have always been the unwritten law of the land. And there have been
several projects to chase out refugees from urban centers by the Kenyan
authorities. There were many arrests and arbitrary investigations in Eastleigh, the
Nairobi neighborhood overpopulated by Ethiopian and Somali refugees. So the
government has never been in a position to protect urban refugees. The rules did
not allow you to be here in the first place. Given the bombings in Nairobi and the
threat from extremist elements in Somalia, the higher echelons in Kenyan
government are now even pushing Daddab camp to be removed from Kenyan
territory and be placed inside mainland Somalia. I very much doubt if there has
been a change of heart towards a more integrative and inclusive approach towards
urban refugees in Nairobi. I think it is to the contrary.
Because of the grim living condition in camps and despite official resistance in cities,
refugees come to the townships of Nairobi. But as I indicated earlier, most of the urban
refugees I interviewed reported that they flew into or travelled directly to Nairobi. Upon
arrival, most were welcomed by siblings and family members. This is especially the case
for those who came here to facilitate their immigration to Western countries. One of my
respondents, for instance, stated that his whole family was here in Nairobi when he came.
Seven of our respondents indicated that either their brothers or sisters hosted them when
they arrived. Another respondent stated, “Yes, my aunt assisted me when I arrived in
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Nairobi. She provided me with shelter, food and pocket money for some months”. Some
of them were also welcomed by their friends or spouses.
Surprisingly, ten (10) of my respondents indicated that they had no particular person to
welcome them when they arrived into Nairobi. But once they arrived, all of them went to
the Eastleigh area where Ethiopian refugees are found and sought help from complete
strangers who happen to be Ethiopians. They spent a day or two at another refugee’s
place to look for a job and rent out another room (that they usually share with two or
more people to defray cost). Refugees usually pick all kinds of daily chores to make their
daily living. Men become “makangas” (“taxi boys” who call out for passengers on
“matatus”) or they become “conductors” (those who collect fees from passengers inside
the “matatus”). One of the respondents recounted his experience as follows,
When I came here for the first time, my family extended all kinds of support that I
needed. But they got tired of me asking for money as time goes, and there was no
one that could assist me. Life forced me to work as a “makanga” in a “matatu”.

Finding support could be much harder for women. One of the female respondents who
came to Nairobi with her friend narrated how hard it was for them to make a living. She
stated,
We did not have a host family who could provide us with shelter and food. For a
few days, we stayed in a hotel in Eastleigh. But when we realized that we were
running out of our small money, we decide to earn money as bar girls. There
were instances when we were forced to sleep with men for money in order to
cover our daily expenses and rent. It was so hard.

Uncharacteristically, some people get lucky when it comes to finding support and jobs.
One of my female respondents recounted her experience as follows,
I stayed in Nairobi and I was staying in a small Ethiopian hotel known as
Hawassa. I heard the owner mentioning that he needs a cook and I approached
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him to be employed there. He took me in and I started working for him. I was
hired with a monthly salary of 3000 Kenyan shillings. Later I became a maid for a
Somali Kenyan family where I used to cook. The family was well off and agreed
to pay me 100 USD per month. The lady was also kind enough to give me a two
weeks break and advised me to go to Addis Ababa and bring my son back from
Ethiopia. I brought my son, and continued to work for the same family. But
following the 2007 Kenyan election crisis the family moved to Germany. The
family gave me 400 USD and I found a cooking job in a restaurant.

4.3 Shocks and Surprises in Kenya
I also asked refugees about what their first impressions were about Kenyans, in general,
and if they had experienced any culture shock once they settled in Nairobi. A plethora of
responses came and refugees were excited to share their anecdotes and encounters. These
experiences could be clustered around 3 major areas: dietary habits, social norms, and the
relation of the police to the citizens. Many confided that they found the way food is
prepared in Kenya different from that of Ethiopia. One of the respondents was blunt
saying, “I was shocked to learn that Kenyans cook cattle intestine and eat it! We do not
do that in Ethiopia, right?” Some find certain social norms very different from Ethiopia.
For instance, a respondent said, “I’m always surprised at occasions when Kenyans do not
greet their neighbors very well!” Another respondent mentioned, “I am shocked when I
see old people standing inside a crowded “matatu” while the youth sit. If it were Ethiopia,
you should stand and let the old people sit”.
Most of my respondents described Kenyans as peaceful and sociable people. However,
they expressed their shock about the rampancy of police corruption in Kenya. One of my
female respondents described the situation saying, “The only thing that rules in this
country is money. It is not the law.” Another respondent added, “In Ethiopia, you go to
the police station to complain if somebody has done something illegal or inappropriate to
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you. Here it is the reverse. Even the locals, Kenyans, avoid the police by any means
necessary”. Another female respondent added,
In Ethiopia, people tend to feel sympathy for you if you are a refugee or a
stranger. In Kenya, it is totally different. The police in particular stop you and ask
you for money. I was working as a waiter in an Ethiopian restaurant when the
officer came and asked me to show him my work permit. I did not have one and
he detained me until he was given a bribe to release me. I still work in the same
Ethiopian restaurant.
But refugees take a great care to differentiate between the Kenyan law enforcement
officials and the general public. As mentioned earlier, their impressions about Kenyans
are overwhelmingly positive. Here is a testimony from one of our female respondents
whose son grew up in Nairobi and is now going to a Kenyan middle school. She stated,
I have found Kenyans to be very sociable people. They respect your privacy and
do not interfere in your family life. Your neighbors do not ask you questions like
“Who are you? What do you do for a living?” They are very careful when it
comes to upbringing their children. Unlike Ethiopians they do not pinch or whip
their children in order to discipline them11. The children here are brought up as
adults. My son will say “I am sorry” if he has done anything wrong. He does not
understand it if I keep grumbling about his mistake. My son has grown up as a
Kenyan. He speaks perfect Swahili and English. He does not even like Ethiopian
food. He once said, “Ethiopia’s brown sauce is too hot and spicy!” (laughter)
Refugees repeatedly stated that arriving in Nairobi and getting used to Kenyan society
and culture was difficult for them. Most of them do not speak Swahili (which is the
national language) and good English (that most Kenyans fluently speak). In many
instances, they were harassed, asked for money and detained by Kenyan police officers.
This stands out as the major problem and cultural shock to Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi.
It did not therefore come as a surprise that eighteen (18) of our urban refugee informants
replied that they do not feel well integrated into the Kenyan society as opposed to twelve
(12) others who claimed that they are integrated. Both groups cite interesting anecdotes to
11

It is common in Ethiopia for parents to pinch, slap, and whip their children.
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substantiate their claims. A priest of one of the Ethiopian Orthodox Churches in Nairobi,
for instance argued,
I know of a lot of marriages that took place in our parish between Kenyan and
Ethiopian spouses. Kenyans usually say that Ethiopians are trustworthy and
hardworking. So they hire our people in their homes and businesses. Ethiopians
also like the fact that ordinary Kenyans do not have xenophobic attitude towards
us. We conduct our daily life more or less the same way that other Nairobians do.
Another refugee stated,
I know of two Ethiopian friends who married Kenyan women. There are also
many Ethiopian women who married Kenyan men. Just this week the son of the
Prime Minister of Kenya, Fidel Castro Raila Odinga married an Ethiopian girl! So
there is some integration underway here.
But still, there are others are very skeptical about the claim of integration. One of the
government officials that we interviewed stated,
I do not think most urban refugees are integrated to the Kenyan population.
Especially in the case of Somalis, they stick together and do not open up to other
Nairobians. They only speak their language and very little English. Rarely do they
interact or say marry Kenyans. In addition, the problem of small arms is tied to
the smuggling of weapons from Somalia. Some elements are also linked with
radical Islamists. These developments, I would argue, have made the relations
between Kenyans and urban refugees very tense. Integration, for me, is something
non-existent or even unrealistic.
These skeptical comments about integration were also made by Ethiopian refugees
themselves. One of my respondents stated, “We Ethiopians are inward looking. We
cannot live outside the confines our own community. It is not strange to meet someone
who has been living in Nairobi for more than 20 years but does not have a Kenyan
friend.” Another refugee added, “In my opinion, there are few who integrated themselves
with the Kenyan life but the majority of us are not integrated”. A more nuanced opinion
came from a Kenyan researcher about this particular issue. He stated,
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There is a lot of economic integration. Business between refugees and the locals is at
an all time high. But the social aspect of integration is lagging. A Kenyan still looks
at an urban refugee as an Ethiopian, Rwandese and Somali. I am not sure if the
economic integration undermines or further facilitates social integration. Secondly,
there is a level of integration between refugees and Kenyan nationals which is more
evident in cities. We mingle and interact in the cities more. For instance, we have six
(6) Congolese families that go to my church. We visit them and fellowship with them
like any other Kenyan church member.

Obviously, it is difficult to reach a conclusive point and state whether urban refugees are
fully integrated to Kenyan society in terms of their economic, political and social
relationships. But the responses have already made it clear that the mere inhabitance of
the refugees, their economic relation with Kenyan nationals, and their use of public
amenities like Kenyan schools and health facilities, are opening the leeway to integration.
The following sections deal with and discuss these facets of refugee-host relations in
more detail.

4.4 Refugee Livelihoods: Economic Rights and Activities
An outstanding feature of urban refugees is that most of them are engaged in income
generating economic activities both in the informal and formal sectors of Nairobi’s
economy. People assume that both urban and camp refugees are economically inactive
populations. The only difference, most commentators outline, is that the former get
assistance from the UNHCR while urban refugees secure financial assistance from family
members and relatives abroad. However, remittances comprise only one of the income
sources of urban refugees. For instance, only five (5) of our refugee informants reported
that they get direct financial assistance from abroad. Otherwise, urban refugees are
engaged in diverse economic activities making it difficult to define them as “refugees”,
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“illegal immigrants”, or “immigrants” in the Kenyan context. Let us explore these
economic activities.
4.4.1 The Self Employed
Broadly speaking, I found those urban refugees who are self employed and those who
earn their income by working for others. The “self employed” have a number of small
businesses that focus mainly on service provision both to the refugee community and
Kenyans. One of the female respondents for instance has a beauty salon that she bought
from Somali woman who used to be a refugee herself. She stated, “This salon was owned
by a Somali woman who left to Europe with her family and I used to work for her as a
hair dresser. She offered to sell the business to me at a reasonable price and I did.” She
continued, “I own and run this business legally. We pay an annual fee to the Nairobi City
Council to renew our business permits.”
Another female respondent owns a small boutique (a retail shop of women’s clothes and
shoes) in Nairobi. It has been more than eight years since she opened her own business.
She added, “We sell modern clothes, shoes and accessories to women. We also bring
traditional Ethiopian costumes from Moyalle Ethiopia. Usually refugees who are ready to
travel to Western countries come and buy our traditional costumes.” One of the male
respondents owns a small music and video retail store where he “rents and sells audio and
video copies of music productions from Ethiopia and the neighboring countries.” He also
repairs electronic equipments like tape recorders, DVD and VCD players for the locals
and makes a very good living. He stated, “My business is quite profitable. Not only do I
cover my family’s expenses; but I also pay the studio rent and my assistant’s salary
always in time.” Another respondent who lived in Nairobi for seven years imports
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cosmetic products from the Middle East and distributes to the local shops in Nairobi. He
was also involved in other businesses before establishing his own business and describes
the process as follows,
I first started working as a rental broker six months since got here. I was told to
move out of my apartment and I looked around for many other houses. It dawned
on me that I can start this job of finding cheap apartments for people. Since then I
have been making good money off of this. I used some of the profit to import
cosmetics products and start distributing here in Nairobi. I have also bought two
taxi cabs from Kenyan owners and sublet them to Ethiopian drivers (refugees).
They take one third of the daily profit they make and I collect two third of it. I am
planning to sell both of these cabs and buy a bigger field vehicle that I can rent
out for safari tours and field travels.

4.4.2 Employed Workers
Perhaps the most frequently mentioned job that young male Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi
are engaged is in public transport. More than 8 of my male respondents stated that they
worked as drivers, “makangas” 12and “conductors”13in the famous “matatus” of Nairobi.
Here is a story from one of the respondents who remembers his first stint as a “makanga”
vividly,
I was very courageous to start as a “makanga” when I knew very little Swahili
and had no idea of Nairobi’s neighborhoods! But you will do everything to
survive. A year or so later, I started speaking Swahili very well and was promoted
to be a conductor. The “matatu” owner was an Ethiopian. Our “matatu” was fast
and classy. She was called “Born Free”. I worked for more than 7 years as a
conductor on her. But the job was very precarious. The owner can fire you any
time he feels like it. And usually, the owners bring one of their relatives from
Ethiopia and give your position over to them. In such instances, you have to look
for another “matatu” to work on. We hustled hard during those days just to
survive.

12
13

“Makangas” are ushers to city buses who call out passengers.
“Conductors” are the people who collect fees inside city buses.
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Another respondent now works as a “makanga” on one of the “matatus” owned by a
fellow Ethiopian. He stated, “I have now learnt to speak Kiswahili very well and so I do
not find it hard to communicate with “matatu” passengers.”
Ethiopian refugees sell both their skilled and unskilled labor to survive and make a living
in Nairobi. Here are some of the other economic activities they are engaged in. One of
our female respondents stated, “I work as house maid.” Another one is a cook. She
described her job as follows, “I know how to prepare most of the Ethiopian traditional
dishes and I have learnt how to prepare the Kenyan traditional meals. I now work in this
Kenyan restaurant that also serves Ethiopian dishes”. She added, “I also do catering at
Ethiopian weddings and other ceremonies to make extra money.” We have barbers who
are busy catering for both Kenyan and Ethiopian customers in the populated quarters of
Eastleigh North and South.
Another major employer of Ethiopian refugees is “Sheba Miles”, a famous high end
Ethiopian restaurant that hires a number of waiters, waitresses, cooks, janitors and
guards. One of our respondents works in “Sheba Miles”. He explained the role of “Sheba
Miles” as follows,
I used up all my savings in my first two months of stay in Nairobi. I did not have
a lot when I got the employment opportunity to work at Sheba Miles. Here, I get
paid and I do not have to worry about rent and food. This is because the restaurant
covers them both. Moreover, I am going to school. I think I am one of the luckiest
refugees in Nairobi. The restaurant owner has not only helped me but a number of
other refugees. There are more than 15 waiters and waitresses here and around 5
cooks.
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4.4.3 Basic Expenditures
In addition to exploring revenue sources and economic activities of urban refugees, this
study looked at the spending pattern of refugees on essentials such as food, shelter and
clothing. All of my respondents reported that Ethiopian refugees buy food items, spices
and ingredients from Ethiopian stores. Bachelors frequent Ethiopian restaurants. One of
the respondents explained the situation as follows, “Ethiopians buy their groceries from
local stores and cook in their households. Young bachelors go to Ethiopian restaurants to
eat. Seldom do Ethiopians eat Kenyan food”. When it comes to clothes, people prefer to
buy used clothes from Europe that are sold in one of the biggest open air markets in
Nairobi known as the “Kikomba” market.
Kenyans import these clothes which are much cheaper and of better quality than the ones
which are locally produced. But “Kikomba” is not the only market for clothes. One of my
respondents stated, “There are famous used cloth stalls in markets known as “Adams”,
“Toya” and “Kwangware””. These markets are named after the neighborhoods they are
placed in. Most Ethiopians reside in Eastleigh and “Chai Road” areas where there is a
large concentration of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees. Another respondent explained the
reasons why Eastleigh remains to be a top destination point for urban refugees. He stated,
“People come here for two reasons. First, these neighborhoods are underdeveloped and
rent is cheap. Second, Ethiopians have difficulty speaking English (which most Kenyans
speak fluently) and Swahili. So they prefer to congregate in these areas where they feel
embraced by their country folks”.
As far as housing is concerned, all of the refugees that I interviewed indicated that they
rent houses from Kenyan landlords. There was not a single incident where a refugee
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reported that he or she owns the house in which he or she is currently residing. Often, a
single individual rents a two or three bedroom house from a Kenyan national and sublets
them to Ethiopian refugees. Refugees also share utility costs such as water, electricity,
and landline phones among themselves. Most of these houses are brick built with one
kitchen and bathroom. Crowding and congestion typify the living arrangement of the
refugees both in their houses and in their neighborhoods i.e. Eastleigh and Chai Road.
One of the community leaders described the housing condition in many of these buildings
as follows,
Refugees do not have enough income to pay for decent accommodation. So, you
would find grandparents, spouses, children and grandchildren sleeping a single
room. Imagine the trauma they undergo. The space is very small, congested and
there is no ventilation.
The same respondent quoted a recent health study conducted by RCK which showed that
“around 95% of urban refugees living in Nairobi suffer from Air Transmitted Diseases,
especially Tuberculosis.”
Sadly, I also found out that two of our informants do not actually have enough money to
even rent a room and would have to crash at their friends’ rooms. One of them described
his condition as follows, “I do not have enough money to cover my rent. I always live by
sharing my friends’ rooms. I sleep one night at one of my friends’ house, and another
night at the others.” I asked the two informants if the problem of refugee homelessness is
a serious problem in Nairobi. They answered it is and added that they know of many
refugees who cannot afford to even cover their housing expenses and squat in other
people’s homes.
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4.5 Refugee Business Ventures
It is important to underscore that the interest to invest in the Kenyan economy was
something recent among Ethiopian refugees. A prominent Ethiopian businessman
describes it as follows,
In the 80s and early 90s, there were not many Ethiopian refugees and
businessmen in Kenya. Instead, there were many Eritrean refugees who used to
have heavy trucks and long distance buses. They were active in the urban
transport sector. Later with the influx of the Ethiopian refugees, people started up
opening small businesses like kiosks, coffee shops, boutiques and restaurants.
From the mid 90s on however, you find a lot of influential Ethiopian businessmen
who are active in the transport sector and the hotel and tourism sectors too.
Refugees, in general, and the business leaders, in particular, underscore that Kenya offers
a favorable environment with plenty of opportunities for trade and business. One of my
respondents compared this to the situation in Ethiopia stating, “The licensing and
registration of new businesses is so efficient in Nairobi. If you have the capital, then you
can easily invest or even buy property. In Ethiopia, it is so hard to invest even when you
are a national.” Because of this, most of the refugees who went abroad via Nairobi come
back from countries like Canada and the US to open up businesses. Another respondent,
for instance, stated, “Yes, we have a lot of émigrés who live in Canada, Australia and the
US and who are now in Nairobi to invest”.
4.5.1 Licensing and Taxes
The Nairobi City Council provides a two step clearing process for people seeking
licenses. First, refugees are asked to show their IDs or alien certificates that attest their
legal residency in Nairobi. Second, refugees are expected to submit the amount of seed
capital they are about to invest in the opening of their business venture.

As for the

licensing process, one of the female respondents stated, “The licensing process is fairly
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simple. We also pay an annually fixed amount of money to renew our business permits at
the city council. Otherwise the government does not levy any income or business tax on
us.”

Yet, I found three business owners who mentioned to me that they operate without a
license and were not shy to tell the reason. In all the three instances, they were not
interested to pay for the license and the annual fees. In lieu, they bribe the city officers
and continue trading. One of them was blunt in his response stating, “I do not have the
license but I always give 5OO Kenyan shillings to the city council officials when they do
routine checks”. He continued, “Corruption is endemic in this country and yes that is why
I prefer working without license”. The cavalier attitude of these particular informants
about their practice and the way corruption is taken for granted in Nairobi was truly
disturbing for the interviewer.

4.5.2 Hiring and Management
One of the most popular Ethiopian businesses in Nairobi is the famous Ethiopian
restaurant in Nairobi known as “Dire Dawa”. “Dire Dawa” is a high end restaurant that
occasionally caters for senior government officials like the Vice President of Kenya and
government ministers. It has thus far collected a number of prizes and trophies. For
instance, it was ranked as one of Nairobi’s top ten restaurants in 2007. It was the 2011
winner of the “Best Value for Money” restaurant in Nairobi. It was the restaurant of the
month in June 2012.
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The owner was born in Ethiopia in 1962 in a small town called Awassa which roughly is
a 200 kilometers south of the capital city Addis Ababa. He fled the country following the
1974 Ethiopian revolution and the subsequent coming to power of the Derg, a military
junta of officers that usurped the Haile Selassie I’s monarchy. He started business by
selling hair products for men and soon made his way into retail business. He later
mobilized his capital to open “Dire Dawa” restaurant in Nairobi. Currently, the owner is
also involved in import and export business too.

He is also a shareholder in a

construction company which won the bid to erect towers and facilities for a cross country
electricity grid stretching from Western Ethiopia to the North and Eastern parts of Kenya.
One of the managers of “Dire Dawa” stated that the refugee population in Nairobi has
exploded and the living condition of most of these refugees is disappointing. He added,
“Most of these refugees subsist on financial aid and remittances from relatives and
kinfolk who live in the West. But, there are also many refugees who pursue their studies,
engage in business ventures and do something meaningful with their life”. He states that
this business has been employing fellow Ethiopians to support them financially. He
mentioned that most people ask him why he does not employ Kenyan nationals as waiters
and waitresses. He replied, “some of the refugees working for us may not have legal
papers and hence would not be able to find jobs elsewhere.” The restaurant “has more
than 30 such employees who live in the residential quarters of the hotel, have fixed salary
and benefit from service tips and tokens”.
In short, businesses utilize both the skilled and unskilled labor of Ethiopian refugees and
provide employment and income for their fellow country folks. This is not to argue that
Ethiopian businesses do not hire Kenyans. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. Given
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their skills and willingness to work, Kenyans are also employed in Ethiopian businesses.
Hiring policy is also contingent on the nature of the business itself. One of my female
respondents who owns a beauty salon reflected on this as follows,
I have two employees who are hair dressers. One is Kenyan and the other one is a
Somali. Hiring depends on the kind of business you have. If you for instance have
a beauty salon, then you sure need Kenyan, Somali and Ethiopian workers
because the styles of hairdressing for women of each ethnic group differ. So you
need people who cater for that particular group. Or if you have restaurant or
coffee shop, then you need waiters and waitresses who speak Swahili and Somali
languages.
This proved to be true when I interviewed another female respondent who is the owner of
a famous high end beauty salon located in one of Nairobi’s famous four star hotels. She
came to Nairobi by the end of 1988 to visit her relatives. In the same year, her relatives
moved to the Netherlands and she had to go to the UNHCR and register as a refugee. The
UNHCR also sponsored her education in hairdressing at a famous college in Nairobi. She
graduated in one year (1989) and started as an assistant in a top beauty salon inside one
of Nairobi’s four star hotels and worked there until 1993. It was in 1994, that she left her
former job to open up her own high end beauty salon. She narrates her story as follows.
On my fourth year in Nairobi, I opened up my own beauty salon but finding a
spot in the downtown area was very difficult. Fortunately, the spouse of a
prominent official was one of my clients and she found me two rooms inside
“Fedha Towers” (one of the tallest buildings in down town Nairobi). I run this
business from 1994 to 1998. And following the transfer of all UN offices from
downtown to the outskirts of Nairobi14 I felt I should move because most of my
customers were UN staff.
I found a new complex in the Westlands Sarit Center area that I refurbished and
moved all my stuff in. Unfortunately, burglars stormed into the apartment
complex and looted everything I invested on. It was such a devastating blow since
I had nothing left. But I found myself another place and started all over again in
two months which became quite successful. In fact, I hired three other
14

“Gigirri” is the name of the neighborhood where the UN officers are now
headquartered.
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professional hairdressers, Kenyan, Algerian and Lebanese women, who were very
great professionals. This was very important because our customers were from all
over the world. I worked in the same spot for 9 years (until 2008) and moved to
my current beauty salon in 2009.

I also interviewed one of the managers of another high end Ethiopian restaurant. He
spoke of their hiring policy as follows,
We do help a lot of these young people who are willing to work in the restaurant.
This far, around 43 Ethiopians have worked here in my restaurant before they
moved to the States. One of them stayed for 7 years working for me. Another
worker only stayed for 3 months and moved abroad. Most of these refugees are
very grateful that we gave them the opportunity to work and support themselves
when they needed it badly. In fact, I was in Atlanta (GA) last year to visit my
relatives and around 21 of my former workers drove from the neighboring states
to meet and greet me! It was such an emotional and exciting moment for me.
Interestingly, a few Ethiopian refugees have in fact succeeded to expand their business
ventures into Juba (South Sudan) and Kampala (Uganda) from Nairobi. A fitting example
for this is the story of a prominent Ethiopian business man who fled persecution as a
young university student from Ethiopia, ended up in Nairobi and started an amazing
journey of professional and business success in Nairobi. Here is an excerpt from my
interview with him.
I was one of the university students who opposed the policies of the current
regime in Ethiopia while they still were rebel fighters. In 1991, university classes
were disrupted because of the escalation of the civil war and ultimately Addis
Ababa fell in the hands of the rebel fighters. In 1992 I rejoined Addis Ababa
University to finish my studies but deeply opposed the political changes which
unfolded with the coming of the EPRDF15. I fled to Kenya Moyalle and ended up
in a refugee camp not far from Moyalle.
The camp was so inhospitable for all of us. There were around 25000 refugees in
this camp half of which were university and college students who fled Ethiopia.
There was security problem since secret agents of the Ethiopian government used
EPRDF is an acronym for the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary Front
which is a coalition of ethnically organized parties that overcome the former military
junta in 1991. EPRDF is still in power.
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to infiltrate into the camp and assassinate some of their political foes. There was
also conflict between refugees and the local population. But most importantly
basic supplies like potable water and food did not come in time and we used to
spend days half starving. There were not enough tents. There were a few incidents
of rape too. And the United Nations was completely disorganized.
Three weeks later, I boarded a bus that comes to Nairobi even though I had no
legal travel documents. The driver used to stop ahead of check points for us to
jump off the bus and we used to do detours to avoid the police and jump on the
bus again. When I got to Eastleigh, I had no relative or friend. But I stumbled on
an Ethiopian who happened to be the uncle of one of my college class mates and
he took me to his place. Staying in Eastleigh, I met another university student
who knew that I was a 3rd year university student back home and recommended
that I contact a Canadian outfit which used to provide college assistantships and
scholarships for refugees. The name of the organization was Wendell Charitable
Trust. I contacted their office, explained who I am and presented my transcripts
asking for their assistance. The regional director gave me an exam to check if I
was indeed a university student and begun to look for universities in Canada to
take me in. Fortunately, the University of Alberta and Mc Gill University
expressed their interest to provide me scholarships. I finally decided to go for
University of Alberta and the UNHCR settlement officer cooperated to finalize
my refugee status mandate.
Unfortunately, the Canadian Consular Officer rejected my visa application
alongside three other Ethiopians. She insisted that the regime in Ethiopia is
democratic and that we have nothing to fear for back in Ethiopia. That was the
lowest point of my life. Frustrated and despondent, I almost gave up on my search
for schools. However, the director of Wendell Trust advised me to continue my
study here in Kenya. I agreed and was enrolled in Nairobi University to study
Chemical Engineering in 1993. The trust secured funding from another UK
foundation. But in the same year, student riots and demonstrations broke out in
Nairobi against the Moi administration and the University got closed indefinitely.
This became another setback. But I did not give up hope; I went to the University
of East Africa in Barraton (outside Nairobi) and asked to be transferred to their
school. I was accepted and I spent 4 years in that University and earned my
Bachelor of Arts in Agro-economics. I continued one more year and completed
my Bachelor of Arts in applied chemistry in 1998. The University was impressed
by my performance and asked to retain me as a graduate assistant. I worked there
for 3 months but left to Nairobi once again. My ambition was to work for the UN
or the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Back in Nairobi, I read that the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP)
has vacancy for a chemist with an economics background. I applied and
fortunately secured my first ever professional job at the UN with a monthly salary
of 5000 USD. I worked there for a few years and became a Junior Program
Officer (JPO) at age 24. In 2000, I left for the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) and begun to work as a food security advisor of the UNDP to
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World Food Program (WFP) in South Sudan. I worked in South Sudan until 2006
and resigned from the UN.
In 2006, I opened an Ethiopian restaurant in Juba (the new capital of South
Sudan) which became the busiest restaurant in the city. Following infrastructure
development works in South Sudan, I imported three Italian made heavy trucks
and begun to sublet them to the contractors. I began to make around 12000 dollars
from each truck every month. And in 2010, I began my own construction
company in South Sudan which became a huge success. Just recently my
company won the contract to build the state house of the South Sudan
government. I have also become the major shareholder of the only Toyota car
dealer company in South Sudan known as Global Lines.
Here in Nairobi, I am involved in Real Estate development business. South Sudan
is the place where I took off investment wise, but there are lots of problems in
terms of law and order. The risk factors are too high. But in Nairobi, we have a
system which is so friendly to foreign investment. They have a very well
developed infrastructure (telephone lines, the internet, electricity, water supplies
etc), probably the best in East Africa. And the country has always been open to
foreigners, say compared to Ethiopia. There are a number of international
organizations and headquarters of the UN offices. But most of all there is
adequate skilled manpower for any business venture that you would want to
embark on. Hence I am now refocusing my investment into Kenya. But through
all these years, I have been living permanently in Nairobi.
4.5.3 The Spite of Corruption
Though business leaders within the Ethiopian refugee community are very grateful about
the opportunities they have seized in Nairobi, they do not shy away to point out that
corruption is one major problem in Kenya. It runs through the government bureaucracy
ranging from private police officers and their commanders to the clerks, department
heads, commissioners and ministers of the Kenyan state. In fact, the 2011 Corruption
Perceptions Index of countries by Transparency International (a German based watchdog)
ranked Kenya’s public sector to be the 29th most corrupt nation in the world out of 183
countries16. This holds true also for the city council of Nairobi where the bureaucrats are
accused of using their office prerogatives to ask for bribes and kickbacks. One of my
respondents described the situation as follows,
16

See http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/
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There is a lot of corruption when it comes to the routine checks done by the health
and sanitation department of the city council. Offices are dispatched to monitor
the sanitation and safety standards of barber shops, beauty parlors, restaurants and
bars in which case they threaten the owners to write dismissive reports about the
business unless the latter cooperate to give them money. Corruption is ingrained
in the workings of the Kenyan public service, especially those who work at the
lowest tiers of administration like wards, divisions and the city council.

Another respondent who clears some goods via the Ethio- Kenyan border complained of
the custom officials stating,
Custom clearance is a major problem on the border. The custom officials levy
tariffs arbitrarily. For instance, the officials may charge you 2000 Kenyan
Shillings to clear a stack (approx 25 Kilograms) of traditional costumes that you
want to bring in. Next time they may raise that exponentially and ask you 14000
Kenyan Shillings. We know much of what they collect from us does not go to the
coffers of the government but to the officials themselves. Those who work in the
hotel services are also subject to harassment by city government officials who ask
for money complaining that the business is not safe and hygienic enough to treat
customers. It is an excuse to get money illegally from refugee business owners.
One of the workers at Sheba Miles restaurant explained this stating, “Sentiments of
xenophobia and resentment against successful refugees do exist among Kenyan
officials”. He remembers of an incident when a certain Kenyan official came to dine at
the restaurant and insisted on sitting on a reserved table. He gently reminded the official
that the table is reserved and volunteered to arrange a different table set for the customer.
But the official angrily interjected saying, “Don’t tell me where to sit in my own
country!” Incensed, the manager replied “This is your country but not your table!”
However, the respondent stated that police harassment and corruption have relatively
declined since the Mwai Kibaki administration came to power (2002) took over. Still, he
argues, Kenya is not out of the woods when it comes to fighting corruption.
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4.6 Forced Displacement and Social Capital
4.6.1 Religious Institutions
Another striking feature about the “stay” of Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi is the existence
of numerous churches and mosques where they congregate to worship and network with
each other. There are two Orthodox Churches that host hundreds of believers at their
Sunday services. In addition there are a total of seven (7) Ethiopian evangelical churches
where evangelicals commute to worship both through the weekdays and the weekend.
Ethiopian Muslim refugees do not have a separate mosque of their own but go to the local
mosques in Eastleigh. These religious institutions are not only engaged in spiritual
ministries and services but also provide the social and cultural milieu for refugees. One of
the priests of the Ethiopian Orthodox churches in Nairobi outlined the services that the
church provides as follows,
Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC) is directly and constructively involved in the lives
of refugees in many ways. I remember that refugees used the church’s land line to
correspond with UNHCR and other the international agencies during those days when
there were no cellular phones in Nairobi. The church officiates marriages. We have a
small collection of books in Amharic17 that refugees borrow to read. We also give
Sunday school Amharic language lessons to children of refugees. Most of these
children are born and brought up here and do not get Amharic lessons in Kenyan
schools. We provide prayer and counseling services for the youth. Recently, we are
planning to open up a private clinic for refugees for nominal fees. We are planning to
use the revenue from this service to provide various psycho-social services for the
refugee community.
The Ethiopian Orthodox Church also founded a charity and care taking association for
the Ethiopian community known as “Maedot”. I interviewed one of leaders of “Maedot”
about the objectives and the activities of the association. She started by saying that

17

Amharic is a widely spoken national language of Ethiopia
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“Maedot” is a self help association that raises funds from the congregation on a monthly
basis. People make voluntary contributions. This far, she added,
“Maedot” has: 1) assisted ten families who could not cover school fees for their
children, 2) served hot meals to those refugees who did not have enough to eat and
are in a very desperate condition, 3) visited more than 40 Ethiopian patients in
hospitals, 4) covered the travel expenses of more than 10 refugees who wanted to
back to Ethiopia. We are focusing especially on those who were illegally trafficked
from Ethiopia to head to South Africa but were caught by Kenyan law enforcement
officials.
Traditionally, orthodox believers also have a number of religious fraternity and sorority
associations where men or women meet up every month to commemorate a divine figure
(angels, saints etc.). These associations are known as “Ye Tsiwa Mahibers”. People
gather every month for food and drink and the ceremonies start with blessings and prayer
by the local priest. The Treasurer mentioned of three associations held in remembrance of
St Gabriel, Virgin Mary and Bishop Gebre Menfes Kidus18. Another female respondent
also indicated that she is a member of a “Mahiber” with 10 members. She continued,
“We visit each other on the day of the Saint we commemorate. We also comfort a
household in case a family member or a relative of our “Mahiber” passes away”.
I also interviewed one of the pastors of an Ethiopian Evangelical Church in Nairobi. The
history of this particular church elucidates how refugees have been initiating, developing
and institutionalizing organizations of faith and mutual support while facing immense
challenges. It attests to the argument that refugees are involved in creating social
practices and structures on the move from their country of origin and en route to a third
country of final settlement. Their “temporal” and “spatial” suspension in Nairobi did not
deter them from such “creative” transition. It is also essential to note that different
18

Abune Gebre Menfes Kidus is Ethiopian Bishop canonized as a Saint by the Ethiopian
Orthodox Church
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cohorts of refugees come and go via Nairobi but the institutions that they founded outlast
the stay of these refugees in Nairobi. The institutions expand, become more formal and
sophisticated through the passage of time. Here is a brief story of the Church narrated by
the Pastor,
Our church was first founded by a prominent Ethiopian evangelist known who
lived in Nairobi for more than 20 years serving as the East Africa director of the
International Bible Society (IBS). This particular organization is a global outfit
working on bible translations and the distribution of Scripture all over the world.
Here in East Africa, the IBS has succeeded to get the bible translated into 32 local
languages.
Dr. Belay was working in Nairobi when in 1991 the Derg 19 regime fell in
Ethiopia and thousands of people fled into Kenya. These include university
students, former government officials and ex- combatants. Dr Belay used to travel
to the Tikka Refugees Camp to minister to these refugees. Many did not have
adequate food and shelter and some people died of cholera epidemic. Most
people believed in Christ and became born again Christians and members of a
new congregation. Dr Belay also invited other more senior ministers to
consolidate the refugee congregation and church membership grew in leaps and
bounds.
In 1991, some of the refugees begun moving from Tikka camp to Nairobi and
founded a cell in Eastleigh area whose membership begun to swell again. So this
fellowship grew into our Church. The church was first hosted by the Kenyan
Deliverance Church in Eastleigh. A year later, the Church rented a big
convention center in the downtown area. We just celebrated our twentieth
anniversary here.
Our membership was in its thousands in the first 5 to8 years since we moved here
(1992-2000). But it started shrinking as many people started to leave to Europe,
Canada, USA, and Australia for third country resettlement. Still many of our
members are waiting for their relocation to these countries and hence our
membership is currently at 812 people. I would say only 20 percent of these
members live in Nairobi permanently as legally permanent residents. In short, we
are a refugee church!!
The pastor first arrived in Nairobi to do his diploma in Psychology and studied at Daystar
University in Nairobi from 1997 until 1999. In the year 2000, he enrolled at the Pan
African Christian University (Nairobi) to study theology and graduated in 2004.
The “Derg” is a popular name to the military junta that overthrew Emperor Haile
Sellasie I of Ethiopia in 1974 and ruled the country until 1991.
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Meanwhile, he used to minister in this congregation voluntarily as a counselor and a
preacher in its mid-week services. The former senior pastor of the church asked him to
work as his assistant pastor in 2005. And he was appointed a senior pastor of the church
in 2006 following the departure of the former pastor. He argues that his Church is more
than a spiritual establishment but works to improve the social and economic welfare of its
members. He lists some of the social services the church provides as follows,
Most of the refugees have a serious language problem. They do not speak English
well. We organized language proficiency classes for refugees where we used our
senior church members to train them. We also began entrepreneurship and
business management classes to those who are interested. The latter went for three
years and stopped two years ago when the person who is in charge left the
country. We are also providing Amharic language lessons for children in Sunday
school programs. They read scripture, play drama, and sing spirituals in Amharic.
This way they stay rooted in their language and culture. We insist that people
dress in our traditional costumes on holidays, during weddings and specials
festivities.
I probed the pastor to find out how the church raises funds to cater for these social
services. He responded that “the church raises its fund from the tithes and donations of its
members”. He added that they do not have any assistance from foreign churches or
international charity organizations. The church’s budget is very small most of which is
used to pay for the rent of the conference center and cover the fees of the senior pastor
and his assistants. Asked whether this financial condition of his church would not
constrain their social services, the pastor responded,
We do not have adequate financial resource to directly spend on charity and
community development work. But we assist our refugees by doing job and
training searches and announcing them for our members in time. We also do oneoff financial supports for those refugees who decide to repatriate to Ethiopia.
Some members of the church who are well off have volunteered to bring in some
refugees and provide them shelter and assistance. A few others have sponsored
the education of church members who wanted to go to college. For instance, we
have an Ethiopian refugee who went to a Kenyan aviation school and graduated
as a pilot. He is now working for the Ethiopian airlines.
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4.6.2 Educational Institutions
All of my respondents confirmed that there are no exclusive Ethiopian community
schools in Nairobi. Ethiopian families send their kids to Kenyan public and private
schools. One of the respondents summarized the situation as follows,
There are no Ethiopian community schools in Nairobi. People send their kids to
Kenyan schools. There are two parallel systems of education in Kenya. The first
is the 8- 2- 4 system of primary ,middle school and high school system of Kenyan
education and the British commonwealth system.
Kenyan schools are highly regarded by Ethiopian refugees for their superior quality
compared to their Ethiopian counterparts. Parents were also asked whether there were
incidents of discrimination and bullying against their children in schools. To my surprise,
refugees did not report any such incident. As far as higher education is concerned, all but
one of our informants stated that many refugees do not go to college in Nairobi. This is
because most people cannot afford to pay the tuition fees of these colleges. One of my
respondents stated,
I know a few people who go to Nairobi University. There are many refugees who
want to study there. But because of financial problem, most of us are out of
school.
Another refugee summarized the situation stating, “We all run to feed ourselves and
survive; college education feels like luxury when you are refugee in this expensive city!”
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4.6.3 Community Organizations
Here, I inquired whether there are other informal or formal organizations formed by
Ethiopian refugees as non-profit community driven initiatives. One of my respondents
recounted that there is an Ethiopian Community Association (ECA) legally founded in
1996. ECA functioned as an independent and nonprofit outfit up until 2003. It was active
in terms of providing health assistance for sick refugees, preparing laissez-passé forms
for those Ethiopians who want to repatriate, and managing funeral services for the
deceased and comforting families of the deceased. However, the respondent continued,
The Ethiopian embassy began to interfere in the management of the association. It
wanted to assign people who are sympathetic to the regime in power in Addis and
use the network for political cooptation purposes. Many people who were active
in the organization resigned from participating because of this.
Members were also asked about two ubiquitous associations in Ethiopia, “Iddirs” and
“Iqqubs”. In Ethiopia, almost every household is a member of local burial associations
known as the “iddir”. These organizations collect monthly contributions from members;
they announce the death of a family member to the community; they arrange the venue
and ceremony of the funeral procession; and comfort the family of the deceased for three
days by bringing food and drinks to the mourning family. They also serve people who
come to pay their condolences to the family of the deceased. A typical “Iddir” has a
chairperson, a treasurer that manages the bank account and a secretary. Another famous
cultural institution among Ethiopians is the “Iqqub”. “Iqqubs” refer to a group of
individuals who pool a fixed (and usually a significant) amount of money and provide it
to members in order to underwrite a business initiative of their own choice. Members
take turns to access this seed capital and every member is bound to contribute monthly
until everyone gets the opportunity. “Iqqubs” are useful in that they raise capital instantly
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and help those who are in need of money quickly. They also serve as a collective saving
scheme of members who set aside money for the “Iqqub”.
Refugees underscored that there are no “Iddirs” in Nairobi. Instead, there are ad hoc
contributions to cover and manage the funeral expenses if or when a refugee passes away.
One of the respondents explained the situation as follows,
I do not know if we can call them “Iddirs” properly because they are not
formalized as in Addis Ababa. They do not have assets, offices and some division
of labor. However there are informal associations where Ethiopians from different
ethnic origins meet up periodically and assist each other in such unfortunate
incidents like the death of a spouse or a family member. When people die, we
contribute to manage the funeral service. There is also that tradition of taking food
and drinks to comfort the family of the deceased and spend time together.
I then asked refugees, business as well as community leaders why it is difficult to foster
community organizations like “Iddirs” in Nairobi. One of my respondents answered as
follows,
You should realize that here everybody has dual challenges. On the one hand,
people have their collective identities and associations (national or ethnic) and do
everything to socialize and coexist. But, on the other hand, there is a lot of fear
and suspicion among refugees themselves. Each refugee thinks that the other may
be a government plant or an unknown quantity that could hinder or block his/her
emigration process. So everybody is tightlipped and fearful not to divulge much
information about their past background, their true identity and their future plans.
It is so hard to form community associations and run such initiatives amongst
urban refugees when trust is missing!
4.7 Synthesis
The bulk of this chapter analyzed how Ethiopian refugees negotiate aspects of urban
citizenship in Nairobi. Accordingly, I found that there is more to the term “urban
refugee” than just political refugees. In fact many fled to Nairobi for economic reasons.
Some aimed to use it as a transit corridor to the West or other African countries (notably
South Africa) while others wanted to settle in Nairobi permanently. There were also
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political refugees who fled the country due to political persecution and still others who
left their country of origin for personal or family related matters. Refugees had some kind
of a social safety net upon arrival where they were welcomed by family members,
spouses, and friends but in some cases complete strangers who happened to be
Ethiopians.
I found that refugees are active economic agents both in the formal and informal sectors
of Nairobi’s economy. The bulk of the respondents were employed both as skilled and
unskilled workers. Most worked as restaurant managers, barbers, hairdressers, cooks,
waiters, “makangas” or “matatu” conductors. Others managed to open up small
businesses like beauty salons, barber shops, audio and video stores, boutiques, and
cafeterias. They are registered by the city council and pay annual fees to renew their
business permits. Still others have managed to break into the formal economy running
high end businesses, cosmetic stores, construction companies, and import and export
enterprises in Nairobi. In so doing, these refugee-cum-businessmen have created a lot of
employment opportunities for other Ethiopian refugees and local Kenyans too.
It is this full blown participation of Ethiopian refugees in the Kenyan economy that
complicates their status of residence in Nairobi.

It is hard to define them only as

“refugees” even though most of them fled their country of origin for a number of reasons.
It is also hard to refer to them as “immigrants” for the overwhelming majority of them
await resettlement in a third and preferably western country. Here again, I have identified
people that the Kenyan state recognizes as “refugees” but have arrived in the city to
permanently settle and make a living. One is tempted to refer to this group of people as
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“illegal immigrants” but they are comfortable to carry a refugee ID and live in Nairobi
indefinitely. Perhaps, one can qualify them as de facto immigrants.
Obviously, one cannot refer to refugees as full-fledged Kenyan citizens. But here again,
we have second generation Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi who speak perfect Swahili,
study in Kenyan schools and consider themselves more as Kenyans than Ethiopians.
Should the Kenyan state grant citizenship to this cohort of people? Would not this
automatically complicate the status of their parents who wield their refugee alien
certificates but have lived there for years? Qualifying citizenship for Kenyans themselves
could perhaps be part of the discussion when we attempt to qualify the experience of
urban refugees. Save for carrying Kenyan IDs, participating in local and national
elections or carrying Kenyan travel documents (such as passports); Ethiopian refugees
seem to more or less enjoy similar social and economic rights like Kenyans.
This is not to argue that Ethiopian refugees are fully integrated into Kenyan society. That
is not the case. In fact, the study found out that Ethiopians retained their collective
identity by establishing (or replicating) their own unique economic, religious and cultural
institutions and practices. There are two Ethiopian Orthodox churches and around seven
Ethiopian evangelical churches. They have charity and care giving associations like
“Maedot”. These institutions are not only engaged in spiritual ministries and services but
also provide the social and cultural milieu for refugees. They offer help for the poor, the
sick and the elderly. They provide trainings in language and business skills to help
refugees integrate. They comfort refugees when a family member passes away. They
support refugees who choose to go back to Ethiopia by defraying travel costs. Refugees
also have fraternity and sorority associations known as “Mahibers.”
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They also founded the Ethiopian Community Association (ECA) legally in 1996 which
was active in terms of providing health assistance for sick refugees, preparing laissezpassé forms for Ethiopians who wanted to repatriate, and managing funeral services for
the deceased. This elucidates how refugees have been initiating, developing and
institutionalizing organizations of faith and mutual support while facing immense
challenges. Refugees are constantly involved in creating social practices and structures on
the move from their country of origin and en route to a third country of final settlement.
Their temporal and spatial suspension in Nairobi did not deter them from such “creative”
transition. It is also essential to note that different cohorts of refugees come and go via
Nairobi but the institutions that they founded outlast their “stay” in Nairobi. The
institutions expand, become more formal and sophisticated through the passage of time.

In addition to their inkling to retain and reinforce their collective identity as Ethiopians,
refugees also face a number of challenges from their host society that force them to
cluster together. Most of them do not speak Swahili (which is the national language) or
good English that most Kenyans fluently speak. And in many instances, they are
harassed, asked for money or arbitrarily detained by Kenyan police officers. This stands
out as the major problem and a major cultural shock to Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi.
Corruption is a big problem in Kenya. It runs through the government bureaucracy
ranging from private police officers and their commanders to the clerks, department
heads, commissioners and ministers of the Kenyan state. This holds true also for the city
council of Nairobi where the bureaucrats are accused of using their office prerogatives to
ask for bribes and kickbacks.
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Given these unique set of conditions, the second research question looms even larger.
Can the ‘Right to the City’ approach adequately explain the everyday struggle of
Ethiopian urban refugees for rights and resources in Nairobi? To answer this question, we
need to recap the basic premises of Lefebvre’s argument for the “Right to the City”.
Purcell’s three point summary comes in handy. First, Lefebvre established his notion of
urban citizenship on inhabitance. This is a radical departure from the two traditional ways
in which citizenship is define i.e. ius soli (being born in the territory) or ius sanguinis
(descent from citizen parents). Second, Lefebvre posited that everyone should have the
right “full and complete usage of the city”. All inhabitants of the city should be able to
“live in, play in, work in, represent, characterize and occupy urban space” (Purcell,
2002:106). Last but not least, “right to the city” implies the right to directly participate in
the democratic management of the urban space. Needless to mention that Lefebvre’s
approach to democratic management is a critique of liberal and representative democracy.
For him, representation (via electoral practices) alienates the urban citizen. The antidote
is what Lefebvre dubs the right to difference. This entails the right to claim rights, to
struggle and conflict with the powers that be while managing one’s own city.
I have earlier indicated that all but three of our respondents came straight to Nairobi.
Camp refugees also left and settled in Nairobi without duress. Even though the UNHCR
and the government of Kenya insist that refugees should primarily be kept in camps,
there is no strict rule or law that confined refugees to these premises. Movement into and
residence inside the city of Nairobi has not therefore been sanctioned against refugees. In
fact, beginning from the year 2006 the Kenyan government took the step of registering all
urban refugees in Nairobi and issuing them an alien certificate card which confirmed
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their legal residence in the city. To use Lefebvre’s qualifier, inhabitance was always
granted and has never been denied to urban refugees in Nairobi. Seen from this vantage
point, urban refugees will pass the first test for urban citizenship unequivocally.
Ethiopian refugees do “live in, play in, work in, represent, characterize and occupy urban
space” (Purcell, 2002:106).
If anything, this chapter went further and explored how urban refugees occupy urban
space in Nairobi. Here again, Lefebvre’s three fold taxonomy of urban spaces serves us a
great deal. In his other book The Production of Space (1973) Lefebvre introduced three
main ways of understanding space i.e. “perceived, conceived and lived spaces.” Elden
and Brenner elaborated on this schema of Lefebvre stating that it unites “physical, mental
and social space”. Perceived spaces, that Lefebvre also calls ‘territorial practices’ and
‘territorial representations’ include : “the physical, material spaces of state territory, from
the borders, fences, walls and barriers erected to mark its external limits”(Brenner and
Elden, 2009:365). Conceived spaces , whom he also calls ‘representations of territory’
refer to, “a range of imagined senses of the body of a nation translated into political
practice, including maps and charts; abstract ways of representing territory cartography,
and otherwise diagrammatically”(Brenner and Eden, 2009:365). Thirdly, lived spaces
refer to the individual and social experience of living through the physical and mental
world of spaces. For Purcell, lived space represents “the complex amalgamation of
perceived and conceived space. It is the everyday life of the city dweller (Purcell,
2003:577).”
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In Nairobi, refugees regularly construct urban spaces in all the three ways Lefebvre
outlined. They occupy recognizable and crudely delineated territorial representations i.e.
physical and geographic areas where they physically dwell clustered. They produce
goods and services. They trade with fellow Kenyans and other African refugees. They
occupy apartment buildings, churches, mosques, bars and restaurants disproportionately
in Nairobi’s municipal wards like Eastleigh North, Eastleigh South and Killimani. These
perceived urban spaces translate into representations of territory or conceived spaces that
refugees create through their routine interactions with territory, the fringes of the Kenyan
state and the host community. For instance, Kenyan officials usually refer to Eastleigh as
“their” neighborhood marking and addressing it as the neighborhood of outsiders (i.e.
refugees). Speaking of Eastleigh, informants come with words like “crowding”, “illegal
human trafficking”, “Somali and Ethiopian businesses”, “Islamic Fundamentalism”,
“bomb attacks” , “security threats” etc. These “conceptions” speak volumes about how
the physical abode of urban refugees is interpreted by the Kenyan state and the public at
large. Eastleigh is implied as that wild neighborhood whose governmentality is suspect
due to its overwhelming refugee population.

Also, this chapter went to great length to document and analyze what Lefebvre termed as
the social space of inhabitants i.e. “the everyday life of the city dweller (Purcell,
2003:577).” Here I described their economic activities and business ventures. I outlined
their basic expenditure patterns. I looked at the religious and community organizations
that they have created during their stay in Nairobi. In short, I depicted how refugees
muster their social networks and economic resources to negotiate rights and resources in
Nairobi. Three words will summarize the nature of these urban social spaces:
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“resilience”, “innovation” and “cooperation”. Refugees come through difficult conditions
only to unpack and innovate new livelihood strategies of survival. They also offer a
tremendous amount of economic, social, cultural and spiritual support to each other. This
definitely helps cushion the pain of adjusting to the grim reality of being a refugee. To
paraphrase Lefebvre, Ethiopian urban refugees stand out as active inhabitants who are
constantly engaged in the creation and restructuration of perceived, conceived and social
spaces in Nairobi.

But such practices will not lead us to automatically conclude that urban refugees are
urban citizens. This is because Lefebvre brings in a second and more important qualifier
to what he means by “right to the city”. In addition to the appropriation and creation of
urban spaces, Lefebvre stressed “the democratic management of the city through the
direct participation of society (Mathivet, 2010:25)”. In fact, Lefebvre recommends a
“contemporary formula for social citizenship, expressing a ‘social project’ which requires
a new political contract between the state and citizens”. In short, state- refugee relations
and the latter’s ability to participate in the management of the city should be examined
thoroughly. Here, I have found that the relationship between refugees and the Kenyan
state is not that rosy at all! None other than the problem of police corruption and
harassment substantiates this assertion.

Refugees and their business leaders spoke

bitterly about the problem of corruption and police harassment repeatedly.

Refugees stand out as targets of police harassment and corruption because of their
vulnerable position as the “other” i.e. aliens or foreigners. According to one of my
respondents, “There is an undercurrent among Kenyan police officers that refugees come
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to Kenya either because they are rich or to make money off of Kenyans!” Hence Kenyan
police officers are not reluctant to harass and discriminate against refugees. But refugees
insisted that they face the specter of discrimination and exploitation not from ordinary
Kenyans but rather from the foot soldiers of the Kenyan state! The State through its
punitive organs (or shall we say “law enforcement officials”?) appears to be the single
most institution that draws the contours of a refugee-citizen divide in Nairobi. The
political, therefore, takes the centre stage in defining the rights and capabilities of a
refugee vis-a vis its limitations and vulnerabilities. The following chapter therefore
dwells on the relationships between the Kenyan state and urban refugees reflecting
mainly on the policies and practices that delineate the scope and content of political rights
for refugees.
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CHAPTER V
THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: THE STATE AND URBAN REFUGEES
Overview

In previous chapters, I traced the genesis of the term “citizen” from liberal renditions that
describe an individual (i.e. a free subject) who claims a bundle of civic, political, social
and economic rights from a respective state. In turn, the citizen is expected to pay taxes,
elect his or her political representatives, and stand in defense of that state in case of
aggression. Critics of liberalism such as civic republicans argued to expand the notion of
a citizen. For the latter, a citizen should be more than a tax payer or a voter and should
actively participate in the public and cultural affairs of his or her nation devoutly. It is
that sense of emotional and cultural allegiance to the “nation” that counts more to them
than mere birth or residence in a country. Still others challenge the entire premise of
locating citizenship on membership in the nation-state arguing that we are “citizens of the
world” before we become citizens of nation-state. For these who espouse cosmopolitan
citizenship, our allegiance to universal human rights and dignity should never be
compromised even when our respective nation-states trample on the rights of “other”
states or communities.

Qualifying “citizenship” therefore hinges on the notion of nation-state i.e. the power of
the state to determine and sanction the rights of its citizens vis-a-vis “aliens” (guest
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workers, immigrants, illegal immigrants, refugees, stateless persons, etc). This brings the
politics of rights to the forefront of the discussion. The analysis from extensive interviews
with Ethiopian urban refugees did point in that direction too. Refugees kept reiterating
that they face the specter of discrimination and exploitation in Nairobi not from ordinary
Kenyans but rather from the officials of the Kenyan state. The Kenyan Police appears to
be the single most institution that draws the contours of a refugee-citizen divide in
Nairobi.

The following chapter therefore pays a discriminate emphasis to the relationship between
the Kenyan state and urban refugees. It aims to explore the policies and practices that
delineate the scope and content of political rights for urban refugees in Kenya. The
chapter posits two important questions. First, what are the bundles of political rights that
urban refugees in Nairobi enjoy (or are supposed to enjoy) and how do these differ from
the rights of citizens? Second, how do Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi relate to the Kenyan
state, and its law enforcement agencies? Accordingly, the first section provides a
thorough summary of the international, national and local right regimes that urban
refugees in Kenya operate under. The second section delves into how urban refugees
explain their relations with the auxiliaries of the Kenyan state.
5.1 Global, Continental and National Regimes of Refugee Rights
5.1.1 The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
An ideal point to start reviewing the international legal framework on urban refuges
would be the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted and
proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly. This document enshrined basic,
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universal and inalienable rights to all human beings, including refugees. These inter alia
include: a) the right to life, liberty, and security of person (Article 3); b) the right to
recognition everywhere as a person before the law (Article 6); c) the right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each State (Article 13); and d) the right to
own property alone as well as in association with others. (Article 17)
The declaration is also unequivocal about human dignity and the importance of protecting
it by law. Article 7 of the UDHR stipulates this vital notion by stating that “All are equal
before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.”
Article 9 qualifies this provision stating that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile.” More importantly, the UDHR enshrined that every human
being has “the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”
(Article 14) Clearly, the UDHR is the first international policy instrument which
recognized the right of refugees and recalibrated it as a human rights issue. In short,
refugees, simply by virtue of being human beings, have fundamental rights to life and
security, to adequate legal protection, to move around freely, create and own wealth.
Finally, even the right to be a refugee is qualified for the first time as a basic human right.
(UN Gen Assembly Resolution 217A (III), 1948)
The only provision of the Universal Human Rights Declaration that delineates and
confines the rights of the individual within the nation-state is Article 21. Stipulating a
bundle of political rights for a citizen-person of a given country, Article 21 boldly states
that:
1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.2) Everyone has the right to
equal access to public service in his country.3) The will of the people shall be
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the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Seen from this vantage point, refugees can enjoy all but political rights of participation,
election and access to public services in their host city or country.

5.1.2 The United Nations Convention on Refugees (1951) and the Revised Protocol
(1967)
Three years later (1951), the United Nations adopted its Convention on Refugees where it
also decided to establish the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).
Article 1 of the 1951 convention defined a refugee as a person, who fled his or her
country “owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” and “is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”
Sub Article 4C of the first article qualifies that a ‘refugee’ may lose his or her title is if
“He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which
he remained owing to fear of persecution.” Hence, the Convention recognizes the
possibility of refugees settling in permanently and becoming citizens of the country they
fled into.

Even more, Article 7(1) states that host countries “shall accord to refugees the same
treatment as is accorded to aliens generally”. For instance, contracting states should have
favorable policies for refugees with regards to “the acquisition of movable and
immovable property”. (Article 13) Industrial, artistic, literary and scientific works of a
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refugee “shall be accorded in the country in which he has his habitual residence.” (Article
14) A refugee can also have gainful employment in the host country, if “1) he has
completed three years’ residence in the country, 2) he has a spouse possessing the
nationality of the country of residence, or 3) he has one or more children possessing the
nationality of the country of residence.” (Article 17(2)) And refugees have broader rights
to access public education and housing in favorable terms and by the standards that other
aliens in the host country or city are treated. (Articles 21 and 22) A few amendments
were inserted into the 1951 Convention when the UN General Assembly adopted a
Protocol on 31 January 1967.

The 1967 Refugee Protocol starts by lifting the time and geographic limits mentioned in
the 1951 Refugee Convention. This Protocol is more explicit and forthcoming when it
comes to the legal protection of refugees and the duties and responsibilities of the host
state for refugees. Article 16 sub-article 1 discusses that a “refugee shall have free access
to the courts of law on the territory of all Contracting States”. Sub article 2 further
stipulates that “A refugee shall enjoy in the Contracting State in which he has his habitual
residence the same treatment as a national in matters pertaining to access to the courts.”
We have to mention two more important obligations of any signatory state here. Article
26 commits host states to afford refugees the freedom of movement. It states that host
states should “accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of
residence and to move freely within its territory.”

Article 27 also mandates the

contracting states to “issue identity papers to any refugee in their territory who does not
possess a valid travel document.”
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We can conclude by stating that the Refugee Convention (1951) and the 1967 Protocol on
the Status of Refugees cover three main subjects. First they detailed the basic refugee
definition, and specified the circumstances under which one cedes a refugee status.
Secondly, they outlined the legal, economic, social and cultural rights of refugees
alongside their duties and obligations. Particularly the 1967 Protocol stressed the right of
refugees to be protected against forcible return, or refoulement, to a territory where their
lives or freedom would be threatened. Thirdly, both the Convention and the Protocol
discussed the contracting state’s obligations to cooperate with the newly formed United
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Kenya is a signatory to UDHR, the
Convention and Protocol on the status of refugees.

5.1.3

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Declaration on Refugees

Two years later, African Heads of States met in Addis Ababa on 10 September 1969 and
endorsed the OAU Convention on African Refugees, which is the first legal and policy
instrument of the continent. The OAU convention endorsed the UN Convention and
Protocol but included new concerns and provisions which were not discussed before. For
instance, the Preamble (Clause3) states that the refugee problem has become “a source of
friction among many Member States.” Hence, Article 3 stated that “the granting of
asylum to refugees is a peaceful and humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an
unfriendly act by any Member State”. Written in the context of the Cold War and African
civil wars, it speaks about the difficulty to “make a distinction between a refugee who
seeks a peaceful and normal life and a person fleeing his country for the sole purpose of
fomenting subversion from outside.” (Preamble (C4))
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The OAU declaration brought in very helpful ideas to the international upkeep of
refugees in general. For instance, it enshrined the principle of non-refoulement. Article
2(3) stated that a “person fleeing his country shall not be subjected to such measures as
rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion.” Second, Article 2(4) introduced the idea
that an OAU Member State can “appeal directly to other Member States and through the
OAU” to assist in granting asylum to refugees if it finds it overwhelming or difficult. It
also encourages other Member States to respond to such calls “in the spirit of African
Solidarity and international cooperation” and “lighten the burden of the Member State
granting Asylum”.

Despite these constructive additions, the security concern of member states about
subversion from neighboring countries is evident in the wording of the declaration.
Accordingly, Article 3(1) states that any African refugee “shall also abstain from any
subversive activities against any Member State of the OAU.” The penultimate sub article
stresses that

Signatory States undertake to prohibit refugees residing in their respective
territories from attacking any State Member of the OAU, by any activity likely to
cause tension between Member States, and in particular by use of arms, through
the press, or by radio.

The African continent, it seems, was the first to realize that refugee outflow due to forced
displacement could be used as an ideal opportunity to mobilize political dissent and
combat operations against the incumbent of a neighboring state. Unfortunately, this
became the case in the 1970s and 80s where guerilla fighters and insurgents began to
exploit refugee camps as recruiting and resource mobilizing grounds for civil wars raging
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inland. The escalation of such wars, in turn, resulted the further outpouring of refugees to
the neighboring countries unleashing a vicious cycle of conflicts and refugee-cumcombatants. This was more so in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. In most of these cases, the global
superpowers (USA and USSR) were each supporting rival factions and staging brutal
proxy wars.

Last but not least; the OAU convention legalized the ‘encampment’ approach to refugees
stating that, “For reasons of security, countries of asylum shall, as far as possible, settle
refugees

at

a

reasonable

distance

from

the

frontier

of

their

country of

origin.”(Article2(6)) Otherwise, ‘encampment” has never been enshrined as a legal
prerogative of contracting states in the UN Convention of refugees (1951) and the 1967
Protocol. To sum up, all of these international legal instruments play a pivotal role in
articulating the rights and duties of refugees, contracting states, the UNHCR and the
African Union. They have also inspired the development of national policies and laws on
refugees by such countries like Kenya and South Africa.
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5.1.4

The Refugee Act of Kenya (2006)

The Refugee Act of Kenya became the law of the land in December 30 th, 2006. The Act
begins by defining what a refugee is, the category of people who are not eligible for the
status of a “refugee”, and the conditions under which a person cedes his or her refugee
status. The Act drew a lot both from the UN Convention on Refugees and the 1967
Protocol while qualifying categories and concepts. To its credit, the Act outlines its
provisions in plain English with few esoteric legal terms. It also formally instituted the
Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) to be “responsible for all administrative matters
concerning refugees in Kenya, and shall, in that capacity, co-ordinate activities and
programs relating to refugees.” (Article6 (2)) It also enshrined the prerogatives of the
Commissioner for Refugee Affairs who is going to head the DRA. Inter alia, the
Commissioner is delegated to: a) “formulate policy on refugee matters in accordance with
international Standards”, b) “register all refugees”, c) “issue refugee identification cards
and travel documents to refugees”, and d) “manage refugee camps and other related
facilities”. DRA is also designated to liaise with UNHCR.

The Act also declared the formation of a Refugee Affairs Committee (RAC) and the
Refugee Appeal Board (RAB). RAC’s mandate is to assist the Commissioner for
Refugees in matters concerning the recognition of persons as refugees as defined in the
Act. The RAC comprises of 12 members, a third of whom must be women. All twelve
members are drawn from government ministries and departments. All but two of the
bureaus represented are from the national security corps of the cabinet. They include
representatives from the Police, National Intelligence Service, Ministry of Interior,
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Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and of course the
Department of Refugee Affairs. Besides the provision for the incorporation of one
representative from the host community and civil society, refugees are not represented at
all. This means, refugees are “left only with DRA (whose competence is broader) and the
courts of law as the legal forums through which to represent their issues and concerns.”
(Munene, 2010:19) The Refugee Appeal Board comprises a chairperson with a
background in law, plus six other members. Refugees can appeal to this board if they are
not satisfied with the decision of the Department of Refugee Affairs. (Refugee Act,
Section 10 (1))

Articles 16 and 17 constitute the core of this Act for they posit refugee encampment as
the center piece policy of the Kenyan government when it comes to refugees. There is no
mention of urban refugees in the legislation. In fact, Article 16(2A) speaks of establishing
“transit centers for the purposes of temporarily accommodating persons who have applied
for recognition as refugees”. Since immigration processes are undertaken in Nairobi,
lawmakers seem intent to establish “transit centers” (a euphemism for camps) in urban
areas too. Section 16 (4) also provides that “…every refugee and member of his family in
Kenya shall, in respect of wage-earning employment, be subject to the same restrictions
as are imposed on persons who are not citizens of Kenya”. This implies that the refugees
have the right to acquire work permits. However, Munene (2010:17) argues that “not
many refugees will be able to secure work permits” for two reasons. First, “The
government will consider the skills that a migrant has to offer before a work permit is
given” (Munene, 2010:17). In most cases, refugees do not have formal credentials of
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training and skills. Secondly, “The work permit has to be paid for”. Most refugees may
not have the money to access the permit (Munene, 2010:17).

More troubling provisions of the Refugee Act are articles 19 and 21. Article 19 states that
the Commissioner can “withdraw the refugee status of any person where there are
reasonable grounds for regarding that person as a danger to national security or to any
community of that country”. Furthermore, Article 21 states that the Ministry of
Immigration can “order the expulsion from Kenya of any refugee or member of his
family if the Minister considers the expulsion to be necessary on the grounds of national
security or public order.” These provisions provide extraordinary (and extrajudicial!)
prerogatives to the office of the DRA. It is also not clear what a “reasonable ground”
constitutes to withdraw a refugee status or expel refugees as national security threats.
Ironic enough, the law does not also specify where expelled refugees can go afterwards.
To sum up, the Refugee Act is a policy blue print that privileges national security
concerns and encampment. It reads more as a monitoring and punitive device and is
rather very skeptical about refugees in general. It also rides roughshod over the reality of
urban refugees in Nairobi and how they have become a part of the economic and social
fabric of the city.
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5.1.5

The New Kenyan Constitution (2010)

After years of wrangling and controversy, the Republic of Kenya has ratified a new
Constitution of Kenya following the referendum on 4th August 2010.

The Kenyan

Parliament has now taken the responsibility of forming various legal and policy task
forces to streamline national Acts, Bills and Proclamations passed in previous years
according to the new Constitution of Kenya. In fact, I learned from our interview with an
official of Refugee Coalition Kenya (RCK) that the Parliament has actually delegated
RCK to create the task force that would review the 2006 Refugee Act and streamline it in
the spirit of the new Constitution. The fact that the national Parliament has actually
entrusted a local NGO to head this initiative is very commendable.
I have also looked into the Chapters, Articles, Sub-Articles and Clauses of the
Constitution to see if there are relevant chapters that touch upon or deal with the issue of
refugees in Kenya. Only the chapter that deals with citizenship matters (chapter 3) seems
to be tangentially related to our focus. The new Constitution defines citizenship in the
two traditional ways i.e. by descent from Kenyan parents (ius sanguinis) and by place of
birth (ius soli). Article 14(1) stipulates that “A person is a citizen by birth if on the day of
the person’s birth, whether or not the person is born in Kenya, either the mother or father
of the person is a citizen.” Article 14(4) continues that “A child found in Kenya who is,
or appears to be, less than eight years of age, and whose nationality and parents are not
known, is presumed to be a citizen by birth”.

In addition, the Constitution warranted the possibility of citizenship by naturalization too.
Article 15(2) states that “A person who has been lawfully resident in Kenya for a
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continuous period of at least seven years, and who satisfies the conditions prescribed by
an Act of Parliament, may apply to be registered as a citizen”. The two factors (outlined
in broad strokes) that would lead to Kenyan citizenship through naturalization therefore
are a) 7 years of inhabitance, and b) satisfying conditions prescribed by a subsequent Act
of Parliament. Both of these provisions would definitely make urban refugees who have
lived in Nairobi for more than seven years very optimistic about securing Kenyan
citizenship. But still, turning this possibility into reality solely depends on a future
legislation “establishing conditions on which citizenship may be granted to individuals
who are citizens of other countries.” (Article 15(4))

The Constitution vests all political rights and freedoms on Kenyan citizens only (Article
38). These include the rights to (a) form, or participate in forming, a political party; (b)
participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, a political party; or (c) campaign
for a political party or cause. Every citizen, the Constitution states, has the right to vote
and be voted into public office. That these rights are exclusive to Kenyan citizens is
discussed under Article 78(1) which states that “A person is not eligible for election or
appointment to a State office unless the person is a citizen of Kenya”. Even more, the
Constitution states that “A State officer or a member of the Defense Forces shall not hold
dual citizenship.” (Article 78(2)) To conclude, the new Constitution is not that different
from other Constitutions, International Protocols and Conventions which carve out
political rights as the exceptional domain of citizens. But it is progressive in that it left
the door ajar for urban refugees when it comes to naturalization and claiming full Kenyan
citizenship at a later stage. The ratification of a Kenyan Naturalization Act would
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ultimately determine the opportunities or perils of such a course. Nevertheless, the writer
believes it is a commendable step in the right direction.

5.2 The Politics of Refugee Rights in Nairobi
5.2.1 Legal Recognition for Urban Refugees
Despite the flurry of international and national conventions, protocols and acts with
regards to refugee rights, both the Kenyan government and the UNHCR were not keen to
formally recognize and address refugees who live in urban areas before 2006. This was
reflected in the interviews both with officials and refugees. This benign neglect of urban
refugees gave the leeway for brazen harassment directed especially at those who did not
have a refugee mandate in Nairobi. One of my informants summarized the history of
state-refugee relations in Nairobi as follows,
We can speak of three different time frames when Ethiopian refugees began to
arrive in Kenya. The first phase of Ethiopian refugees came in the early 1970s
following the collapse of the Imperial regime in Ethiopia. Their number was quite
small and most of them were political refugees. But the second and major phase
of refugee influx to Nairobi happened in 1991 when thousands of demobilized
soldiers, supporters and high officials of the military regime in Ethiopia fled to
Kenya. University students and journalists who were very critical of the rebel
fighters also began to flee to Kenya in the following years. Following the 2005
post –election crisis in Ethiopia, another wave of political refugees happened. But
1991 represents a major benchmark where Nairobi began hosting thousands of
Ethiopian refugees whose number now stands next to Somali refugees.
Beginning from 1991 up until 2003, the Kenyan Police was very hostile to urban
refugees. They used to arbitrarily arrest refugees, ask for money, and threaten to
detain if refugees do not cave into their demand. Things have improved since the
Kibaki administration came to office in 2002. But in 2005, a prominent Kenyan
politician Mrs. Martha Karuwa who was then Kenyan Minister of Justice came
with a drastic draft bill that aimed at summary expulsion of refugees. Most
refugees were shocked and began to flee to South Africa and Uganda. The
Ugandan government explicitly stated its readiness to host refugees and the
UNHCR threatened to move its regional office to Kampala. The Kenyan
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government made a complete turn around and decreed all urban refugees to
register and get their alien certificates. In just a day, more than 4000 Ethiopian
and Eritrean refugees got their alien certificates from the Kenyan authorities.

One of the refugee informants described the situation in 2005 as follows, “I got the alien
certificate in 2006. Before that Martha Karuwa ordered us to leave the country. But it
brought an international outcry from UN agencies here and the government changed its
mind”. It has now been more than 6 years since the Kenyan government begun to issue a
legal certificate of residence to urban refugees that it calls “Alien Certificate”. The
policy reversal by the Kenyan government and its gesture to legalize and formalize the
residence of urban refugees is highly regarded by Ethiopian refugees. One of my
respondents who arrived in Nairobi in the middle of the 2005 crisis recounts the policy
change as follows,
Ethiopian refugees used to have a lot of problems with Kenyan police officers
who used to detain and harass us for money. The situation has improved since
2006 when the majority of urban refugees were issued alien certificates by the
Kenyan government. This was good news for me because in 2005 I applied for a
refugee status mandate at the UNHCR but was rejected by the UN. Fortunately,
the Kenyan government granted me the alien certificate which has given me the
legal status to reside in the city and engage in business legally.
The alien certificate has a number of useful functions which I summarized as follows.
First, the alien certificate grants an urban refugee the legal right to reside in the city of
Nairobi. It serves as an identification card and helps a great deal in protecting refugees
from random harassment by rogue police officers. Now, the police have less excuse and
leverage to harass refugees who carry their certificates around. The alien certificate is
also vital if one wants to secure business permits from the city council. It is required by
banks if a refugee wants to open a bank account. Kenyan schools and colleges require the
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alien certificate in order to process admission for applications of urban refugees. And
more importantly, refugees are granted Kenyan exit visas to settle in western countries
only if they have mature alien certificates. Refugees are not allowed to leave Kenya if
their alien certificates are forged or have expired. Hence, refugees underscore how vital
the alien certificate is. One of the respondents stated, “The alien certificate protects you
from police harassment. You can open up your own bank account and manage your
finances without fear of dispossession. It serves as your ID card anywhere else”. One of
the female respondents engaged in cross border clothing trade also mentioned, “The alien
certificate is very crucial. Without it you cannot cross the border for trade purposes.”
Before 2005, it was only the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
that was solely involved in refugee registration. It also had the mandate to undertake what
is known as Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process. Refugees are summoned to be
registered. They are asked to submit relevant documents and records that attest about
their identity and the reasons why they fled the country. They sit in for personal
interviews where UNHCR officials try to determine whether the applicant has faced real
and eminent threat of political persecution in their country of origin.
The RSD process takes a long period of time mainly because the UNHCR Kenya office
processes the applications of hundreds and thousands of camp refugees in Daddab and
Kakuma in addition to the urban refugees located in Nairobi. Also, the UNHCR office
caters for refugees from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Southern Sudan, and Northern
Uganda. More than 15 of the refugee informants had to wait for more than two years to
pass through the RSD process and finally secure what is popularly known as the “refugee
mandate” from the UNHCR. In fact, most refugees who have not yet received final
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results about their UNHCR applications bitterly complain about the slothfulness of the
process. One of the respondents stated,
To secure “mandate” from the UNHCR takes a very long time. After years of
waiting, your application can actually be rejected. There is an interview and
screening process which is quite long. Usually, journalists, political refugees and
those active in human rights organizations in Ethiopia get their mandates rapidly.
Even then, the actual process of securing third country settlement and processing
the entry visa takes a long period of time. I know of people who have waited for
more than 10 years for this process to be completed. The rule says that you should
not be waiting for more than 2 years but they are actually processing applications
of the year 1999 right now.
These sentiments of refugees are supported by UNHCR’s own assessment of the process.
The Global Report of the UNHCR (2011:91) admits about how slow third country
settlement from Kenya has been as follows,
Almost 8,700 cases were submitted to resettlement countries in 2011: over 80 per
cent to the United States followed by the United Kingdom, Sweden and Australia.
However, only about one third of them (2,725) were able to depart, mostly to the
United States, Canada, Sweden and Australia. Delays in departures to receiving
countries were due primarily to exhaustive background security checks and
clearances. A total of 111 persons repatriated voluntarily, mostly to Somalia and
South Sudan.
Given the incredible backlog of the UNHCR system, refugees find the alien certificate to
be much more helpful. In most cases, refugees managed to secure both the alien
certificates and the UNHCR mandate. For instance, one of our refugee informants
reported,
The UNHCR has already approved my application for a refugee status and has
given me the document that we here refer to us “mandate”. The UNHCR is also
processing my relocation process into a third country. I am actually waiting for
the relocation process to be finalized but I also have the alien certificate which is
very useful because it is your ID card.
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But in some cases, refugees whose UNHCR applications were refused have managed to
stay in Kenya wielding their alien certificate only. One of the female respondents
explained her situation as follows,
I received the Kenyan alien certificate in 2006 when I was actually waiting for the
final result of my application for a UNHCR mandate. Unfortunately, the UNHCR
rejected my application but I still use my alien certificate to stay in Nairobi. Most
of us who arrived here before 2006 managed to secure alien certificate even
though we did not get the UN mandate as a refugee.
Over the last three years, however, the Kenyan government and the UNHCR have
collaborated to close this legal loophole, which will adversely impact some urban
refugees. A UN official in Nairobi described the new process of securing legal residence
in Nairobi as follows,
We streamlined the refugee status determination process with Kenya’s
Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA). Upon arrival, refugees should now get
registered with the DRA to get a provisional ID locally known as the
“Shiromoyo”. That identification card serves only for a year and in the mean time
the refugee has to apply at the UNHCR to get a refugee mandate. UNHCR calls
for interviews almost every six month. Once it is granted, then the Kenyan
government offers you the alien certificate. Usually it takes a minimum of two
years for the UNHCR to process your relocation in a third country.
Two of my informants who are also community leaders in the refugee community
confirmed the same about the new system of registration that the Kenyan government and
the UNHCR have introduced.
In the past, anybody can directly go and apply for a refugee mandate from the
UNHCR. Now the process has changed. You have to first get your provisional ID
from the Kenyan government before heading out to the UNHCR. After rigorous
interviews, the UNHCR officials either grant or reject your applications for
refugee mandate. If accepted, the UNHCR also offers a list of countries who have
agreed to take refugees as hosts (most of these countries have quotas). The
refugees then choose a country. The UNHCR then works with the immigration
department of the respective host country and begins to process entry visa for the
applicant. This process usually takes between 2 to 8 years (depending on the case)
for refugees to finally be issued immigrant visa into western countries. After
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securing the mandate, though, the refugee should appear at the Kenyan Ministry
of immigration to get his alien certificate. The certificate is crucial because it is
the sole document that warrants exit visa from Kenya when refugees leave the
country.
It is important to underscore here that in the past, the UNHCR was unwilling to process
mandate and relocation to urban refugees insisting that they should go back to refugee
camps! One of the informants described the situation as follows,
Earlier, the UNHCR insisted on accepting and processing the application of camp
refugees only. Urban refugees used to play a tricky game with the UN system.
They had contacts in the camps who telephone them about upcoming visits of
UNHCR officials and interviewers days ahead of these planned visits. Most of the
urban refugees used to go to Kakuma (which is almost a two days journey from
Nairobi) to get counted, interviewed, and follow up on the status of their
relocation applications. Then, they sneak back to Nairobi on the next immediate
bus.
Right now, Nairobi hosts urban refugees some of whom have both the alien certificate
and the UNHCR mandate. There are others who managed to secure the alien certificates
pre-2009 even though the UNHCR rejected their refugee mandate applications. And post2009, we have refugees who are waiting for UNHCR decisions for mandate and do not
have an alien certificate either. The latter only have their provisional IDs. One of the
respondents belongs to this group. Asked whether he has the certificate, he responded, “I
don’t have Kenyan ID because I have been waiting for the UNHCR decision for a
refugee status to apply for the alien certificate.” There, of course, were some outliers
when it comes to why they do not have alien certificates in Nairobi. Another respondents
added, “I managed to secure the Kenyan passport illegally and it was helpful for me to
travel at least to other African countries. Frankly, I do not need it!” Note how the state
which happens to predate on the weakest and most vulnerable sections of its population
(refugees) is itself very weak, informal and transactional. The so called “aliens” can buy
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their way into Kenyan citizenship (at least nominally) securing passports and travel
documents from corrupt officials.
Two of the business leaders that I interviewed also reported that they are now Kenyan
citizens and carry Kenyan passports. Both stated that they applied to the Ministry of
Immigration Affairs in Kenya for naturalization and managed to secure Kenyan
citizenship. Asked about the criteria the Kenyan authorities considered to grant these
people the citizenships status, both respondents outlined the following factors. The
reasons include: their long years of stay and work in Nairobi, the fact that they had legal
business/work permits, they paid taxes in time, and they were known to Kenyan
authorities as peaceful and law abiding business people in Kenya.

One of my

respondents who owns her own high end beauty salon in downtown Nairobi narrated the
process as follows,
For so many years, I used the UNHCR travel document to fly to Europe, other
parts of Africa and the Gulf region for business. But it was so hard to secure visa
from embassies because of my refugee status. So in 2005, I applied for Kenyan
passport at the Ministry of Immigration. The Kenyan officials requested a letter
from the Ethiopian embassy declaring that I have rescinded my Ethiopian
citizenship. But the Ethiopian Ambassador was unwilling to give me such a letter
and I had to plead him via the Togolese ambassador to get the letter. Finally he
relented. The authorities looked at the fact that I have lived there for 17 years as a
legal permanent resident and reviewed my business profile. I understand they also
did security checks. They finally agreed to issue me a Kenyan passport.
Another respondent, a manager of a high end Ethiopian restaurant in Nairobi also
explained about the naturalization process as follows.
Until very recently refugees used to go the UNHCR to register and get a
residential permit. In my case, I had to go to the Kenyan Ministry of Immigration
to get a Class M residential status which also allowed me to open up and run my
restaurant business. But in 2007, I went to the Kenyan Ministry of Immigration to
apply for Kenyan citizenship. The senior officials knew me, checked my profile
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and agreed to grant me citizenship. But they first demanded that I revoke my
Ethiopian citizenship which I did. Now I am Kenyan citizen.
It is, however, important to state that I only stumbled on three cases where refugees
stated that they have Kenyan citizenship and travel documents. Otherwise, the
overwhelming majority of Ethiopian refugees still carry their alien certificates.
Often, refugees stress the importance of having the alien certificate in Nairobi for security
purposes. This is especially true in the context of the Horn of Africa where Somali based
Islamic extremist groups have launched bomb attacks in Nairobi. Given these attacks,
massive police raids and arbitrary arrests are commonplace in the neighborhoods of
Eastleigh where the majority of Somali and Ethiopian refugees reside. The Kenyan
security officials suspect that Eastleigh is the hideout spot for the jihadists to plan and
execute attacks in the city. The problem is innocent Somali and Ethiopian refugees get
caught in the cross fires. In the post 911 order of the “War on Terrorism”, urban refugees
are now subject to more police scrutiny than ever. In a condition like this, not having
legal alien certificate means landing in prison. One of the refugees from Eastleigh North
described the situation as follows:
Just two weeks ago, we had bomb attacks in the city that the jihadist group in
Somalia known as Al Shabab claimed responsibility for. Following that attack,
the Kenyan police conducted random raids to find Al Shabab operatives in
Eastleigh. Houses were ransacked and properties were confiscated or in some
cases simply stolen by the Police. Hundreds of Ethiopian and Somali urban
refugees were also arrested. Later, however, only those refugees who have their
alien certificates were released and those who did not are still detained for further
investigation.
I also inquired whether Ethiopian refugees with alien certificates face other legal
prohibitions during their stay in Nairobi. All but two of my respondents replied that they
face no restrictions or prohibitions owing to their refugee status. One of the respondents
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stated, “This is a land of freedom to me. There is no limitation on where I live, where I
work or move in Nairobi.” Another respondent added, “No, there is no restriction
regarding our rights here.” Two respondents stated otherwise. One of them replied
saying, “I was told by one of the Kenyan immigration officials that we should stay in a 40
kilometers radius around Nairobi. But nobody checks and I have not faced any problem
even when I travel to cities like Mombasa which is hundreds of kilometers away from
Nairobi.” The other respondent added, “The Kenyan officials do not allow you to go out
of the city. You are actually expected to apply for an additional travel document to make
such travels. However, the officers do not strictly implement these laws. You can go
anywhere you like.”
5.2.2 Policing, Prejudice and “Terrorism”: Refugees and the Kenyan State
I started off asking refugees how they characterize their relationship with police officers.
All respondents described their relation with the Kenyan police as something which is not
affirmative at all. One of the refugees defined it as follows, “The relationship between the
police and the refugees is like cat and mouse. The police always ask for money when
they meet any refugee. We prefer to hide whenever we see the Kenyan police and we do
everything to avoid contacts with them.” Another respondent joked about it as follows,
“We play hide and seek with the police! Let alone us, refugees, even Kenyan citizens do
not like to face the police in whatever circumstance they are in”. In fact, one of my
informants said, “The police have their own calendar when it comes to refugee
harassment. The last week before the end of the month is when they run short of money.
And so, we joke Kenyan policemen promise their wives that they are going to go out and
get the money from a refugee to buy groceries!”
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The following comments from an Ethiopian community leader summarize the sentiments
of urban refugees when it comes to abuses of power by the Kenyan law enforcement
officials. He stated,
The government agency infamously known for harassing refugees is the Kenyan
Police. They arrest refugees arbitrarily. They release you only if you give them
bribe. Up until 2006 they used to take money and valuable items such as the rings
and necklaces of refugees. This is especially the case at the end of every month
where the officers have little money left in their pockets and struggle to make
ends meet or during holidays when they want to buy presents for their family.
It is a very tragic thing to witness that the so called ‘law enforcement officers’ are
the most illegal people who violate the human rights of refugees! To their credit,
though, the Kenyan police do not torture or physically assault refugees. But there
were incidents where female urban refugees were sexually assaulted and raped by
police officers. Refugee protection is a big problem both in camps and cities.
When a famous Oromo 20 political activist by the name Jateni was killed in
Kakuma camp; the UNHCR did not investigate or name the perpetrators.
It is not only the detentions and corruption that refugees detest about the Kenyan police.
The humiliation and “degradation ceremony” that some rogue police officers commit
upon refugees is tragic. Here is an anecdote from one of the respondents,
I know of a girl who was working without permit as a waitress. The police came
in and threatened to arrest her if she does not give them money. When she gave
them the 1500 Kenyan Shillings, they complained it was not enough. They tied
her up and roamed the streets with her in a very embarrassing way until her
friends manage to collect more money and bargain her release. Imagine how
painful this is for a woman who is dragged around like a sex slave, shackled
before thousands of people. I am telling you, the police have no respect for human
dignity!
A priest of one of the Ethiopian Orthodox churches also disclosed how rampant police
corruption is and how sophisticated it got over the years. In some instance, police officers
contact Ethiopian refugees to spy on other refugees and know who has money. He
described the problem of police harassment in Nairobi as follows.
20

The Oromo are largest ethnic group in Ethiopia some of whose elite have been fighting
for liberation and secession from Ethiopia under a veteran political organization known
as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Mr. Jateni was an activist of the OLF.
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Police officers have been harassing refugees in this city for so many years. They
may arrest you arbitrarily and insist on getting money to release you. It does not
really matter even if you show them your Ethiopian passport. They view
Ethiopian refugees as their extra source of income. I remember officers saying,
“Why do you wait for your salary when there are Abyssinian refugees?” Actually,
they used to wait outside our church compound to arrest people.
They also used to spy on Ethiopian refugees who have completed their emigration
process to fly to the West. I remember an incident when they spotted an
individual whom they heard is flying out of Nairobi that evening and arrested
him. They know the refugee will pay anything to be released and catch his long
awaited flight. So they asked to be paid 80000 Kenyan Shillings (approximately
950 US Dollars!). The individual did not have that amount of money. So people
had to actually bargain over the amount of the bribe for the police men and got
him released in time.
The pastor of one of the Evangelical churches also reflected on the problem of police
harassment underlining how pervasive and systematic it has this far been. He stated,
Corruption is so rampant in this country and so is police harassment. The police
just want to extort money from these people who are strangers and very insecure
about their condition in Nairobi. In fact, they used to do this brazenly and in broad
day light before 2005. I remember an incident where friend of mine went to a
local money transfer bureau, the Western Union, to collect some money sent to
him from abroad. The Police ambushed right outside the office and arrested my
friend knowing he received some money. It was shameful because he had to
negotiate the amount he gave them as bribe. When his relatives called from the
US to check if he received the money, he jokingly answered, “Yes, they (the
police) did receive the money!”
There were a number of instances where I was called to police stations to
negotiate the release of a detainee. Most officers cooperate the moment they know
that you are a pastor. But I was also arrested by the police when I was a student at
the Pan African Christian University (2001). The Vice Chancellor sent a worker
from campus to get me released from prison. It became a newspaper headline
where the Chancellor gave an extended interview on the Daily Nation about
refugee harassment in Kenya.
Refugees were asked whether police harassment is related to xenophobia and
discrimination. While 17 out of 30 informants responded that police reaction to refugees
is primarily driven by xenophobia and discrimination; the remaining thirteen (13)
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respondents replied that it has more to do with corruption than xenophobia. Here are
some of the reactions to this particular question. One of the informants stated,
Police harassment and corruption is not something primarily driven by
xenophobia. I think the police are paid very poorly and they think refugees have a
lot of money. It is also easy for them to racially profile Ethiopians and Somalis
who have a lighter skin complexion with tall and skinny figures than other
Kenyans. Hence they usually set out to get money misusing their official position.
But police harassment does not go into excesses like assault or beating. They
usually let you go free once they get money.
One cannot but appreciate the “fair” judgment of some refugees when they argued that
police behavior is not out of racism but because their pay is low and they exploit
undocumented refugees for financial gain. But the fact is the Kenyan police racially
profile refugees. They identify Ethiopian and Somali refugees with lighter skin
complexion and other physical features as the fat cats who can be fleeced easily. They
conduct extrajudicial detentions and arrests. They also release detainees without any legal
due process. And in some cases, some police officers concocted trumped up charges
against refugees that refused to give money. Here is an account from one of the refugees,
I remember of an incident when a refugee refused to give money to corrupt police
officers. They put heroine in his pocket, photographed them as exhibits, and filed
false charges against him as a drug trafficker. You cannot appeal to the higher
officials because they are steeped in corruption to their eyeballs too! If you insist
talking to the top level commanders, then you may have to pay a much bigger
amount of money by way of a bribe. So, refugees “resolve” the matter at the
station level giving a small amount of money to the foot soldiers of the Kenyan
Police Force.
All of these deliberate, extrajudicial and corrupt acts by the Kenyan police make us
wonder whether we can absolve such institutional practice from xenophobia and racism.
Two leaders of prominent Kenyan non-governmental organizations that work on refugee
matters agree that we should not. One of them commented,
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It is obvious that the police harass especially Ethiopian and Somali refugees. I do
not think refugees from the Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Uganda and Congo) are
subject to the same kind of police maltreatment as Ethiopians and Somalis. It
could be because of the latter’s language (most speak Swahili) and cultural
affinity to Kenyans and even the similarity of their physical features with native
Kenyans.
Another representative of an international NGO working on refugee affairs added, “I
think Ethiopian and Somali refugees are more subject to police harassment due to their
looks and physical features. People guess that they are not locals and think that they have
a lot of money.”
Yet, some refugees fault their fellow refugees for not standing up to their rights and not
resisting this illegal practice of extorting money from refugees. One of the community
leaders commented about this stating,
Many Ethiopian refugees do not prefer to stand up for their rights or take the case
to court. This, I think, is for two reasons. There is the language barrier and the
feeling of insecurity and vulnerability as a refugee. So people pay whatever
amount they are cajoled to pay (sometimes they negotiate the amount) and leave
detention centers. Technically, a refugee can summon the UNHCR to his or her
aid to provide him or her legal assistance and protection. But people do not want
to suffer in jails while all of this is bound to happen. In addition, it is quite
difficult to get the ears of the UN officials who are not even willing to talk to a
refugee unless they issue you an appointment. The bureaucratic red tape at the UN
is very frustrating. So nobody takes the UNHCR seriously when it comes to legal
aid and protection in Nairobi.
Another respondent also remarked that urban refugees are partly responsible for
worsening the situation by agreeing to pay bribes to police officers. He added,
Part of the reason why police harassment became common is the fear and
insecurity of Ethiopian refugees themselves. They do not hold their ground and
ask to see a legal advisor when such unjust acts happen. They immediately resort
to give bribes and get released from detention centers as soon as possible. This
makes corrupt police officers more arrogant and rogue.
I tried to contact and interview police officers at ward station, division and metropolitan
levels. But in all instances the officers declined the interview asking the researcher to get
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an official permission from higher offices. Trailing the chain of police command, I ended
at the Kenyan National Police Commission seeking support from the Head of the Public
Relations Department. The officer was not willing to be interviewed. Neither did he
cooperate to write me a letter of introduction to the lower echelons of police command
which made it virtually impossible to interview officers.
However, all the civilian government officials the researcher interviewed denied the
proposition that police corruption is partly fuelled by racial profiling and xenophobic
attitude towards refugees. One of the ward level officials summarized the government’s
line of defense as follows,
We understand that refugees are harassed by police officers. But we should
remember that the harassment is by a few rogue officers and not by the entire
police force. Plus these officers harass refugees as single individuals and not as a
group. We should also remember that some officers also harass Kenyan citizens.
We should therefore differentiate between individuals and institutions. So the
argument that Kenyan Police has xenophobic attitude is completely unfounded.
Let us also remember that big police reforms are underway in Kenya right now. In
fact the new Inspector General of the Police force is about to be appointed by
Parliament. We expect new and constructive changes will take place following
these appointments.
Another official reacted to the complaints and accusations of many urban refugees very
cautiously. He phrased his argument as follows,
I cannot say the police force is entirely corrupt and xenophobic. But I cannot also
say that all police officers are good and doing their job responsibly. However, you
should remember the national security risk we are facing in Nairobi which is
partly linked to urban refugees in Kenya! Last Sunday, we had a blast in Eastleigh
outside a church compound. Police had to close in on a perimeter where they first
detained potential suspects and had to conduct the investigation to find potential
leads and suspects behind this attack. If you do not have a legal identification
card, and you are not a Kenyan, then the police would think of you as a suspect.
Refugees would definitely complain about these arrests, detentions and
investigations as something unfair. But this is what the police should do in order
to find evidence, leads and perpetrators who do these senseless bombing attacks.
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Other officials insist that the problem of police harassment is on the decline since the
ratification of the Kenyan Refugee Law in 2006. They mention a series of trainings and
awareness creation programs conducted among police officers to reform the
establishment. They also indicate the issuance of the alien certificate as one major
protection for refugees since the latter can use it to prove their legal residence in Kenya.
To the officials’ credit, most refugees also agree that the problem of police harassment
has actually declined in recent years. One of the refugees stated, “A few years back, the
relationship between refugees and police was very bad. I think the situation is improving
since President Mwai Kibaki came to power”. Another reason that Ethiopian refugees
mention as a positive development is the joint Ethio-Kenyan military operations to weed
out jihadists in Somalia. These measures, refugees argue, have changed the mood of the
Kenyan police towards Ethiopian refugees. Here is how one of the refugee informants
described this phenomenon,
I keep hearing that the police used to be really rough to refugees six or seven
years back. Now, however, the police do not detain as many refugees unless they
find you doing something politically sensitive. I remember some of the officers
asking me a token for coffee or tea. Later they befriend you! I remember a
policeman who stopped to tell me that I should not walk in one particular avenue
because it is not safe. So yes, there is an improvement.
Part of this can be explained by the fact that the Ethiopian and Kenyan
government both sent troops to Somalia in the fight against Al Shabab. This spirit
of solidarity is reflected among men in uniform here in Nairobi. For example, the
police raided the entire Eastleigh conducting door to door checks and
investigations following bomb attacks in downtown Nairobi. They let most of the
Ethiopian refugees free, while most Somalis stayed for more investigation.
But refugees reiterate that the decline in police harassment does not mean that there are
no incidents of police harassment and arbitrary detention anymore. There still are. In fact,
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the 2011 Global Report of UNHCR states that refugee harassment and detention has
actually increased in Kenya from previous years. The report (2011:90) states,
The number of arrests and detentions of asylum-seekers and refugees rose in the
wake of the heightened state of security alert in Kenya. Most arrests were for the
lack of civil documentation (such as the asylum-seeker pass or refugee identity
card), illegal presence, or alleged involvement in terrorist activities.
In such instances, refugees usually contribute money to bribe police officers and get the
person released. Neither do the refugees prefer to litigate the case or take the police to the
courts. They think it is a long, arduous and fruitless venture since high ranking officials
are also corrupt. In the word of one of our informants, “Nobody wants to hustle with the
big vultures!!”

5.2.3 Civil Society and the Legal Protection of Refugees
Given the rampancy of police harassment and corruption in Nairobi, the study explored
whether refugees have some form of legal assistance and protection from civil society
organizations (CSOs) in Nairobi. Most refugees mentioned a few organizations that they
are familiar with. I later had the opportunity to discuss this with the leadership of some of
these CSOs. The three oft-mentioned NGOs are the Refugee Coalition of Kenya (RCK),
Refuge Point, and Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS). One of the informants
described the situation as follows, “There are only a few NGOs like RCK and Refuge
Point who assist when refugee get into trouble with the police. However, most refugees
have no information about these organizations”. Another respondent outlined the type of
assistance these organizations provide stating,
I do not know of many NGOs that provide assistance to refugees save for Refuge
Point, RCK and HIAS. I know Refuge Point provides health services for refugees
and that it also assists in third country relocation process in collaboration with the
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UNHCR and the International Organization of Migration (IOM). I know that
RCK provides legal assistance. And HIAS is another agency under which some
refugees managed to finalize third country relocation. I think the UNHCR seconds
the refugee status determination process to these organizations too. They therefore
participate in resettling urban refugees to other countries most of which are found
in the West.
The three other CSOs that were tangentially mentioned in our discussions with refugees
are the German Technical Cooperation Agency, popularly known as GTZ, a Kenyan
outfit known as “Kituo Cha Sheria” and the International Rescue Committee (IRC). One
of my respondents indicated the role of GTZ by saying, “There are not many NGOs and
local CSOs who vouch for the rights of urban refugees here in Nairobi. I know that GTZ
provides a few scholarships for refugees with proper documents to go to colleges and
institutes”. “Kituo Cha Sharia” (KCS) is a Kenyan Non Governmental Organization
(NGO) whose name translates into English as the “Centre for Legal Empowerment”. Just
two years ago, KCS launched its Urban Refugee Intervention Project (URIP) which is
based in Eastleigh through support by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC). The main objective of the
program is to “offer legal advice to a number of vulnerable immigrants on all legal issues,
legal representation, and assist refugees in obtaining work permits, birth and death
certificates, identity cards etc.21”
One would expect international organizations like the UNHCR and IOM to be more
involved in the provision of legal as well as economic services to urban refugees in
Nairobi. Sadly, these organizations are not at the forefront providing assistance. Only a
handful of organizations (not more than ten) are currently involved in providing services
to urban refugees whose population size is estimated to be in tens of thousands. One of
21

http://www.kituochasheria.or.ke/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&It
emid=5
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my respondents lamented the lack of international assistance for urban refugees by
saying, “The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was supposed to
cater for the rights and interests of refugees. But they seldom provide such protection
even in their own camps let alone cities”. UNHCR’s own document discusses why it has
been reluctant to address the plight and issues of urban refugees in Nairobi until 2005.
The study (UNHCR, PDES, 2011:9) reports,
As a result of its tacit agreement with the encampment policy, UNHCR knew
relatively little about the situation of refugees in Nairobi and was not well placed
to devise protection and solutions strategies for them. UNHCR did not enjoy a
constructive relationship with the urban refugee community, a situation that was
both revealed and reinforced in 2000-2001, when a highly publicized resettlement
scandal erupted, involving, amongst others, the corruption of UNHCR staff in the
Kenyan capital.
This situation began to change in the wake of the resettlement scandal, when a
strengthened UNHCR team launched the Nairobi Initiative, a concerted attempt to
examine, understand and respond to the needs of refugees living in the Kenyan
capital. As a first step in the reorientation of its approach, UNHCR identified
those NGOs, community-based organizations and self-help groups that were
working with refugees in the city and completed an informal (and yet highly
informative) study of the refugee population. This was followed up with an interagency urban refugee workshop, convened in association with the Refugee
Consortium of Kenya, and three participatory assessments with the urban refugee
community.
It was only in 2006 that the UNHCR first embarked on a number of urban refugee
initiatives in Nairobi. It begun to underwrite initiatives by local NGOs such as the
Refugee Coalition of Kenya (RCK) which include:
1)The publication of an information booklet for refugees and asylum seekers, 2)
cooperation with the City Council Clinic on refugee access to healthcare, 3)
strengthened advocacy on the issue of free primary education for refugee
children; 4) the establishment of a micro-grant program for refugees, and 5) the
provision of refugee rights training to the police.”(UNHCR, PDES, 2011:9)
It is this belated response of the UNHCR and its current work via a few local NGOs that
makes it invisible to urban refugees.
153

Once again, I inquired refugees for feedback about the role of the UNHCR in protecting
and promoting the rights of refugees in Nairobi. Most of my informants were very
skeptical about the role of the UNHCR. One of our informants summarized this sentiment
of urban refugees as follows,
The UNHCR should have played a major role in spearheading initiatives to
legally protect urban refugees and advocate for our rights everywhere. But the
UNHCR has a closed door policy to complaints and appeals from urban refugees.
They only talk to you about your refugee status determination process or about
the relocation in a third country. The security guards do not even welcome visitors
if they happen to be refugees who are not slotted in for interviews. They do not
even treat us with dignity. So I do not see how they would be able to come and
protect us from police harassment when we need it. In short, our condition is very
precarious and vulnerable because no international organization or government
agency is taking the responsibility to stop police harassment in Nairobi.
Two senior officials of Refuge Point (formerly known as Mapendo) and Refugee
Coalition of Kenya (RCK) agreed to be interviewed. They provided useful information
on the type of project activities their respective organizations carry out to relieve the
plight of urban refugees in Nairobi. I have taken two excerpts from each of these
interviews which provide very good summary of relief and development ventures that
NGOs carry out among urban refugees in Nairobi. The first excerpt is taken from a senior
official of Refuge Point Kenya. The second excerpt is taken from our interview with
another Kenyan official of Refugee Coalition Kenya (RCK).
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Excerpt I

Senior Official of Refuge Point ( Mapendo) Kenya
Refuge Point was formerly known as Mapendo which in Swahili meant “Great Love”.
We changed our name for funding purposes. It started off in the 1980s because of the
unmet needs of refugees in East Africa. HIV AIDS positive refugees from South Sudan
were denied admission to the US and this prompted people to found an advocacy
organization for refugee rights.
Health
Once we became operational, we started supplying Anti Retro Viral (ARV) drugs for
HIV positive refugees in Nairobi followed by food assistance. We still work with HIV
patients and have also established a medical clinic that provides service to refugees free
of charge. We have a separate health clinic in “Kayole” affiliated with the Catholic
hospital. We also have contacts with St Mary Mission hospital here in Nairobi.
In addition to providing curative health services in these clinics and hospitals, we have
community health workers who are also urban refugees. The UNHCR has actually
seconded its urban health service component to us. We also conducted the malaria
vaccination programs in Eastleigh because the Kenyan health workers have language
problems and refugees were also suspicious of these campaigns.
Urban Protection Unit
This is our newest unit that aims to provide assistance to the livelihood of refugees. Here
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we 1) provide assistance to approximately 1000 households in the city of Nairobi, 2) we
also conduct home visits and provide rental assistance for vulnerable refugee families
who couldn’t afford to pay their home rents, 3) we also second officers who assist in the
UNHCR to screen and process third country resettlement programs. Our workers are also
posted with UNHCR not just in Nairobi but also Cairo, Northern Ethiopia, Daddab,
Kakuma, Mozambique, Malawi and Pretoria.
Child Protection Unit
This unit conducts a regular assessment of vulnerable children. This could for instance be
the case of children in abusive situations and finding ways of accelerating their relocation
in a third country. The unit provides counseling services and minor psycho-therapic
diagnosis of children in difficult circumstances.
Research Unit This far we have conducted studies on gender based violence among
refugees. We have just started a project on new arrivals looking at the routes, the
strategies of cross border movement, and the forms of assistance refugees muster in order
to survive in harsh living conditions particularly in camps.
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Excerpt II
Senior Official of Refugee Coalition Kenya (RCK)
Origin
RCK was founded in 1998 by Kenyan legal professionals who worked in different NGOs
dealing with human rights issues. The protection of refugees became an important issue
at that time. There were incidents where even the UNHCR was not respecting the rights
of refugees. So RCK started out as an advocacy forum.
Since then RCK has taken the lead to advocate the plight of refugees and expand the
bundle of rights that refugees should be having in the Kenyan context. We were behind
the Refugee Act which was passed in 2005. We are now charged with responsibility by
the Kenyan Parliament to review that Act and stream line according to the new
Constitution of Kenya.
We have offices in “Dadaab” and “Kakuma” (the two refugee camps in Kenya) and we
are headquartered in Nairobi. The RCK head office serves the urban case load of refugees
who are found in ‘Tika”, “Kitangela”, “Ruiro” and Nairobi Central. We have three major
programs.
1. Legal and Psycho Social Care
1.1 Legal Care
This unit provides legal aid services and clinics to refugees. We hear issues of refugees,
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consult them and try to provide solutions.
We also counsel refugees before they go to their interviews and assessment for refugee
status determination by the UNHCR. And if applications for RSD are rejected, we appeal
on behalf of refugees and represent their case. In case they have court cases, we provide
pre-trial counseling for our clients. We also serve as legal attorneys for them representing
them in confidence. If refugees want to enter legal agreements or business contracts with
Kenyan counterparts, we brief them about the Business Code of the country and brief
them on how they should go about such ventures.
1.2 Psycho Social Support
Many refugees suffer from trauma and many women from sexual abuses when they reach
the camps. RCK does conduct primary psychoanalytical diagnosis and refer serious cases
to hospitals in the Nairobi.
2. Advocacy/ Capacity Enhancement
2.1 Advocacy
As we mentioned earlier, RCK raised awareness to come up with a Refugee Act (2006)
for the country and works with other stakeholders, including UNHCR and IOM, to
support the passing of the Act.
In 2010, the New Constitution passed and the Refugee Act is being reviewed as the
Refugee Bill 2011. After the endorsement of the new Constitution, a Constitutional
Implementation Committee was founded in 2010 that officially requested RCK to take
the task of streamlining and revising the 2006 Act according to the New Constitution. We
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took the assignment and created a pool of stakeholders that work on refugee matters to
meet regularly over retreats and panels and improve the 2006 Act. The network is known
as Urban Refugees Professional Network (URPN)
But we also do other kind of advocacy campaigns. This year the Ministry of Education
(MOE) insisted that students sitting for A-Level and O-level national exams present birth
certificates in addition to school IDs. This puts thousands of refugee students out of the
equation for two reasons. Most refugees are born in rural areas where birth certificates
are not readily issued! Second, even if they have one; refugees will not be able to carry
them in their flight from their home country. Hence we lobbied about these issues and
made the MOE change its instructions regarding the administration of national exams.
2.2 Capacity Enhancement
RCK has been active in training Kenyan Law Enforcement agents about the Geneva
Conventions, refugee rights, and international practices on refugee protection. We have
collaborated with the Kenyan Association of Magistrates; the Kenyan Court Users
Association and the Police to provide these trainings. We have done this because the
level of police harassment is embarrassing for Kenya. While the financial motivation is
mainly behind these harassments; we believe ignorance about refugees and their rights
also plays a role. We have trained station heads, district level police officers, and officers
at the City Police Command and the national level. These trainings have also helped us
create a network of police officers who have served us as watchmen when violations and
infringements happen against refugees. They blow the whistle and we contact the district
level officers; explain what happened and ask to contact refugees. This usually happens
when refugees are summarily detained by officials (the usual excuse being roundups and
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security check against terrorist elements) and are later asked to pay money in order to get
released. This year we have also trained prison wardens.
3. Information and Research
We conduct studies on refugees’ welfare both in camps and the cities. We publish,
disseminate and blog about these findings. So we are contributing to knowledge
production and dissemination too.

The project activities and program concentration of these local and international NGOs to
provide some form of a social safety net for urban refugees is laudable. Particularly, their
emphasis on providing health services to children and women is very vital. They also
focused on providing legal assistance for refugees in their dealing with Kenyan law
enforcement agencies like the police and the magistrates. But the contribution of these
organizations is like a drop in the ocean given the staggering size of urban refugee
populations in Nairobi and their continuous inflow to the city. Second, the limited
capacity of these organizations in terms of finance and human resources means they can
only reach out to hundreds or thousands of refugees on a yearly basis. They also are very
few in number. An informant from a Kenyan Human Rights organization known as “Haki
Jamii” explains these constraints as follows,
To be honest, I think the idea of refugees as rights’ holders is pretty much a new
thing here in Kenya. Partly because, refugees themselves feel that they cannot ask
for more and enjoy their basic human rights like Kenyan nationals. So the issue is
less visible and less vocal.
Yes, there are the international conventions on refugees that Kenya is a signatory
to. But despite these beautiful conventions, national governments do what they
want to do and the UNHCR makes inconsequential noises. The only organization
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that I hear is doing some serious work is RCK which provides legal aid for
refugees. But even that kind of legal aid does not aim at broadening the legal
framework of the country or negotiating broader rights for refugees. Instead, it is
providing refugees legal help within the existing legal framework.
I think the notion of rights to refugees can come forth only in one condition. That
is if the refugees organize themselves into collective political action groups.
Unless the motivation and the drive come from the refugee communities
themselves, I do not think local or international NGOs can do very much.
The official’s remarks about the need to have refugee driven initiatives encouraged me to
ask whether there are Ethiopian grassroots organizations that work on human rights and
development issues in Nairobi. All of my respondents responded that there are no such
organizations. I then asked refugees why such collective initiatives have been nonexistent in Nairobi. One of my respondents replied as follows,
I do not know of any community association or youth group that works to protect
and promote the rights of Ethiopian refugees here. You may wonder why. But you
should realize that here everybody has double challenges. On the one hand, we
have our collective identities and associations (national or ethnic) as refugees. On
the other hand, there is a lot of fear and suspicion among refugees themselves.
Each refugee thinks that the other may be a government agent or an unknown
quantity that could hinder or block his or her emigration process. So everybody is
tightlipped and fearful not to divulge much information about their past
background, their true identity and their future plans. Therefore, it is so hard to
form collective associations and initiatives amongst urban refugees.
Refugees also mentioned how hard building such grassroots community associations
could be because people seem to privilege their ethnic origin and base their social and
political affinities on it even when they are in another country. So there are small
informal associations of various Ethiopian ethnic groups in Nairobi. The “Oromos”, the
“Tigrayans”, the “Amharas” and the “Guraghes”22, for instance meet and greet in their
informal circles of mutual assistance. A good example for that is the case of ethnic
refugee churches. In Nairobi, for instance, there is an Ethiopian Coptic church which
22

“Oromo”, “Tigray”, “Amhara” and “Guraghe” refer to the prominent ethnic groups in
Ethiopia.
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used to provide services for both Ethiopian and Eritrean Orthodox Church goers. A recent
scuffle however forced the Eritreans to establish their own Eritrean church. Among the
evangelicals, there are Oromo ethnic churches where sermons and prayers are exclusively
conducted in Oromo language, thus excluding non-Oromo Ethiopians. This has made it
difficult to imagine a pan-Ethiopian community association which brings them all for the
common good of urban refugees. This is partly because the Ethiopian government
undermined such independent initiatives. Here is a testimony from one of the community
leaders,
In 1996, we founded the Ethiopian community association in Kenya. This
association functioned until 2003 as an independent and nonprofit outfit. It was
active in terms of providing health assistance for sick refugees, preparing laissezpassé forms for those Ethiopians who want to repatriate, and managing funeral
services for the deceased and comforting families of the deceased. However the
Ethiopian embassy began to interfere in the management of the association. It
wanted to assign people who are sympathetic to the regime in power in Addis and
use the network for political cooptation purposes. So many people who were
active in the organization resigned from participating.
Regardless of these challenges to found grassroots organizations for advocacy and legal
protection, Ethiopian refugees stressed the importance of establishing them. They also
underscored the need to have some form of political representation i.e. an elected body
that can be mandated to communicate with the Kenyan government. One of the
respondents stated, “We would lead a better life in Nairobi if we have a chance to create
our own association and elect our own representatives. We will have a united voice
against harassment and corruption. We can also secure help and assistance from relief
and development organizations if we organize ourselves.” Another informant added, “I
think we can move freely without fear of the Kenyan police if we have a formal
representative that speaks to Kenyan officials.” But here again, some refugees discussed
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how mobilizing refugees for collective political representation could be challenging task.
One of the refugees discussed these potential challenges as follows,
I think it is hard for us to get any kind of formal political representation for many
reasons. First and foremost, most people use Kenya as a transit corridor and not as
the last destination. Our life is pretty much suspended. Secondly, the majority of
Ethiopian refugees who come here are uneducated and find it difficult to even
speak English let alone discuss political matters with Kenyan officials. Thirdly,
many refugees fear for their life here in Kenya because the Ethiopian government
could send agents to target them. There are instances when this happened to
Oromo dissidents in Nairobi who were undercover. But they were identified by
the government spies and murdered. So, the idea of being more active and visible
in Kenyan politics would call for a number of problems both from the Kenyan and
Ethiopian side.
To conclude, the ubiquity of police harassment and corruption in Nairobi, and the
constant fear and insecurity of urban refugees with regards to Kenyan law enforcement
officials speaks volumes about the level exploitation and abuse they encounter on an
everyday basis. Even more, there are few local organizations that provide some form of
legal aid and protection services to these refugees. The limited capacity of these
organizations coupled with the neglect of international organizations like the UNHCR to
seriously address the problem of urban refugees means refugees continue to be “victims”
of rogue officials. As far as their relation to the Kenyan state is concerned, we can
summarize that urban refugees are suspended between constant insecurity and unjust
exploitation.
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CHAPTER VI
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: URBAN REFUGEES AND “RIGHT TO THE
CITY”
Overview
This chapter is an analysis of how urban refugees are “governed” in Kenya. It begins by
revising the major findings of the study both in chapter 4 and 5. It then utilizes the
arguments of the “right to the city” approach to consider whether the “urban citizenship”
literature speaks to the experience of Ethiopian urban refugees in Nairobi. These
discussions lead to the final section of the chapter which underscores the need to have a
critical look at power and governance at the “nation-state” level in Africa since it is
directly, if not more influentially, involved in the urban governance of refugees. Section
6.4 is therefore a critique of the emphasis that “the right to the city” literature proffers
only at the “urban” level. In lieu, the section up scales and engages with alternative
perspectives about the highly extractive and authoritarian nature of the nation-state in
Africa. In short, this chapter aims to abstract from the empirical narratives and reflect on
the heuristic value of the “right to the city” approach to explain the condition of urban
refugees in an African city.
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6.1 Henry Lefebvre: On the Politics of Rights
This study took off by fleshing out the three conceptual dimensions of Henry Lefebvre’s
“Right to the City” approach. It is a theoretical scheme which grappled with the idea of
re-configuring citizenship in three major ways i.e. scale, essence, and scope. Let us
consider his take on the scale of citizenship. By speaking of the “City”, Lefebvre weds
the idea of citizenship to the urban scale in contrast to the nation-state. He posited the
City as that prominent agora where people enjoy rights and benefits. The City is that
space where people constantly engage with and contest against the powers of capital in
their struggle for further rights and amenities. It is the space where people practice the art
of collective self –government that Lefebvre calls autogestion. This view is unique in its
own right for since Westphalia the Social Sciences (particularly Political Science)
consider the nation-state to be the ultimate (and in some cases the only) scale on which
the struggle for meaningful citizenship is waged and articulated.
Secondly, and most importantly, Lefebvre viewed the notion of citizenship as a liberal
social contract between the political establishment and voters inadequate. Liberal
democracy hollows out the participation of citizens in the politics of their City. In
essence, representation alienates ordinary citizens from the process and outcomes of
politics. Substantively, therefore, Lefebvre defined urban citizenship as a “new” social
project which confers rights like: “right to information, to expression, to culture, to
identity in difference (and equality), and to self management.” (Gilbert and Phillips
.2003:319)

Fernandez (2007:207) did an excellent job in summarizing Lefebvre’s

departure from that liberal contractual narrative citizenship stating,
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If Rousseau distinguished between politics and the social pact, considering
politics to be a mere circumstantial effect of the ‘general will’ underlying the
social pact, Lefebvre proposed a contemporary formula for social citizenship,
expressing a ‘social project’ which requires a new political contract between the
state and citizens in order to reduce the gap between state and government, and
between the institutional power and the power of civil society.
Lefebvre’s project of urban citizenship does not stop at re-scaling its focus and redefining its essence. It gets more fascinating in that it widens the scope of citizenship
beyond the confines of national borders and passports. While it seems to have localized
the scale of citizenship, it leaps forward and universalizes the scope of citizenship. It
anchors the criterion of inclusion to urban citizenship not by place of birth or ancestral
descent but by inhabitance (the sheer presence of an individual) in that particular urban
scale. In the words of Purcell, Lefebvre vouches for “full and complete usage of the city”
by granting equal political and economic rights to all inhabitants. This means, “guest
workers”, “illegal” immigrants, “immigrants” or “refugees” will have equal say and
access to “live in, play in, work in, represent, characterize and occupy urban space” the
same way people born or brought up in that space have.(Purcell, 2002:106)
In chapter 4, I discussed how Ethiopian refugees fared in terms of inhabiting and altering
Nairobi’s economic and social space. I delved into great detail to depict how refugees are
engaged in both the formal and informal sectors of Nairobi’s economy. Some toil as
restaurant managers, barbers, hairdressers, cooks, waiters, “makangas” or “matatu”
conductors. Others thrived as small business owners like beauty salons, barber shops,
audio and video stores, boutiques, and cafeterias. Still others have managed to break into
the formal economy running high end businesses and construction companies. It is this
active participation of Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi economy that brings a pressing
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question to mind. Would this be reason enough to conclude that Ethiopian urban refugees
are indeed “urban citizens” of Nairobi? This question prompted us to further probe into
the politics of rights and the relationships between the Kenyan state and Ethiopian urban
refugees in chapter 5.
Here, it is important to justify why such focus on the politics of rights is imperative
before indulging with a summary of my empirical findings and reflections. This is
important because the state, in all circumstances, stands out as the single most powerful
institution whose bearings on the scale, essence and scope of urban citizenship are
inescapable. The state also becomes a primary target whose constitution would be altered
if one picks a Lefebvrian project to reconfigure citizenship at the urban scale, through
participatory democracy and social citizenship. It is the elephant in the room. Even more,
we cannot speak of the state in generic terms attributing it to be “liberal” and
“democratic” in all contexts. This is more so for postcolonial states of Africa which in
most cases are run by authoritarian regimes of strong men and patron-clientelism. What
does the “right to the city” then mean if African states do not represent legitimate social
contracts between “citizens” and the political establishment?
There is a flurry of works (Simone A, 2001; Nyamnjoh, 2007, 2006; Chachage and
Kanyinga, 2003, Nyaoro, 2010) that point to the dismal record of African states when it
comes to respecting and protecting the rights of refugees and immigrants. For instance,
Nyamnjoh discussed the case of South African and Botswanan cities stating that
“disaffected nationals, in conjunction with the state, direct their resentment against
immigrants and ethnic minorities.” (Nyamnjoh, 2007:74) But this should not deter us to
dig further and explore “the hierarchies and relationships of inclusion and exclusion” that
167

determine “accessibility to citizenship in real terms.” (Nyamnjoh, 2007:79) It is in this
spirit that I analyzed refugee-state relations in Kenya and how that speaks back to
Lefebvre’s politics of rights.

6.2 Governing “Strangers”: Speak Inclusion and Practice Exclusion
The problem of refugees, stateless persons, and internally displaced people (IDPs)
emerged as an outstanding issue in the aftermath of the Second World War. The United
Nations took the lead in developing a gamut of conventions, and protocols on human
rights and refugees, which members states became a signatory to. The post War era of
reconstruction dovetailed with the emergence of numerous independent states in Asia,
Africa and Latin America. Most of these countries also incorporated the fundamentals of
these conventions into their respective constitutions.
The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Convention on Refugees
(1951) stand out in this regard which also influenced the new Constitution of the Kenyan
Republic (2010) and its Refugee Act (2006). Close to home, the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) which has now evolved into the African Union (AU) ratified its first
Convention on Refugees in 1969 whose legal provisions and underlying tenets have also
informed the policies of Kenya. The format of these conventions is very similar for they
address three major concerns. They outline a portfolio of rights for refugees; they declare
and constitute institutions to oversee implementation; and they address procedural
matters such as appeal and collaboration with other government or international
organizations.
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Despite trivial differences in procedure, however, we notice two overriding and
contradictory undercurrents beneath this global architecture of rights for refugees. On the
one hand, the post colonial state has consented to the protection and upkeep of
international refugees. This it did through the formal recognition and accenting to
international and continental conventions. In the case of Kenya, the State has gone further
to officially articulate and ratify a national Act of Refugees which duplicates most of the
UN conventions and beckons towards greater inclusion of refugees in the domestic
political space. Hence there is de jure recognition about the problem of refugees and
readiness to host and protect refugees as a host state.
The trend for recognition and inclusion began from endorsing the UDHR (1948) that
canonized the right to life, liberty and security of person, and also outlined the civil,
political, social and cultural rights of all human beings. For the first time in human
history, UDHR enshrined the right to be a refugee as human right. All human beings have
“the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” (Article 14)
The 1951 Convention (that Kenya is a signatory) also outlined the right of refugees to be
rightful owners of industrial, artistic, literary and scientific works. It stated that refugees
can have gainful employment at least after three years of residence. It recognized that
they can become citizens of their host state through naturalization, affinal (marriage) or
consanguinal ties (if they have children with a spouse from the host country).
The conventions assign the state to be the responsible agent to provide legal protection
and security for refugees. The UDHR, for instance, upholds the principle of “equality
before the Law” and protection by the law “without prejudice or discrimination.” States
should also ensure that no refugee shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention by
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law enforcement officials. The 1951 Convention on refugees reiterates and extends these
fundamental liberties to refugees. For instance, the Convention stressed that a refugee
“shall have free access to the courts of law on the territory of all Contracting States.” The
Conventions and Protocols also enshrined the freedom of movement. In fact, the 1951
convention urges all states to “accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to
choose their place of residence and to move freely within its territory.”
To its credit, the OAU Convention pioneered in making the principle of non-refoulement
as a policy cornerstone. It unequivocally stated that no refugee shall be rejected at border
entry or face expulsion back to the country of origin that he or she fled away from. It also
introduced the concept of “refugee transfer” to another African state if it finds the refugee
inflow overwhelming to address or cater for. It is the first blueprint which stressed the
need to have regional cooperation to tackle refugee crisis. It is truly comforting to realize
that mankind has come a long way to enshrine, declare and protect the basic and
inalienable rights of refugees throughout the world. It is also encouraging to note that
most African states are signatories to the UDHR, the 1951 UN Convention, and the OAU
declaration on refugees. Post World War II, we can safely argue that there is a concerted
effort on the part of states to recognize the problem of refugees, provide them with
adequate legal protection and enhance their welfare. The Refugee Act of Kenya accedes
to this trend of inclusion and recognition for it endorses the aforementioned conventions
and protocols as legally binding documents.
But there is another policy undercurrent which runs through the fabric of these global,
regional and national policy instruments which to a certain extent contradicts the previous
gesture of host states towards the recognition and upkeep of refugee rights. It is this
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undercurrent that I refer to as the securitization and exclusion of the refugee
phenomenon. From the outset, the international architecture of nation-states sanctions
people to enjoy political rights of participation, election and access to public services
only in their country of origin. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 21)
declares political rights to be the exclusive domain of citizen-persons only. Refugees
would have to suspend their political rights until they re-establish their former citizenship
or change it. To their chagrin, host states do not find refugees turning apolitical once
they cross a borderline. To the contrary, they usually become politicized. That is the
reason why the OAU convention stated about the difficulty of making “a distinction
between a refugee who seeks a peaceful and normal life and a person fleeing his country
for the sole purpose of fomenting subversion from outside.” One can read subversion as
the shorthand for political activism here.

In fact, Article 3(1) of the OAU convention urges that any African refugee “shall abstain
from any subversive activities against any Member State of the OAU.” African states, it
seems, were the first to realize that refugee outflow could be used as an ideal opportunity
to mobilize political dissent and combat operations against the incumbent of a
neighboring state. This happened in the 1970s and 80s where guerilla fighters and
insurgents began to exploit refugee camps as recruiting and resource mobilizing grounds
for civil wars raging inland. Policy wise, therefore, states begun to redefine refugees as
national security threats leading to what we call the securitization of the refugee problem.
This undercurrent translated itself into national laws and regulations whose primary
intent is to monitor, regulate and impose stringent sanctions on refugees.
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Here again, the OAU Convention on refugees was the first to legalize “encampment” as
the most ideal approach to handle refugees. It is ideal not from the perspective of
providing health or educational services to refugees. Rather, the need to secure the
borders and the hinterland from “refugee subversion” made encampment the unrivalled
modus operandi. Interestingly, encampment has never been enshrined as a viable option
for refugee protection in both the UN Convention of refugees (1951) and the 1967
Protocol. Kenya’s Refugee Act (2006) accedes to the same notion of securitizing the
refugee problem. Encampment is its centermost stratagem of refugee management
(Articles 16 and 17). Even the national Refugee Affairs Committee (RAC) is populated
by representatives from the Police, National Intelligence Service, Ministry of Interior,
Ministry of Local Government, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In fact, the Refugee Act
(2006) does not mention anything about urban refugees. Given the remarkable population
size of urban refugees and their significant participation in Nairobi’s economy; their
omission from the law of the land is staggering. It seems Kenya’s policy for urban
refugees is one of benign neglect.
Apparently, the securitization of the refugee phenomenon has brought far reaching
negative consequences than encampment and benign neglect. None attests to this fact
than the Refugee Act (2006) which confers extraordinary (and extrajudicial!) powers to
the office of the Department of Refugee Affairs to revoke the refugee status of
individuals or expel them out of Kenya, if there is “reasonable ground” to do so. The Act
does not however make clear what constitutes a “reasonable ground” to rescind a refugee
status or expel refugees. Ironic enough, the law does not also specify where expelled
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refugees can go afterwards. These draconian provisions erode the basic rights and
freedoms of refugees, particularly their right to legal protection and due process. They
also force refugees to live under the shadow of fear and insecurity since they could be
expelled by the stroke of pen from the Department of Refugee Affairs. In short, the
Refugee Act is a policy blue print that attests to the securitization of the refugee
phenomena which privileges encampment and control. It reads more as a monitoring and
punitive device that invokes fear on the part of refugees.
Here it is important to note that public opinion is also shifting to view refugees more as
security problems. A Kenyan researcher described this sentiment as follows,
Unfortunately, the face of refugees in Kenya is the Somalis who are being viewed
as security threats in Kenya. Even Kenyan Somalis get pulled out first because
they look Somali. Second they are asked for money to secure Kenyan ID,
something which they should be able to get freely. The Kenyan government also
tightened the process stating that you now need a birth certificate and parental IDs
to get Kenyan IDs. But imagine how many people have IDs in the rural Eastern
provinces of Kenya with birth certificates and parental IDs? It simply does not
work!!
I think there is also rising anti-refuge sentiment in Kenya. I was in Nakuru town
(180 Kilometers outside Nairobi) when I saw a mob of angry street boys chanting
and saying “They killed one of us” after the Eastleigh church bombing happened.
Coincidentally, they found two Somalis on their way that they beat up and
mugged in broad day light! This is new to Kenya and very disturbing too.
The Kenyan state therefore is in a double bind. It straddles two opposing viewpoints and
policy commitments. On the one hand it speaks about the recognition and upkeep of
refugee rights and welfare. On the other hand, it considers refugees as national security
threats meant to be excluded and confined in refugee camps. This is an unsavory art of
governing “strangers”.
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6.3 A Faustian Bargain: Incarcerate or Predate
The situation gets even bleaker when we consider the findings from the interviews.
Asked about their relations with state officials, refugees view the officials not as
guarantors or protectors of their rights but the very violators. First of all the benign
neglect of urban refugees by the Kenyan Government and the UNHCR until 2006 should
be viewed as depriving the support and amenities urban refugees deserved. Willful and
deliberate exclusion of urban refugees from the existing safety net of protection and
provision is itself a violation of human rights. It is violation by omission. But even for
those who are found in the refugee camps, one can hardly argue that their rights are
protected and amenities are adequately provided by the state or international agencies. In
fact, their living conditions are terrible. One of the community leaders among the
Ethiopian refugees described encampment as follows,
The camps do offer housing (usually tents), and they ration foods (grain and
water). But the camps are like concentration camps. The climate is so hostile and
the places are usually infested with tropical diseases and plagues. The quality of
shelter and food refugees receive is horrible. And security wise, Ethiopian
refugees fear for their lives because the government infiltrates spies and assassins
to attack its political foes. Actually, people know that the person who used to
organize intelligence and counter offensive missions inside Kenya is now
officially appointed as a political attaché by the Ethiopian government inside the
Kenyan embassy.
In fact, many refugees argued that they prefer to live in urban areas without any support
from the Kenyan government or the UNHCR rather than stay in the camps. Refugees are
confident that in urban areas they are able to find jobs or establish their own small
businesses to cater for their needs. They are also better placed to contact their relatives
abroad and seek some financial assistance in urban areas. One of the respondents
described it as follows, “There is plenty of advantage that urban refugees have. They rent
better houses; and they have access to educational and health institutions as long as they
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afford to cover their own expenses.” The Kenyan state and the UNHCR insist on
concentrating people in these camps but have failed to provide the basic nutrition,
housing, health and educational that refugees need.
Had camps been more attractive care and protection units than cities, then refugees would
have flocked to them.

But the camps neither provide the services nor the protection

refugees need. As indicated above, the Ethiopian government infiltrates these camps to
spy on, intimidate and in some cases even assassinate political refugees that fled into the
camps. While the conventions speak of subversion on the part of refugees against the
host state, the Kenyan case is a complete reversal where refugees are targets of
infiltration by agents of the very state that chased them out! To sum up, the analysis
clearly shows that the Kenyan state shows little or no enthusiasm to address the
conditions of urban refugees. Neither does it commit resources and personnel to cater for
the thousands of refugees which are found in the camps. It is a watchman state bent on
confining and monitoring strangers than recognizing their rights and including them into
the social and economic fabric of the Kenyan public.
Obviously, that visceral urge of the states to confine, monitor and control refugees has a
lot to do with the securitization of the refugee problem. But it is crucial to recognize that
the meaning of securitizing the refugee problem has evolved through time in Africa.
During the 1970s and 80s, African states viewed refugee camps as breeding grounds for
armed rebel movements. In the case of Ethiopia, for instance, the military junta that ruled
Ethiopia until 1991 lost the civil war to two rebel groups namely the Eritrean People’s
Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Both the
TPLF and EPLF used neighboring Sudan and its refugee camps (which were
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overpopulated with Ethiopian refugees) as recruiting and fund raising grounds to
continue the armed struggle against the military regime. The Cold War context also
means the global superpowers were also involved in aiding their preferred armed group
to stage an assault on states that lean towards the East or the West. But the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War brought peace dividends in Africa where
protracted civil wars came to an end in Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and Liberia. And
new security challenges began to emerge from the dying embers of the Cold War.

Post 9/11, the refugee issue is being re-securitized. States re-rationalized the need to
encamp refugees and couched it in the language of “war against terror” and fighting
“international terrorism” in the Horn of Africa. This is not to down play the security
threats of Kenya from Islamic extremist elements. The Kenyan state does face real, and
imminent national security threats from jihadist armed groups. Nairobi was one of the
cities which became the first victim of Al Qaeda bomb attacks following the 1998
bombing of the US Embassy building. Since then Al Shabab, a Somali Islamic Jihadist
group and an affiliate of Al Qaeda, declared war on Ethiopia and Kenya calling them
satellites of the “evil” West. Eastleigh, the biggest hub of urban refugees in Nairobi, has
now become the theatre where groups like Al Shabab wage their “mini-jihads” against
powerful actors like the Kenyan state.

Let us consider attacks made only in the second half of the year 2012. In July 2012, at
least 15 people were killed inside a church in a Kenyan northeastern town Garrissa when
Al Shabab militants threw hand grenades in the middle of a Sunday church service.
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In August, 2012, a suicide bomb attack by a Somali man in Eastleigh killed one person
and injured 6 more Kenyans. The attack coincided with Secretary Hillary R Clinton’s
visit to Nairobi. And on November 20, 2012 a bomb thrown into a “Matatu” exploded to
kill ten (10) innocent civilians and injure around 20 people in the refugee populated
Eastleigh. Actually, riots erupted for three days in Eastleigh when Kenyan youth started
mob lynching, destroying and ransacking the houses and businesses of Somali refugees
in Eastleigh. It took more than three days for the riots to end. The recurrence of these
bomb attacks in crowded concentration points and public transport vehicles has definitely
increased xenophobia in Eastleigh. Two days after the incident, the Daily Nation, the
most popular daily newspaper in Kenya reported,
Ten (10) women had been raped as a result of Monday’s skirmishes, which was
concentrated in Eastleigh Section I. At least nine people were injured and
property worth millions of shillings destroyed when angry mobs went on the
rampage in the wake of the matatu explosion. Business premises closed for most
of yesterday as police battled rioting youth who were targeting residents from the
Somali community.
Another bomb attack rocked Eastleigh on December 7, 2012 “killing two people and
wounding at least eight” while I was writing this23. Unfortunately, both the Kenyan state
and Kenyan nationals pour their wrath on innocent refugees who have nothing to do with
such concerted bomb attacks. Incidences of rape, vandalism, looting and mob lynching
on refugees in Nairobi are a stark proof about the rise of xenophobia. It is also a
testament on how Kenyan state governs. If it cannot confine them, then it predates on
them. Munene (2010:4) described the rise of xenophobic attacks in Nairobi as follows,

Xenophobia is on the increase. Refugees are considered a threat to the socioeconomic stability of developing host countries because they compete with local
23

http://www.dw.de/kenyan-bomb-blast-kills-two-in-nairobi/a-16438435
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communities over resources, markets and jobs. This might lead to tension and
conflict over resources between refugees and hosts, a situation often exacerbated
by xenophobia.
However, it is wrong to assume that police harassment in Nairobi comes only as a
response to only the bomb attacks and subversive activities of extremist elements based
in Somalia.

The findings from interviewing a range of informants clearly show that police corruption
and harassment of refugees is a long standing problem which has more to do with the
structural problems of the Kenyan police itself. The interviews came up with evidence
that the Kenyan police racially profile refugees. They identify Ethiopian and Somali
refugees with lighter skin complexion and other physical features and threaten them for
money. When refugees refuse to do so, they risk arbitrary arrest. They conduct
extrajudicial detentions until the friends and relatives of the refugee bring the ransom
money. Refugees do everything they can to avoid these officers and do so at particular
days of the month. The last week of each month and the eve of weekends are days when
the Kenyan police go out in full force to extort money from these vulnerable refugees.
The police also release detainees without any legal due process if the latter concur to pay
bribes.

The study also brought cases when some police officers concocted trumped up charges
like drug trafficking against refugees that refused to give money. Some of the officers
have no qualms for they even wait outside church yards and auditoriums to harass
refugees for money. They even spy on refugees who are about to leave the country
detaining them for a staggering amount of money. They understand the refugees will do
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anything to catch their long awaited emigration flights from Nairobi. Given all these,
refugees live in fear and security. They do not divulge such information like their plans
for departure and emigration.

In fact, the rise of political Islam in the Horn of Africa and terror attacks in Nairobi now
gives ammunition for the Police to arbitrarily arrest and threaten refugee charging them
as suspects for terrorism. Being a refugee can almost pass for being de facto “terrorist”.
The securitization of the refugee problem has therefore shaped two major strategies of the
Kenyan state when it comes to governing refugees. It encamps and monitors those in
camps. And when it comes to urban refugees, state officials either prey on them (via
corruption and exploitation) or threaten to incarcerate them. In fact, incarceration is
routinized so much so that refugees immediately start to collect contributions to get a
fellow refugee released once detained.

6.4 Re-thinking the “Nation-State”: Critique of “Right to the City”
The “right to the city” literature considers the re-scaling of citizenship at urban levels as a
truism. This, the protagonists argue, is the case owing to globalization where the nationstate is relinquishing some of its powers to supra-national entities( like the European
Union), sub-national entities(devolution of power to regions and localities), and also to
the global corporate class (retrenchment of the public sector owing to processes like
privatization. (Purcell, 2003; 2002) In fact, it has now become trendy to emphasize the
role of “global cities” and develop a hierarchy of them. The plethora of literature around
Global and World Cities (GaWC) testifies to this trend (Sassen, 1991, 1995, 2006;
Friedman, 1986, 1995; Taylor, P.J., G. Catalano and D.R.F. Walker, 2002a, 2002b).
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Sassen(2006:230), for instance, writes about the “denationalization of state agendas” in
today’s hyper-connected global era arguing,
There had been a considerable institutionalizing, especially since the 1990s, of the
“rights” of non-national firms, the deregulation of cross-border transactions, and
the proliferation of privatized systems of law internal to specialized fields, most
notably the reinvented lex mercatoria and new lex digitalis. These are systems of
private rules to govern specialized domains. Except for the most powerful, states
today also find their work constrained by the growing influence and power of
several supranational organizations, particularly IMF and the WTO. If securing
these rights, options and powers entailed an even partial relinquishing of
components of state authority as constructed over the last century and more, this
signals a necessary engagement by national states in the process of globalization,
even as this same process also enables the formalization of non-state normative
orders where the state once had excusive authority.
For Sassen and others, this process of “denationalization” is destabilizing the notion of
citizenship at different levels resulting in the “debordering and relocalizing” of
citizenship primarily in urban centers. Sassen (2006:314) continues,
The national as container of social process and power is cracked, opening up
possibilities for a geography politics that links sub-national spaces. Cities are
foremost in this geography.
Obviously, these arguments dovetail with the premises of the “right to the city” literature
and the new era of “urban citizenship” it speaks about. However, a recurrent theme
which surfaced during the analysis and write up of this thesis is the predominant role of
the nation-state in crafting, legislating, and enforcing laws when it comes to urban
refugees. Considering the case of urban refugees in Nairobi, therefore, much of the hype
about globalization and the decline in the power of the nation-state appears to be, at least
uninformed, or utmost exaggerated.
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In the Kenyan context, the Department of Refugee Affairs (which is under the Office of
the Prime Minister) is the only agency which has jurisdiction over matters of refugee
registration, and camp management. It is the only agency which liaises with the UNHCR
and has a say in the resettlement of refugees in a third (usually Western) country. When
it comes to security, it is the national police force of Kenya and the intelligence bureau
that have regular contacts with urban refugees. The only other government agency
interacting with refugee affairs is the City Council of Nairobi that issues business permits
to refugees, collects annual fees and conducts a regular check up of their business
premises.

These facts show the need for a more comprehensive and deeper analysis about the
structure and functions of the Kenyan state, itself a post-colonial creation. It was not
within the remit of my research questions to deal with this issue. I am however convinced
that a deeper dive to look at the creation and the workings of the Kenyan state is
absolutely essential if we need to better explain state-citizen and state-refugee relations in
Kenya. This is for two practical reasons.

First, the historical processes that led to the creation of states in Africa are unique and
somewhat different from the history of state formation in Europe and North America. For
instance, Lefebvre is critical about the liberal democratic states in the West which in his
opinion alienate and dis-empower urbanites from self government and collective decision
making i.e. autogestion. Ironic enough, much of the debate among African scholars is
how to turn the page on authoritarian rule in many African states and ensure legitimate
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democratic social contracts between the people and their governments. In fact, the
demand for urban citizenship (if it only implies right to the local city-state) may sound a
far cry seen from that vantage point. We will come back to some of these debates on the
nature of the African state shortly. But secondly, the state is the single most powerful
institution whose bearings on the scale, essence and scope of urban citizenship are
inescapable. It becomes a primary target whose structure would need to alter if one picks
the Lefebvrian project to ensure formal urban citizenship for immigrants, refugees, guest
workers etc.
The Kenyan state offers us a number of contradictions in its treatment of refugees. It has
placed encampment as the center most strategy of governing strangers. But at the same
time, it has allowed thousands of refugees to reside in cities like Nairobi. It has issued
legal alien certificates for these refugees that enabled them to open up businesses, enroll
in colleges and schools, or get health treatment in public hospitals and clinics. Yet again,
it has become more hawkish due to repeated bomb attacks by Islamist extremist groups
most of whom allegedly use Eastleigh as a hideout and a launching pad for such
operations. But at the same time, the state apparatus is too weak and corrupt that refugees
can illegally “buy” legal travel documents such as Kenyan passports.
This is happening when the upcoming Kenyan parliament (elections will be held in
March 2013) is given the mandate to ratify national Act of Naturalization for Kenya.
Ironically, “accessing” Kenyan citizenship has become possible for the powerful “others”
even when the national rules and regulations are not yet in place to manage it! Also, state
officials harp on the need to include, empower and integrate urban refugees. But in
reality, public officials ranging from sanitation officers of the city council to officers of
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the Kenyan police force use their discretionary powers to harass urban refugees, ask for
bribes, arrest the latter arbitrarily, and release them without any legal due process. These
are not isolated incidents but structured processes which do force us to question the
structure and functions of the post-colonial state in Kenya.
We would also be wrong to assume that the Kenyan state is an exception when it comes
to rampant corruption, exploitation and blatant violation of human rights including
refugee rights. As we indicated in previous chapters, a number of authors (Simone A,
2001; Nyamnjoh, 2007, 2006; Nyaoro, 2010) pointed out the dismal record of African
states when it comes to respecting and protecting the rights of refugee. The following
arguments would therefore be starting points to re-engage the task of understanding and
explaining the authoritarian and adversely extractive nature of African states.

The modernization Thesis
Going back to the classics of Marx and Weber and to the writings of Barrington Moore
(1966) and Samuel Huntington (1991), there is a conventional assumption that a liberal
democratic state is most likely to emerge in industrialized modern economies. According
to Osaghae(1999:17), the modernization thesis alludes to “poverty, illiteracy, economic
underdevelopment, low levels of industrialization, urbanization, and national cohesion”
as explanatory factors for the pervasiveness of authoritarian regimes in the Third World.
Modernization theory had its own share of criticisms beginning from the early 60s but its
fundamental problem is that the supposed “empirical relationship and positive correlation
between economic development and political development” does not always hold true
(Abbott, 2009:179). Abbott, for instance, explains how the economic growth and
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development of Malaysia was not accompanied with democratization but rather with
increased authoritarianism. In a similar vein, Osaghae(1999:17) criticizes the
development-democratization thesis as “tentative and unproven.”

Neo-Institutionalism
Another popular way of explaining authoritarianism in Africa is the weakness of
watchdog institutions that should have overseen and enforced a democratic process. In
many instances, incumbents “handpicked partisans to serve on so-called independent
electoral commissions and invent new electoral rules and qualifications to exclude critical
segments of the opposition.” (Osaghae,1999:11) Complaints and appeals of the public or
the opposition to higher courts fail on deaf ears for court judges are handpicked and
appointed by the executive whose independence and non-partisanship gets compromised.
A common feature in Africa, Osaghae(1999:16) argues, is “the weakness of
representative, oversight and judicial institutions.” Perhaps, the litmus test of
authoritarianism in Africa is “the failure to grant equality of access to state-controlled
resources to the various groups” (Osaghae, 1999:16). Incumbent regimes in Africa use
the state resource for their party efforts. Often, it is difficult to see the dividing line
between the state and the party organizations.

Neo-institutionalism is a very descriptive way of explaining what is going on in the
continent instead of explaining it. Institutions do not become strong or weak in their own.
Rational and strategic political actors with vested interests tinker and manipulate them.
Institutionalism fails to bring in this dynamics and expose the underlying factors behind
the excesses of the executive. It does not, for instance, explain how the rural peasantry,
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the urban middle class, the incumbent elite, and the army are vying for influence and
benefits each time elections are held.

Neo Patrimonialism
Another explanation of authoritarianism in Africa is that the incumbents “maintain
authority through personal patronage, rather than through ideology or law.” (Bratton and
Van de Walle, 1994:458) Patrimony is “the award by public officials of personal favors,
both within the state (notably public sector jobs) and in society (for instance, licenses,
contracts, and projects).” (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994:458) In such a scenario,
elections become, “violent factional struggles over patronage rather than by divisions of
political ideology.” Svasand and Randall (2001:21) concur stating, “the foundations of
political accountability in Africa are both collective and extra-institutional: they rest on
the particularistic links between Big Men, or patrons, and their constituent communities.”
According to Bratton and Van De Walle, “the prospects for democracy are better in
transitions from regime types other than neo-patrimonial ones. This is so because greater
progress has been made in other regimes in routinizing participation.” (Bratton and Van
De Walle 1994:487) The problem with the argument for neo-patrimonialism (Bayart,
1997; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Bayart, S Ellis and Beatrice Hibou, 1999) is that it
inclines to explain patronage and corruption in Africa in culture deterministic ways.
Simplified, the protagonists state that African officials exploit the people and embezzle
public funds for private gains and ostentatious spending because they are traditionally
predisposed to do so.
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This argument has come under fire from many African scholars. Thandika Mkandawire’s
piercing criticism of neo-patrimonialism and its cultural deterministic underpinnings
stands out in this regard. According to Mkandawire(2002:183-4),

In some essentialist (and often poorly veiled racist) accounts, it is suggested that
there is something fundamentally wrong with African culture - and that senseless
violence is an undisavowable excrescence of that culture. Such accounts attempt
to search some distant past for culturally encoded genes for the perpetration of
atrocious acts and plunder to explain the recurrence of such deeds today. Some
authors even resort to what borders on instant historical anthropology: having
identified cases of plunder in Liberia's troubled past, Stephen Ellis (1998: 169)
concludes: 'There is an obvious echo of this historical tradition in the practice of
present-day warlords.' Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999: 2) concur
with Ellis when they conclude that the 'seemingly "barbaric" violence' is 'an
instrumentally plausible re-traditionalisation of society'. That is how 'Africa
works', and all the conflicts 'are part of everyday calculus of power in
contemporary Africa' (ibid.: 82). Much of this writing takes historical continuity
and cultural relativism to absurd extremes, to say the least, and in its journalistic
rendition attains racist proportions.

But there is an older and still problematic explanation about neo-patrimonialism too.
(Bates, 1981; Jackson and Roseburg, 1983; Callaghy, 1984; Kasfir, 1984; Young and
Turner, 1985; Ergas, 1987; Chabal, 1988; Rothchild and Chazan, 1988) This school
speaks of “rent-seeking” by the African elite as a rational but adverse capital
accumulation stratagem. Olukoshi (2005:183) draws a very useful line between these two
patterns of explaining neo-patrimonialism in cultural and economic terms. He states,
For some of the contributors to the development of this perspective, rent-seeking
is integral to the very nature of African culture and/or society, while for others the
political/policy elite are the self-conscious producers of niches of opportunity
which they exploit. Some of the rent-seeking niches are also held to arise from the
nature of African economies, which have been structured within a stateinterventionist model of development that allocates an important role to the
exercise of policy discretion, facilitates oligopolistic practices, and discourages
the emergence of market-driven pricing regimes.
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But one thing is clear. Whether one takes the “culturalist” or the “economic” route of
explaining neo-patrimonialism in Africa, both approaches portray a very cynical image
about the prospects of economic transformation and democratization in Africa. Olukoshi
(2005:183) spells this out eloquently stating,
There is widespread agreement among them that Africa’s economic development
and political transition from authoritarian rule have been stymied and obstructed.
The intellectual roots of Afro-pessimism can be traced to this perspective insofar
as it represents a frame which, in treating rent-seeking behaviours, neopatrimonialist practices and post-colony syndromes as ubiquitous and allpervasive, almost sees no way out of the “dead end” to African development.
This tone of explaining the nation-state in Africa as a “cultural other” leaves a bitter taste
in the mouth of many who charge the protagonists of neo-patrimonialism as Afropessimists.

The Disjuncture Thesis
For many (Gibbon et al 1992; Chole and Jibrin 1995; Mkandawire and Olukoshi 1995),
the crisis of states in Africa resulted due to cavalier attempts to transplant the liberal
democratic model of the west riding roughshod over the cultural, economic and political
particularities of the continent. This was the case with the implementation of structural
adjustment programs (SAPs) where poor nations were summarily ‘advised’ to
democratize by powerful external actors. So, liberal democracy is imported in the same
“de-rooted manner the African state evolved in colonial Africa.” (Osaghae, 1999:20)
This created a historic disjuncture between the political elites and the state on the one
hand, and society and ordinary people, the masses, on the other.
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According to Osaghae (1999:20) the elite has also failed to take into account the multiethnic character of their countries and craft “their own forms of ‘multi-ethnic democracy'
(Horowitz 1994; Lijphart 1977) or what post-modernists call 'difference democracy'
(Dryzek 1996).” Claude Ake (1993:244) stood out in this calling for “a consocietal
arrangement-the use of ethnic groups, nationalities and communities as the constituencies
of representation” This, for Ake, “would be a highly decentralized system of government
with equal emphasis on individual and communal rights”.

A good example in support of the disjuncture thesis would be the “culture” of
manipulating elections.

Many African scholars argue that rigging elections and

manipulating results started from the colonial times. Colonial masters introduced local
and regional elections making sure the ‘elected’ are agents of colonial domination. For
Adejoumbi (2000:63), “colonialism by its very nature and character is antithetical to the
logic and philosophy of elections and democracy, having been constructed on a base of
authoritarianism and domination.” After independence, the African state begun to serve
“as the focus of capital accumulation and the fulcrum of social control” making it nearly
impossible to allow genuine democratic elections from within. (Adejoumbi, 2000:63)
Even worse, the Cold war “de-emphasized the object of real elections and genuine
democracy” where both the East and West allied with tyrants for strategic reasons. Up
until the early 90s, therefore, Africans were “denied democracy by a confluence of
internal and international factors.” (Adejoumbi, 2000:63)
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Putting the Kenyan State to the Test
I do not pretend that these explanations about the root causes of authoritarianism in
Africa sufficiently explain everything about the Kenyan state. Neither am I arguing that
this is an exhaustive list of explanations mainly because the history of state formation
varies between African states themselves. The way the Ethiopian state emerged is for
instance remarkably different from the Kenyan state materialized. Also, none of these
explanations go far when considered each at a time. An eclectic framework is in order.
National politics in Kenya is featured by intense and sometimes violent competition
between the elite of the various ethnic groups (Kagwanja et al, 2008; CSIS, 2011;
Anderson, David M, 2002). There is resentment on the part of the non- Kikuyu elite that
the latter have controlled the resources and power of the Kenyan state disproportionately
since independence.

The 2007 post election violence in Kenya brought these schisms to the forefront when
supporters of Mwai Kibaki (an ethnic Kikuyu) violently clashed with supporters of Raila
Odinga (an ethnic Luo). The Center for Strategic and International Studies report (2011)
aptly summarized the conditions which led to the outbreak of violence that shook the core
of the country. The study argues,

The violence of January 2008 laid bare the principal fault lines of Kenyan Politics.
These fault lines break mainly along ethnic lines and are the product of the
convergence of three factors: first, the number and relative size of Kenya’s
principal ethnic groups, particularly the fact that Kenya’s politics are driven by
shifting coalition amongst the largest groups; second, a highly uneven
geographical pattern of economic development which has divided the country into
rich and poor areas, and which has meant that several ethnic groups, particularly
the Kikuyu, are relatively rich while others are relatively poor; and this the fact
that since independence, Kenya’s political leaders have invariably sought to
mobilize electoral support on the basis of ethnic appeals. (CSIS, 2011:3)
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The CSIS (2011:1) reported that “more than 1500 were killed and nearly a third of a
million were displaced” by the crisis.

The United Nations intervened and former

Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Koffi Annan, brokered a power sharing deal
where Mr. Kibaki retained the Presidential post and Mr. Odinga became the Prime
Minister. Each faction fought hard to appoint its supporters to key ministerial portfolios
like foreign affairs, defense and finance. The coalition government has survived so far
but elections are due to be held in March 2013. The future of Kenya is hanging in the
balance and talking to ordinary Kenyans in the streets of Nairobi, one easily feels
simmering tension building up to the election date.

Given this background, neo-patrimonialism and institutionalism could help partly explain
the workings of the Kenyan state. Kenyan parties are coalitions of de facto ethnically
organized parties. They represent coalitions of elite who peddle their ethnic identity as
the single most political capital to wield power. There obviously are incentives and
rewards in doing so. (Kagwanja, M, 2009) But also, the state infrastructure has very weak
institutions such as the Kenyan Electoral Commission. The 2007 post election violence
saw massive vote frauds and rigging especially in the rural parts of the country. Both
President Kibaki’s party and Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)
declared themselves as winners. Eventually, violence broke out in the Rift Valley region
of Kenya where people “burned and looted factories, shops and homes, and chased those
perceived to be supporters of Kibaki (mostly, but not exclusively, members of his Kikuyu
tribe) away.” (HRW, 2008:4) The independence of the judiciary was compromised and
the police force was incapable of maintaining law and order.
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Even more, the fact that the international community intervened to stop the violence; that
it forced the contestants to settle for shared government; and charged six prominent
political leaders for crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in
Hague; speaks volumes about how weak and deferent the Kenyan state is to outside
influence. Political legitimacy, it seems, does not come from popular sovereignty (the
Kenyan people themselves) but rather from powerful foreign countries in the West that
call the shots. One definitely needs a huge dose of history about the colonial origins and
the neo-colonial relations of the Kenyan state with the West to partly explain its
authoritarian and predatory proclivities. All said, I cannot stress more about the need
conduct serious and comprehensive studies to look into the historical roots of the Kenyan
state and its political economy. As painstaking and costly as they would be, only such
research ventures could provide us better explanations about state-citizen and, by
extension, state-refugee relations in Kenya.

Seeing like a State, Seeing like a City
A caveat is important here. This is not to argue that citizenship is not entirely contested at
an urban level at all. Rather, it is to argue that urban refugees employ their individual and
collective agency as well as resources to chip away from the confining, monitoring and
fixing acts of the state both at urban and national levels. Hence, struggles for “right to the
city” do not happen exclusively or detached from parallel struggles for “right to the
nation-state”. These processes are happening altogether at once. They are intertwined
both in essence (what urban refugees demand) and in scale (whether they demand it at
national or urban levels). Our task should therefore be to explore the inter-linkages
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between these registers of political action. It is in that spirit that I call for a re-focus also
on the politics of the nation-state.
Warren Magnusson (2011) has done an excellent job in underscoring the need to look at
politics both from the optic of the “nation-state” and “the city”. He stresses that “seeing
like a state” (2011:3) has always been the preoccupation of political scientists with such
conventional assumptions like:
1) The world is divided into states, each of which has its own territory and
claims sovereignty in relation to it. 2) Within each state, there is a hierarchy of
authority, so that there is always a final authority with respects to issues in
dispute. 3) Within each state, everything and everyone is ultimately subject to
the state’s authority: in that sense, the state is sovereign.

This approach, Magnusson argues, ignored the importance of studying power relations
outside the prism of the sovereign and “see like a city”. “Seeing like a city” (2011:4) he
adds recognizes
(1) The world is characterized not only by its division into sovereign states, but
also by the presence within it of a multiplicity of political authorities in different
registers, ones that are there for different purposes and heed the call of different
drummers. (2)Many of these authorities claim that they are not political – only
cultural, economic, religious, communal, or whatever – and such a move often
enhances their autonomy, not least in relation to authorities that claim
sovereignty. (3) Only some of the political authorities are arranged in a neat
hierarchy: most are not. (4)The space of the state is only one of many. Other
histories are enacted in spaces that are qualitatively different, and cannot be
assimilated to the space of the state. In fact, what we call social movements are
ones that generate new spaces of action and new histories, in relation to which
new identities, interests, and forms of authority are established. The result is a
pattern of interaction that defies easy modeling.

Magnusson (2011:120) privileges “seeing like a city” which he argues “is to accept a
certain disorderliness, unpredictability, and multiplicity as inevitable and to pose the
problem of politics in relation to that complexity”. However, he recognizes that we
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already live in a world of states and a world of cities, pointing out the need to consider
them both in terms of their complexity and inter-linkages. My findings about the role of
the Kenyan nation-state and its direct involvement in the urban life of refugees confirm
this. We need to see both like a “city” and a “state” shedding light on their complexity,
interfaces and inter-linkages.
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CHAPTER VII
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

A number of policy recommendations came out of the interviews and discussions with
refugees, representatives of civil society organizations working on the issue of refugees,
and government officials. I clustered these recommendations into thematic areas. This
chapter is therefore divided into two major categories of policy recommendations. The
first dwells on recommendations put forth by refugees themselves while the second
category refers to recommendations made by government officials and leaders of the
various civil society organizations.
7.1 Refugee Recommendations
Promoting Economic Rights and Opportunities
The majority of refugee informants underscored the need to further enhance economic
opportunities for urban refugees. These recommendations revolved around two major
themes i.e. jobs and business permits. Seven of my informants stated that there is
bureaucratic red tape when it comes to issuing business permits for urban refugees in
Nairobi. Accordingly, they argued that the process of getting business permits in Nairobi
should be made simpler. One of the informants summarized this argument as follows,
We are grateful that the Kenyan government has made it possible for us to have
legal alien certificates and opening the leeway for refugees to open up small
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businesses. But having the alien certificate should not be seen as an end it itself.
I recommend that the Kenyan government extend its support by letting us to be
active in doing business.
Another informant explained why having business and work permits is essential for the
urban refugee community. He stated, “I think the remittances we get from relatives
abroad create some dependency in our minds. I suggest different organizations plan to
assist refugees to be self reliant and independent by giving them job opportunities.”
I probed more to find out whether refugees aspire to be employed by the government
itself or only private sector jobs. One of my respondents indicated, “There are many
educated doctors, engineers, and professionals who if given the chance by the Kenyan
government can work here. Remember, this benefits not only the refugees but the Kenyan
government too.” Others mentioned that there was precedence in the 1970s where the
Kenyan government employed hundreds of Ugandan professionals who fled Idi Amin’s
brutal persecution in Uganda. One of the officials of “Hakki Jammi” recounted this
saying, “The first wave of refugees to Kenya is from Uganda in the late 70s. I used to
have Ugandan professors here in the University of Nairobi and there were Ugandan
teachers in primary and secondary schools in Kenya”. He stated that these refugees filled
a very important and critical gap in Kenya when it was lagging behind in terms of its
skilled manpower development.
Promoting Legal Recognition and Inclusion
Another set of recommendations were made around political rights, in general, and the
need for more legal recognition and protection of urban refugees, in particular. A number
of urban refugees stated that the refugee alien certificate has been very helpful for their
stay in Nairobi. But they lamented about the long period of time the UNHCR takes to
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issue “mandate refugee certificates” (MRCs). Others emphasized the need to cut red tape
in the UN system when it comes to third country settlement programs. One of the
informants expressed the need for reform as follows, “The UNHCR should improve its
handling of refugees and particularly the third country relocation process. It is not fair for
people to be stranded for more than a decade and wait till they get relocated in another
country”. In general, the UNHCR is viewed as an opaque organization which does not
respond to the plights and challenges of urban refugees in Nairobi.

But the most recurrent and major recommendation that urban refugees made was about
the need to combat police harassment and corruption. This theme dominated most of my
discussions with refugees. Here is how one of the refugees described the urgent need for
police reform, “I want the police to respect our human rights. I want the exploitation and
arbitrary arrests by the police to end. Someone has to force the police to respect the law
of their land!” Some refugees mentioned that this should start by educating the police
force not to violate the rights of refugees. Others indicated the need to punish corrupt
police officers and deter other officers from following course. In light of the recent police
raids to Eastleigh to clamp down on Al Shabab operatives, Ethiopian refugees insist that
the police should be able to differentiate between them and Somali refugees (the
argument being Ethiopians have nothing to do with the bomb attacks in Nairobi). One of
my informants summed up this argument as follows, “We are Ethiopian refugees and not
Somali terrorists! Why should be we be harassed, raided and interrogated by the police
for things our community has nothing to do with?”
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Even more, eleven informants recommended that the Kenyan government grant
citizenship to those who want to live in the country. One of the refugees stated, “Some of
us have lived here for more than ten years. Our children go to school here and we have
our businesses. It would be very helpful if the Kenyan government grants citizenship.” In
fact, most of these refugees expressed their optimism that the new Kenyan constitution
will offer them the gateway for naturalization. Another respondent added,
The new constitution has a provision that the naturalization process will be
undertaken following an Act of the Kenyan Parliament. We think this is a very
good idea! Many people who first set out to migrate into another country have
changed their mind and settled to live here for the long haul.
Another refugee spoke about the public debate about naturalization which was
undertaken before the ratification of the new constitution. The constitution, he argued,
has made naturalization a realistic option for urban refugees. He continued,
There was a lot of debate among the Kenyan elite about the future of refugees.
There were some who insisted that refugees are living here, working and
contributing to the economy of Kenya and argued that Kenya should provide
citizenship to the refugees. There were others who viewed us as security threats to
the country; and people who compete for the jobs of Kenyan nationals. Some
Kenyans hold this view strongly because they already think white settlers and
Indians have unfairly benefited and thrived in Kenya. So they view the influx of
refugees negatively. But the new constitution has already stipulated that: 1) a
foreigner who married a Kenyan national can be naturalized as a Kenyan if she or
he lived in the country; 2) there is a provision that someone who worked as a legal
and permanent resident of Kenya can be naturalized as a Kenyan after 7 years of
stay here. These are very encouraging developments for many Ethiopian refugees
who now lived here for more than 7 years and think of settling here permanently!

Awareness Creation and Integration
Respondents also commented that Ethiopian refugees should first know about the pros
and cons of life in countries like Kenya before they leave their country. Awareness
creation, they argue, is very important so that many who are lured by the news of good
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life in Kenya and West do not come to Kenya unprepared. One of my respondents
stressed this point stating,
Being a refugee is very difficult. I came here hoping that my life would be better,
but I ended up in worse living conditions. So I advise friends in Ethiopia to know
about the challenges and opportunities of refugee life before they cross the border.
Others recommended that urban refugees in Nairobi should be forthcoming and active to
integrate to the Kenyan society. Integration, they argued, cannot be realized only by state
laws and regulations. According to one of my informants, “Ethiopian refugees should be
more open-minded to integrate themselves with the Kenyan people. This creates a lot of
opportunities for both the refugee community and Kenyans”. Part of this integration,
refugees uphold, comes from finding job opportunities and being productive member of
society.
I think most refugees are dependent on cash transfers from relatives who live in
countries like American and Canada. This hurts the confidence and enthusiasm of
refugees to find jobs here and thrive on their own. There are some who have been
receiving help for 10 years. Imagine how that affects your self esteem?! Most people
get addicted with alcohol and drugs because they are jobless and idle. In my opinion,
integration should foster creating work opportunities for urban refugees.

7.2 Recommendations by Policy Actors
Go Beyond Encampment
Opinion about Kenya’s refugee policy swings between two extremes. There are many
who argue that Kenya has the record and reputation of being the most welcoming country
for refugees in East Africa. There are others who blame Kenya for benefiting from the
instability of neighboring countries in two ways: 1) by hosting a myriad of international
and UN organizations who are involved in humanitarian assistance in the Horn, and 2)
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through income remittances from abroad to the refugees themselves. Most of the
respondents graded Kenya highly when it comes to receiving refugees but they express
their doubts about its center most strategy of refugee administration i.e. encampment.
One of the respondents stated,
The Kenyan government has been welcoming refugees for more than 5 decades
now. The government also had peaceful relations with the Ethiopian government
and people. But they insist on confining refuges to camps! They were always
concerned to round up and confine refugees in remote camps which were so arid
and inhospitable. Actually, I think Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania have a much
more relaxed policy towards refugees. In these countries refugees are not forced
to stay in camps. Most live in urban areas, trade, send their children to education
and at the same time process their relocation in Western countries.
The respondents recognize that the current refugee law sticks to the encampment
approach and totally neglects the phenomenon of urban refugees. This, they argue, should
be reversed. Some are not very enthusiastic about the implementation of naturalization as
per the new constitution. They have doubts whether there is the political will to enforce
the provision. One of the officials of Refuge Point explained his reason as follows,
In the current Refugee Law of Kenya encampment is put in a preferred position.
Things have not changed much. I know there are new interesting provisions in the
new constitution of Kenya but I very much doubt if this promise will soon be
realized. Let alone refugees from Ethiopian and the Sudan, even Somali Kenyans
had to now carry a second identification card proving that they are Kenyans.
Hence there is still a lot of suspicion against refugees in Kenya. Let me give you
an example, I am European and my wife is a Kenyan. But nobody considers our
daughter as Kenyan, people call her a “Musungu” (a white person) even though
this is where she is born and brought up!
Even though these actors are clear eyed about the challenges of shifting from the old
encampment policy of the government, they underline that more efforts should be
expended to expand the bundle of rights and services for urban refugees in Nairobi. In
short, they all agree on the need to go beyond encampment.
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More Freedoms and Empowerment
Respondents insist that a new policy approach to urban refugees should bequeath more
freedoms, aspire to empower them economically and bring them to the fold of the
Kenyan society. A senior Kenyan researcher on refugee matters in Kenya pointed,
Urban citizenship is the answer. Kenya will benefit more if we relax our
regulations on refugees and give them more freedom to work. It benefits the city
for the following three reasons. First of all, refugees bring a lot of skills with
them. Especially urban refugees are people who are educated in their country.
They have some professional training that they can turn into business when they
come here. Secondly, we create more jobs for Kenyans and create revenue.
Thirdly, refugees could use their global connections to bring in capital (by way of
remittances or seed capital) into the country.
Another official from Danish Refugee Council in Kenya argued along the same lines
stating, “We have to encourage and support the full integration of urban refugees.
Especially the young people have the potential to integrate faster because they speak the
language, go to school here and have Kenyan friends”. Accordingly, he listed the
following specific policy recommendations which summed up the comments of the other
respondents concisely. He stated,
1) The provision of security and protection for urban refugees should be the first
priority. This means police harassment and corruption should stop. 2) The creation of
a formal safety net for basic services provision is highly indispensable. 3) Awareness
creation and public sympathy for refugees is important. 4) We should also be working
towards the socioeconomic integration of urban refugees.
As far as providing security and protection for refugees is concerned, our respondents
stated that there still are many refugees that do not have the alien certificate. Providing
these IDs will help a long way. They also added that The Kenyan government should
seriously undertake Police reform to ward off such practices like corruption, harassment,
and arbitrary arrests. When it comes to the provision of a social safety net for urban
refugees, my respondents indicated three major ways of doing so. First, they underscored
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that linking refugees to the government institutions and providing efficient public
services would go a long way. For instance, easing the bureaucratic red tape for refugees
who seek trade licenses can be a good start. Secondly, the government can encourage
banks to finance small business initiatives of urban refugees. Thirdly, the Kenyan
government can help train and improve refugee skills for the Kenyan labor market. Last
but not least, both the government and civil society organizations can work aggressively
to create public awareness about the Refugee Act, their rights and responsibilities in
Kenya. Such action could help stem down the fear, insecurity and also xenophobia that
some Kenyans may have towards refugees. This is extremely important in light of the
tension and intermittent mob violence that erupts after bomb attacks by extremist
elements.
End Turf Wars and Corruption
Respondents within the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and the UNHCR
indicated that there is duplication of efforts by the department of refugee affairs (DRA)
and the UNHCR. This lack of a clear division of labor between DRA and the UNHCR
has led to a turf war between these two agencies. The DRA insists that it should
undertake the entire process of refugee registration and third country settlement. The
DRA officials spoke out that the UNHCR should only confine itself to camp management
and the IOM to travel arrangement. This obviously does not tally up with the
international conventions and customary practice.
In addition, the relocation process of refugees is facing a lot of difficulty because the
DRA insisted that refugees should secure exit visa when they leave the country.
According to an IOM official,
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This is a bureaucratic red tape since refugees have their alien certificates, the
refugee mandate status documents, and legal travel documents with entry visas
when they go the airports. Some officials inside the DRA and the department of
Immigration, however, intimidate refugees and ask for money in order to issue
them exit visas.
The problem of corruption and refugee harassment, common within the police force,
seems to be affecting the DRA too. Unfortunately refugees will pay anything to use their
long waited chance of moving to the West and not miss their final chance. They are
vulnerable and eager. The issue has now become a bone of contention between the
Kenyan authorities, on the one hand, and the international agencies, on the other. The
turf war should come to an end and government corruption abated from the ranks of the
DRA, if refugees are to lead a more secure and promising life in Nairobi.
Engage the City Council and Ward Management
Urban refugees constitute a significant portion of Nairobi’s population. But the city
council never engaged them in policy dialogue as stakeholders in any of its ventures. This
is because the government plans are mainly designed to address Kenyan citizens via the
Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) which claims to be the sole government agency to
oversee refugee matters in Kenya. However, the city council should be involved since
urban refugees contribute to the local economy and also are consumers of public goods
and services such as roads, schools, transport services, housing and other utilities. In
fact, three of the ward managers which govern the refugee populated areas of Eastleigh
and Kilimani discussed major problems part of which are attributed to the constant influx
of refugees to these neighborhoods. One of the managers of Eastleigh North ward
summarized these problems as follows,
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We have a constant inflow of refugees into Eastleigh and our apartments are crowded.
Hence we have big problem of solid waste management in the ward. Language and
communication barrier is another problem we have with refugees. Most refugees do
not speak very good English or Swahili. We also have security problems. Most of
these refugees used to be combatants and some still have political acrimonies and
clan rivalries (this is especially the case with Somalis). Occasionally, scuffles and
fights break out between them. I remember two incidents where the ward
management and district police were involved to stop the fights and resolve the
disputes.
Given these pressing issues, one would assume that the city government will be working
with representatives of urban refugees to address problems of housing, sanitation and
hygiene, and public safety. But all government representatives confirmed that no such
channel exists between the city government and the refugee community. A senior official
at Nairobi’s Social Development Bureau confirmed about this stating,
About 4 months ago, representatives of Oromo refugees from Ethiopia came to
register as a group. Their objective was to raise relief and development aid for
their community here in Nairobi and implement urban based community
development projects. Once their association got registered by our bureau; the
DRA issued a letter that they cannot be registered and that every correspondence
with an individual or a group of refugees in Nairobi should be directed to it.
Apparently, their certificate was suspended by higher authorities.
Clearly city and ward level managers are sidelined from refugee administration. This is
despite the fact that they provide most of the services on the ground and interact with the
refugee populace on a day to day basis. It is therefore very important that the city
council and its leaders at the various tiers of local administration open lines of
communication with urban refugees and liaise to manage these wards safely and
effectively. They have not been able to do this so far.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

It is important to recap the three major research questions of the study in order to provide
a summary of the findings and reflections from the fieldwork.

First, I set out to

understand how Ethiopian urban refugees negotiate aspects of urban citizenship in the
city of Nairobi. Secondly, I aimed to evaluate whether the conceptual tools of Lefebvre’s
‘right to the city’ approach and his call for urban citizenship help us explain the social,
political and economic processes that refugees yield in Nairobi. Finally, I set out to find
out practical policy recommendations that both refugees and the researcher deem are
useful entry points to better the living conditions of Ethiopian urban refugees in Nairobi.

These research questions could be redefined in ways which emphasize the theoretical
inferences, and reflections the study aimed to make from the outset. Seen from such
vantage point, the first research question could be rephrased as follows, “Do urban
refugees have the right to participate centrally in the production of urban space?” The
second research question can also be reformulated as follows, “How far can the urban
citizenship literature on western cities (aiming at the inclusion and participation of
immigrants and strangers) explain the situation of urban refugees in non-western cities?
Last but not least, our emphasis on policy issues can also be rearranged as follows, “What
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kinds of policy recommendations could be made to improve the provisions as well as the
implementation of these policies?” A caveat is important here. The central research
objective of the study remains the same whether one takes the empirical route of
interpreting and analyzing field data or prefers the theoretical route of superimposing
Lefebvre’s ‘right to the city’ model to identify patterns or anomalies. In a nutshell, this
study set out to explore, qualify, and explain how refugees negotiate aspects of urban
citizenship in Nairobi.
As far as methodology is concerned, I employed a case study design interviewing
refugees, community and business leaders, representatives of civil society organizations
that support urban refugees, and finally government officials. Nairobi was selected
because Kenya has been the only stable country in East Africa hosting refugees from
neighboring countries like Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Northern Uganda and
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Official figures suggest there are “around 46,000
refugees in Nairobi, however unofficial estimates are nearer 100,000 (UNHCR 2010).”
The same report indicated that Ethiopians comprise the second largest nationality of
urban refugees in Nairobi following Somalis.
A qualitative case study, I argued, provides a suitable platform of engaging our research
questions because its epistemological assumptions are based on “interpretivism”.
Interpretivism posits that “reality and meaning are constructed from the actions and
reactions of society’s constituent members, the individuals” (Bryman, 2004:17).
Qualitative research asserts that the researcher and the social world impact each other.
Value free research is impossible to conduct for facts and values are not distinct but
intertwined. But most importantly, qualitative research rebels against the excesses of
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positivism which attempt to impose principles and regularities while studying human
behavior. The biggest advantage of conducting this case study was therefore to study
human behavior in a real life context capturing the refugees’ own perspectives and
interpretation of social processes but also yielding them to a coherent theoretical lens i.e.
the “right to the city” approach.
Accordingly, I conducted a total of thirty (30) semi-structured interviews with Ethiopian
urban refugees in three municipal wards of Nairobi. In addition I undertook a total of
twenty (20) key informant interviews with three different groups of people. First, I
conducted in-depth interviews with a total of seven (7) Kenyan government officials in
the city council, and municipal wards. This was followed by interviews with
representatives of both local (Kenyan) and international NGOs working on the issue of
urban refugees in Nairobi. I conducted a total of 7 key informant interviews with
members of the civil society sector. Finally, I conducted six (6) key informant interviews
with Ethiopian community leaders who are active in religious, or community
associations. The Refugee Coalition of Kenya (RCK) was very instrumental in helping
me build rapport with the refugee community in Nairobi and facilitating the selection
process of informants. All of the urban refugees that I approached were willing to be
interviewed anonymously. I also used their recommendation to identify and shortlist a
group of Ethiopian refugee-cum- businessmen and community leaders for the key
informant interviews. Again, RCK’s officials were very instrumental to introduce me to
the NGO community working on refugee matters and arranging interviews.
The only setback I encountered was the refusal of station, division and metropolitan
police officers who refused to be interviewed. Getting the police perspective would have
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been very useful, but civilian government officials partially compensated for the lack of
that perspective by explaining the government’s stand on refugee matters, in general, and
police-refugee relations, in particular. It is also important to state here that the anonymity
of all refugee informants has been kept. I have taken extra care to transcribe the data
carefully, anonymize and protect it. To the best of my ability, I was also cautious to
phrase questions in broad strokes and thematic fashion avoiding personal and pointed
questions which may invoke harm and pain to the respondents.
Table 7 provides a summary of the major findings of the study in relation to the three
overarching research questions posited above. The depiction is followed by three
consecutive sections which provide a detailed summary of the findings. Section 8.1
explains how refugees negotiate certain aspects of urban citizenship in Nairobi. Section
8.2, dwells on the lessons learned regarding the applicability of the right to the city in
Africa and conversely what Africa brings to the right to the city analysis. Section 8.3
summarizes the major policy recommendations made both by refugees and policy actors
in order to better protect and enhance refugee rights and wellbeing in Nairobi. Last but
not least, section 8.4 provides a tight summary of what emerged as the overarching theme
of the study i.e. the theme of being a “stranded stranger”. It ends with a brief discussion
of potential areas of research and inquiry regarding the urban citizenship literature and its
applicability to the African context.

207

Table 7 Summary of Major Research Questions and Findings
Research Questions

Findings

1. How do Ethiopian urban refugees 1. Inhabitance
negotiate aspects of urban citizenship in the
Despite official policy to encamp refugees,
city of Nairobi?
movement into and residence inside the city of
Nairobi has not been sanctioned against
refugees. To use Lefebvre’s qualifier,
inhabitance is the first step through which
urban refugees negotiate citizenship in Nairobi.
2. Production of Urban Spaces
In Nairobi, Ethiopian
construct “perceived”,
“social” spaces.

refugees actively
“conceived” and

2.1 They occupy recognizable and crudely
delineated territorial representations such as
apartment buildings, churches, mosques, bars
and restaurants in certain neighborhoods.
2.2 These perceived urban spaces translate into
conceived spaces created through routine
interactions with territory, the fringes of the
Kenyan state and the host community.
2.3 Refugees also construct what Lefebvre
termed social spaces on a day to day basis in
Nairobi. They work both in the formal and
informal sectors of the economy. They also
established their own religious and cultural
institutions.

2. How adequate is the ‘right to the city’ 3.Participatory
and
Democratic
approach to explain the everyday struggle of Management
Ethiopian urban refugees for rights and
3.1 Urban refugees fail to meet the third criteria
resources in the city of Nairobi?
of Lefebvre’s urban citizenship criterion i.e.
political rights to participate in the governance
of the city.
3.2 Policy wise, the Kenyan state speaks about
the recognition and upkeep of refugee rights
while considering them as national security
threats meant to be excluded and confined in
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camps.
3.3 The relationship between state officials and
urban refugees is one of discrimination and
exploitation. Racial profiling, harassment,
corruption,
and
arbitrary arrests
are
commonplace.
3.4 The right to the city literature is inadequate
for it takes the liberal democratic state for
granted as opposed to authoritarianism and
neo-patrimony prevalent in Africa.
3.5 Its emphasis on globalization and the
reduction in the powers of the nation-state fails
to explain the condition in Kenya. Here, it is
national agencies like the police, the
intelligence and Department of Refugee Affairs
who are exclusively involved in managing
refugee affairs.
3.6 Struggles for “right to the city” do not
happen exclusively or detached from parallel
struggles for “right to the nation-state”. Hence
the urban citizenship literature should re-focus
also on the politics of the nation-state.

3. What kind of urban policy measures can 4.1 Enhance economic opportunities for urban
African cities take to manage displacement refugees offering them both employment and
driven urbanization and use it as a positive business opportunities.
force for social change?
4.2 Easing the bureaucratic red tape to secure
“alien certificates”, and UN mandated refugee
certificates.
4.3 Explore possibilities to secure Kenyan
citizenship for those who have decided to settle
in Kenya permanently
4.4. Go beyond encampment and promote the
integration of refugees through economic,
social and cultural means.
4.5 Enable urban refugees to participate in
urban governance and policy dialogue as
crucial stakeholders, which they already are.
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8.1 Seeing like a City: Negotiating Urban Citizenship in Nairobi
Ethiopian urban refugees live in relative peace with regular Kenyans. They trade, supply
goods and services to the Kenyan market. They also buy goods and services produced
and sold by Kenyans. They have an overwhelmingly positive attitude about the
opportunities Nairobi has offered them. They also are grateful about the acceptance and
tolerance of regular Kenyans to the urban refugees found in their midst. I dubbed this
amicable social space that refugees create in interaction with regular citizens of Kenya as
integration from below. It is a social space featured by a teeming diversity (or complexity
as Magnusson calls it) of actors, motives and economic strategies.

Let me start from the diversity of the refugees themselves. Often, there is an assumption
(mainly by the State) that a refugee is an individual who is forced out of his or her
country due to fear of persecution or eminent life threats. But this political definition
faded away in our case where most urban refugees are not political refugees at all. In fact
many fled to Nairobi for economic reasons. Most refugees consider Nairobi as their
launching pad to settle in Western Europe and America. Others use it as transit point to
travel all the way to South Africa which has now become a popular destination for illegal
immigration and human trafficking. Still others arrived in Nairobi to look for a job and
settle in there permanently. Of course, there were many who fled Ethiopia for reasons of
political persecution. But there were also others who were lured by stories of fortune and
adventure that they heard from their lovers, family members and friends to come and
settle in Nairobi. Right from the outset, therefore, urban refugees defy the conventional
way of defining a refugee. They are a diverse group of actors who view their hiatus in
Nairobi in more ways than politics.
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Urban refugees are also diverse in terms of their economic strategies. They are actively
involved in both the formal and informal sectors of Nairobi’s economy. Most are
employed in the urban transport sectors, owning public minibuses (the “matatus”) or
serving as drivers, ushers (“makangas”) or conductors (money collectors). Both women
and men are involved in small businesses like beauty salons, barber shops, audio and
video stores, boutiques, and cafeterias. These businesses are registered by the city council
of Nairobi and refugees have to pay annual fees to get their business permits renewed
every year. I also interviewed business tycoons who landed in Nairobi as refugees but
have risen to the top. They broke into the formal economy running high end restaurants,
cosmetic stores, construction companies, and import and export enterprises in Nairobi. In
fact, I have realized that these businessmen have created a lot of job opportunities for
Ethiopians and Kenyans too.
It is this diversity that problematizes our use of the word “refugee.” I persisted in using
the term “refugee” only as a signifier that we are talking about people who left their
country of origin, and crossed an international boundary to live in the city of a
neighboring country. Otherwise, the participation of Ethiopian refugees in the Kenyan
economy complicates their status of residence in Nairobi. Most of them sought economic
opportunities in Kenya either permanently or until their final relocation in a third country.
They did not confine themselves to refugee camps waiting for their final settlement in
another country. This makes it hard to call them only as “refugees”. But we cannot define
them “immigrants” either. This is because the overwhelming majority of them await
resettlement in a third and preferably western country. For convenience purpose, they all
carry a refugee “alien certificate” even though their real intent may not even be to
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relocate. For instance, I have identified people that the Kenyan state recognizes as
“refugees” but have arrived in the city to permanently settle and make a living. One is
tempted to refer to this group of people as “illegal immigrants” but they are comfortable
to carry a refugee ID and live in Nairobi indefinitely. Perhaps, one can qualify them as
de facto immigrants.
Again, it is hard to define urban refugees as full-fledged Kenyan citizens. But most of
these refugees have stayed in Kenya for more than decades; some have married and had
children in Kenya. Some of them have children in Kenya who may claim Kenyan
citizenship by birth. What would this make of their parents? The second generation of
Ethiopian refugees go to Kenyan schools, speak perfect Swahili and often struggle to
speak Ethiopian languages. Some of this young people perceive themselves as Kenyans
and so is their social world. This reminds us of Holsten and Appadurai’s distinction about
substantive and formal citizenship. Looking at this particular segment of Ethiopian
refugees; one wonders whether they do not meet the ‘substantive’ criterion for Kenyan
citizenship.
How do these practices speak to Lefebvre’s notion of “urban citizenship”? Lefebvre
removes the ground of citizenship from descent (from citizen parents) or being born in
that country; and fixes it on the notion of inhabitance. He speaks of urban citizens as
people who have full rights to live in, work in, and play in the city and therefore have
ownership and usership rights to the city. Third, Lefebvre speaks of empowering all
inhabitants with the power to be directly involved in the management of the affairs of the
city. He was skeptical about the virtues of liberal representative democracy which
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alienate the regular voter and empower technocrats in the actual governing of the
metropolis.
We should consider Lefebvre’s three fold taxonomy of urban spaces to have a better
understanding what I dubbed integration from below. In his book The Production of
Space (1973) Lefebvre introduced three main ways of understanding space i.e.
“perceived, conceived and lived spaces.” Perceived spaces signify physical abodes.
Conceived spaces are the impressions, biases, or in general, representations etched with
such physical spaces. Finally, lived spaces refer to the everyday lived experience of the
inhabitants. This they do by navigating through both the physical and mental scapes of
the city. Urban refugees are very active in the creation of all three forms of urban space.
In Nairobi, Eastleigh represents that geographically delineated physical and territorial
space where refugees dwell in, play in and work in. There, they produce goods and
services. They trade with fellow Kenyans and other African refugees. They rent
apartment buildings; go to churches and mosques, or visit bars and restaurants. These
perceived spaces translate into conceived spaces that refugees create through their routine
interactions with territory, the fringes of the Kenyan state and the host community. For
instance, Kenyan officials usually refer to Eastleigh as “their” neighborhood marking
and addressing it as the neighborhood of outsiders (i.e. refugees). Speaking of Eastleigh,
informants come with words like “crowding”, “illegal human trafficking”, “Somali and
Ethiopian businesses”, “bomb attacks” , “security threats” etc. For the purpose of this
study, it does not really matter whether these stocks of conceptions about Eastleigh and
its inhabitants are valid or not. In lieu, we need to realize that even powerful actors like
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the state viewed Eastleigh, a remarkable urban territory, as the abode of economic and
social interaction primarily driven by the active agency of urban refugees.

Ethiopian urban refugees are no less productive when it comes to the creation of what
Lefebvre calls social spaces. If anything, this study recorded an elaborate account of the
“lived experience” of urban refugees. It documented their economic ventures. It also
analyzed the creation, and role of various religious and community organizations by
urban refugees. The researcher thinks three words will summarize the nature of these
urban social spaces: “resilience”, “innovation” and “cooperation”. Refugees come
through difficult conditions only to unpack and embark on new livelihood strategies
through cooperation. To paraphrase Lefebvre, they are restless cosmopolitans constantly
engaged in the creation and restructuration of perceived, conceived and social spaces in
Nairobi. Shall we then conclude that Ethiopian urban refugees are vintage urban citizens
of Nairobi? Not really.

8.2 Seeing like a State in Africa: A Critique of the Right to the City
I have already mentioned that Lefebvre underscored “the democratic management of the
city through the direct participation of society (Mathivet, 2010:25)” as another important
criterion to define urban citizenship. According to Fernandez (2007:207), Lefebvre
recommends a “contemporary formula for social citizenship, expressing a ‘social project’
which requires a new political contract between the state and citizens”. So my attempt to
answer our central research question (whether refugees actively participate in the
production of urban space) cannot be fully addressed unless we focus on the ways the
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Kenyan state interacts with refugees. This is very important also because the idea of
citizenship in all its theoretical renditions (liberal, civic –republican, cosmopolitan etc.) is
fundamentally defined by the relationship of citizens to the state. Chapter five and six
dealt extensively with state-refugee relations in Nairobi bringing the politics of rights to
the fore and showing the inadequacy of the urban citizenship literature in this regard.
The analysis from extensive interviews with Ethiopian urban refugees pointed to another
overarching social space which is of exclusion and discrimination in Nairobi. It is a social
space created by a generation of legal and policy regimes that first set out to protect the
rights of refugees. But they were gradually undermined by a counter argument which
views refugees as national security threats and pushes for their confinement and
exclusion. Urban refugees kept reiterating that they face the specter of discrimination and
exploitation in Nairobi not from ordinary Kenyans but rather from the officials of the
Kenyan state. The Kenyan Police stands out as the single most institution that draws the
contours of a refugee-citizen divide in Nairobi. Ethiopian refugees are far from complete
integration in Nairobi, partly due to the exclusive and punitive policies of the Kenyan
state directed mainly at monitoring, regulating and penalizing them.
Let us consider these policies of governing urban refugees in more detail. Here I found
out two parallel but contradictory policy directions. On the one hand, Kenya has been a
signatory to the UN declaration of human rights, its conventions on the upkeep and
protection of refugees; and the OAU convention on refugees. It has also developed and
ratified its own Refugee Law (2006). These conventions and declarations proffer basic
and inalienable human rights to refugees; and enshrine the right to be a refugee as a
human right. They encourage host states to grant refugees the right to work; to own and
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manage material as well as intellectual property. And most importantly, the conventions
reiterate the need to provide refugees with legal protection, ensuring their access to public
courts and attesting their equality before the law. They also recognized that refugees can
become citizens of their host state through naturalization, affinal (marriage) or
consanguinal ties (if they have children with a spouse from the host country). These
official commitments of the Kenyan state are deemed to promote more recognition and
inclusion.
But there is another policy undercurrent which runs counter to the trend for more
recognition and inclusion i.e. a trend of exclusion and securitizing the refugee
phenomenon. From the outset, the UN declaration of human rights preserves political
rights only for citizens of a respective state. Refugees, it seems, are duty bound to be
apolitical once they cross an international border. To their chagrin, host states do not find
refugees turning apolitical. To the contrary, they become politicized. It was the OAU
convention which first recognized the subversive, political potential of refugees. Its
convention rushed to urge host states not to use refugee populations as cannon fodder for
armed political insurrections against a neighboring regime. Policy wise, therefore, states
begun to redefine refugees as national security threats as early as the 1960s leading to the
securitization of the refugee problem.

This undercurrent translated itself into national laws and regulations whose primary
intent is to monitor, regulate and impose stringent sanctions on refugees. The Kenyan
Refugee Law (2006) is undergirded by this same undercurrent of securitizing the refugee
phenomenon. Encampment is its centermost stratagem of refugee management. The
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highest policy making body, the Refugee Affairs Committee (RAC) is populated by
representatives from the police and the national security apparatus of the state. Refugees
do not have any representative whatsoever. Even more, DRA is given extraordinary and
extrajudicial (in light of international law) powers to revoke the refugee status of
individuals or expel them out of Kenya, if there is “reasonable ground” to do so. The Act
does not make clear what constitutes a “reasonable ground” to rescind a refugee status or
expel refugees. It does not also specify where expelled refugees can go afterwards. These
provisions erode the basic rights and freedoms of refugees, particularly their right to legal
protection and due process. They also force refugees to live under the shadow of fear and
insecurity.

Interviews with urban refugees portrayed that they do not view Kenyan state officials as
guarantors or protectors of their rights but the very violators. They also despise the
encampment strategy of the state. Refugees resist encampment for a number of reasons.
Most of these camps are located in arid and inhospitable areas with little or no housing
facilities, clean water and electricity. The UNHCR offers food rations which are meager.
The camps are overcrowded and they have safety and security problems. Women are
exposed to sexual assault and rape. In more than one instances, spies of the Ethiopian
government infiltrated camps to assassinate refugees who fled the country inside Kenya.
Last but not least, there are no health and educational facilities around the camps. For all
these practical reasons, refugees flee to cities.

The situation they face in cities is no less challenging. Law enforcement officials,
especially the police racially profile them. They threaten refugees for bribe and in some
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instances arbitrarily arrest them for money. The police also release detainees without any
legal due process if the latter concur to pay bribes. The relationship between the state
officials and urban refugees is one of discrimination and exploitation. The state either
incarcerates urban refugees or else predates on them. Post 911, the refugee phenomena is
re-securitized where refugees in Nairobi (especially the Somalis) are suspected of being
Al Shabab operators (a Somali Jihadist group and an affiliate of Al Qaeda). The
government of Kenya links refugees with bomb attacks of embassies, churches, and
public transport vehicles in Nairobi. This trend has harbored fear and xenophobia in the
city at an alarming rate. It has also given a new excuse for rogue police officers to
intimidate arrest and threaten to indict innocent urban refugees as national security
threats.

To conclude, encampment, racial profiling, arbitrary arrests and rampant

corruption attest that urban refugees operate under a political space which aims at
discriminating and excluding them.

How do these findings speak to the premises of the “right to the city” approach? The
policies of the Kenyan state and its relations with urban refugees in Nairobi show that the
“right to the city” literature is inadequate when it comes to explaining the role of the
nation-state on the urban. The scholarship on urban citizenship posits the re-scaling of
citizenship at urban levels as something which is fait accompli. The protagonists argue
that the nation-state is relinquishing some of its powers to supra-national, sub-national,
and private-corporate entities due to globalization (Purcell, 2003; 2002). None other than
the Global and World City (GaWC) literature in urban studies trumpets the decline of the
nation-state. Sassen (2006:314) summarized this line of thought as follows,
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The national as container of social process and power is cracked, opening up
possibilities for a geography politics that links sub-national spaces. Cities are
foremost in this geography.

However, this was not the case in Nairobi. In Kenya, it is the Department of Refugee
Affairs (which is under the Office of the Prime Minister) which has the final say on
matters of refugee registration, and camp management. The DRA also liaises with the
UNHCR and has a say in the resettlement of refugees in a third (usually Western)
country. The national police force of Kenya and the intelligence bureau make regular
contacts with urban refugees. The only other government agency interacting with refugee
affairs is the City Council of Nairobi that issues business permits to refugees, collects
annual fees and conducts a regular check up of their business premises. In short, the role
of the nation-state and its institutions is noteworthy, if not indispensable. There are two
important reasons why the role of the nation-state and its interface with the urban should
be explored.

First, the creation of states in Africa is unique and qualitatively different from the history
of state formation in Europe and North America. Lefebvre is critical about the liberal
democratic states in the West which in his opinion alienate urbanites from self
government and collective decision making i.e. autogestion. Ironic enough, much of the
debate among African scholars is how to turn the page on authoritarian rule in many
African states and ensure legitimate democratic social contracts between the people and
their governments. In fact, the demand for urban citizenship (if it only implies right to
the local city-state) may sound a far cry seen from that vantage point. Secondly, the state
is the single most powerful institution whose bearings on the scale, essence and scope of
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urban citizenship are inescapable. It becomes a primary target whose structure would
need to alter if one picks the Lefebvrian project to ensure formal urban citizenship for
immigrants, refugees, guest workers etc.

It is this lacuna of the urban citizenship literature that prompted me to consider
theoretical discussions about the origins and nature of the post-colonial state in Africa.
There is a raging debate about the state in Africa with multiple explanations about its
authoritarian and adversely extractive nature. Section 6.4 attempted to provide a cursory
review of these debates. Some speak of it in terms of weak institutional make up. Others
talk about the preponderance of ethnic and personal networks of power that forced the
state to be neo-patrimonial. Still others speak of sustained but cavalier attempts to import
and impose Western models of governance (like neo-liberalism) in Africa which ignore
local realties and often falter. As I indicated before, these schools of thought about the
nature of the post colonial state in Africa do not provide us an exhaustive list of
explanations about the root causes of authoritarianism in Africa. Rather they point out to
the need for a more comprehensive and deeper analysis about the structure and functions
of the Kenyan state, itself a post-colonial creation. Two caveats are important here.
First, this is not to argue that citizenship is not entirely contested at an urban level at all.
Rather, it is to argue that urban refugees employ their individual and collective agency as
well as resources to chip away from the confining, monitoring and fixing acts of the state
both at urban and national levels. Hence, struggles for “right to the city” do not happen
exclusively or detached from parallel struggles for “right to the nation-state”. These
processes are happening altogether at once. They are intertwined both in essence (what
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urban refugees demand) and in scale (whether they demand it at national or urban levels).
Our task should therefore be to explore the inter-linkages between these registers of
political action. It is in that spirit that I call for a re-focus also on the politics of the
nation-state. Here, I think Warren Magnusson’s recent work and his call for
understanding the politics of urbanism (2011) both through the optic of the “nation-state”
and “the city” is a useful point to start from.
Second, the lack of integration cannot wholly be attributed to the policies of the state.
Refugees’ own conception of otherness and their tendency to cling to folks from their
country of origin for psychological and social purposes also explains the lack of full
integration. This is reinforced by the unique economic, religious and cultural institutions
and practices that refugees create. For instance, there are two Ethiopian Orthodox
churches and around seven Ethiopian evangelical churches. They have charity and care
giving associations like “Maedot”. These institutions provide assistance for the poor, the
sick and the elderly. They provide trainings in language and business skills to help
refugees integrate. They comfort refugees when a family member passes away. They
support refugees who choose to go back to Ethiopia by defraying travel costs. Refugees
also have fraternity and sorority associations known as “Mahibers.”
There are two effects of this particular process. On the one hand, it proves that refugees
are constantly involved in creating social practices and structures. Their temporal and
spatial suspension in Nairobi did not deter them from such “creative” transition. It is also
essential to note that different cohorts of refugees come and go via Nairobi but the
institutions that they founded outlast their “stay” in Nairobi. But on the other hand, these
institutions are exclusively for Ethiopian refugees; reinforcing that identity of ‘otherness’;
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preventing local Kenyans from joining in, and also serving as disincentives for Ethiopian
refugees to break their shell and fully integrate with the Kenyan public. In a situation
where this social and cultural divide is clearly felt and pronounced by both sides, the
Kenyan state would not obviously entertain the bequeathal of political rights in urban
centers. In other words, the lack of integration on the part of refugees themselves
dampens efforts for full urban citizenship in the Lefevbrian sense.
8.3 Policy Recommendations
Chapter 7 has dealt with policy recommendations made both by refugees and policy
actors in great detail. However, most of these recommendations could be clustered into
five (5) focal areas. First, refugees and policy actors stressed the need to promote
economic opportunities for urban refugees offering them both employment and business
opportunities. Secondly, they stressed the importance for legal recognition and
protection. This, many stated, could be facilitated by cutting the bureaucratic red tape that
prevents refugees from securing “alien certificates”, and UN “mandated refugee
certificates” in time.

Even more, one third of our refugee respondents expressed their enthusiasm about the
new Kenyan constitution which avails the opportunity for naturalization. Hence they
called for legal and policy instruments that offer a path to Kenyan citizenship. Fourthly,
both refugees and policy actors stressed the importance of going beyond encampment,
recognizing and addressing the challenges and opportunities that urban refugees avail in
Nairobi. This, they argued, could be realized not only through legislative and policy
actions by the state but also by promoting the economic and social integration of refugees
222

into the mainstream Kenyan society. Last but not least, both urban refugees and policy
actors in government and the civil society sector underscored the need to involve urban
refugees in Nairobi’s governance as crucial stakeholders.

8.4 Stranded Strangers
This study is about strangers who are stranded in space, time and identity in Nairobi. It is
about Ethiopian refugees whose stay in Nairobi produced interesting social, economic
and political practices difficult to qualify in such conventional terms like “refugee”,
“immigrant” or a “citizen”. The bulk of the analysis can be summed up under this
overarching theme of being a “stranded stranger”. All said, urban refugees exist and
interact on two different spaces. On the one hand, they are aggressively involved in
economic activities, social and religious affairs. They muster their skills, money, time and
social networks not only to survive but also to create revenue and employment
opportunities; to render social support for fellow other refugees; and to negotiate access
and rights to the Kenyan state. On the other hand, refugees operate under punitive, highly
exploitative and discriminatory political and policy regimes which deprive them some
basic liberties and freedoms as well as the legal protection they deserve from the host
nation i.e. the Kenyan state. It is this virtual state of suspension; this liminal state of
existence between a refugee and an urban citizen; I preferred to call being a “stranded
stranger”.

The reality of urban refugees is torn in such a way that they meet two of the criteria of
Lefebvre’s concept of urban citizenship ( inhabitance and the production of urban spaces)
but they miserably fail to meet the third criterion i.e. political rights to participate in the
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governance of the city. Given these findings, the right to the city literature should expand
its horizon and conduct more empirical and comparative studies in non-western cities. It
needs to shed apriori assumptions about the impact of globalization on the power of
nation-states. Rather it should explore how the “national” interacts with the “urban”. It
also needs to grapple with the notion of post-colonial states in the South where
authoritarian and neo-patrimonial regimes are more of the norm than the exception. As
evidenced in this study, their history and dynamics is clearly different than the case of
liberal, democratic, and Westphalian states in Europe and North America. Such ventures
will not stifle attempts to develop meta theories about urbanism at a global scale. Instead,
they will provide us the theoretical insights and the research techniques to understand
cities better everywhere.

224

REFERENCES

Abbott, Jason (2009), “Democratic Transition theory and the problem of Malaysian
exceptionalism”, Southeast Asia Research, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 175-200
Adejumobi, Said (2000), Elections in Africa: A Fading Shadow of Democracy?
International Political Science Review, Vol.21, No. 1, pp. 59-73
Ake Claude, “The Unique Case of African Democracy”, International Affairs (Royal
Institute of International Affairs Vol. 69, No. 2 (Apr., 1993), pp. 239-244
Ake Claude (1996), Democracy and Development in Africa, The Brookings Institution,
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N W Washington DC.
Anderson, David M(2002), Vigilantes, violence and the politics of public order in Kenya,
Journal of African Affairs, Volume 101, Issue 405, pp 531-555.
Baubock, Rainer (2009), The Rights and duties of external citizenship, in Citizenship
Studies Vol. 13, No. 5, October 2009, 475–499
Baubock, Rainer (2003), Reinventing Urban Citizenship, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 7, No.
2.

225

Bates, Robert 1981 Markets and states in Tropical Africa: the political basis of
agricultural policies (New Haven: Yale University Press).
Bayart, Jean Francois, (1993), The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, Longman
Publishers, London.
Bayart, Jean Francois, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou(1993), Criminalization of the
State in Africa, Indiana University Press, 601 North Morton Street, Bloomington,
Indiana 47404, USA.
Berg, Bruce L. (2001), Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, A Pearson
Education Company, USA
Boudreau Julie-Anne, Keil Roger, Young Douglas (2009), Changing Toronto:
Governing Urban Neoliberalism, University of Toronto Press.
Bowden, Brett (2003), The Perils of Global Citizenship, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 7, No.
3, 2003
Bratton Michael and Nicolas Van de Walle(1994), Neo-patrimonial Regimes and
Political Transitions in Africa , World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 453-489.
Bratton and Van de Walle, (1997), Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime
Transitions in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press
Brenner, Neil and Elden, Stuart (2009) Henry Lefebvre on State, Space and Territory,
International Political Sociology (2009) 3, 353–377

226

Brown, Alison (2010), The ‘Right to the City’: from Paris 1968 to Rio 2010, XI Urban
Knowledge in cities of the South.
Bulmer, Martin (1984), Sociological Research Methods: An Introduction, Macmillan
Publishers, London.
Callaghy, Thomas 1984, The state-society struggle: Zaire in contemporary perspective
(New York: Columbia University Press).
Campbell, Elizabeth H(2006), Urban Refugees in Nairobi: Problems of Protection,
Mechanisms of Survival, and Possibilities for Integration, Journal of Refugee Studies Vol.
19, No. 3, Published by Oxford University Press.
Carasco, Sara (2010), The Right to the City: Shaping the City that Makes Us, from Z Net
- The Spirit Of Resistance Lives, Amauta
Chabal, Patrick and Jean Pascal Daloz (1999), Africa Works: Disorder as Political
Instrument, Indiana University Press.
Chabal, Patrick (ed.) 1988 Political domination in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
Chachage, S. L. C. & Kanyinga, K. (Eds) (2003), Globalization and citizenship in Africa,
Africa Development, 28(1&2), pp. 1–16.
Chole, E. and Ibrahim, J. (1995), Democratization Processes in Africa: Problems and
Prospects. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa
(CODESRIA).
Clapham Christopher (1985), Third World Politics: An Introduction, The University
of Wisconsin Press.
227

Comaroff, J. L. & Comaroff, J. (1999) Introduction, in: J. L. Comaroff & J. Comaroff
(Eds) Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa: Critical Perspectives, pp. 1–
43 (Chicago: University of Chicago).
Connoly, James and Steil, Justin (2009), Finding justice in the city, in Searching for the
Just City: Debates in urban theory and practice, Ed. Peter Marcuse et al., Rutledge,
Taylor and Francis Group.
Constitution of the Republic of Kenya (2010), Revised Edition 2010, Published by the
National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney General
Creswell, John W (1994), Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches,
SAGE Publications, London.
Dagger, Richard, Metropolis, Memory, and Citizenship in the American Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Nov., 1981), pp. 715-737
Denzin, Norman K. and Lincoln Y (2003), Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative
Materials, Sage Publications, London.
Diamond, Larry Jay (2002), Thinking About Hybrid Regimes, Journal of Democracy,
Volume 13, Number 2, April 2002, pp. 21-35, The Johns Hopkins University Press
Diamond, Larry (1999) Democratization in Africa, John Hopkins University Press
Dikec, Mustafa (2009), Justice and the Spatial Imagination, in Searching for the Just
City: Debates in urban theory and practice, ed. By Peter Marcuse et al., Rutledge,
Taylor and Francis Group.
Dreier P, Mollenkopf J, and Swanstrom T (2001), Place Matters: Metropolitics for the
Twenty- first Century, University of Kansas.

228

Dryzek, J. 1996. "Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization", American
Political Science Review, 90, 1.
Earle, Lucy (2010), Citizenship, The “Right to the City”, and State Fragility, Working
Paper No. 87, Cities and Fragile States, University of Cape Town.
Ergas, Zaki (ed.) 1987, African state in transition (London: Macmillan).
Fábos Anita H.(2003), Dilemmas of Urban Research in Africa, Presentation given in the
Workshop, Research on Refugees in Urban Settings: Methods and Ethics, April 11-13,
2003, Forced Migration and Refugee Studies Program, the American University in Cairo,
Cairo, Egypt
Fainstein, Susan S (2010), The Just City, Cornell University Press.
Fainstein, Susan (2009), Planning and the Just City, in Searching for the Just City:
Debates in urban theory and practice, ed. By Peter Marcuse et al., Routledge, Taylor
and Francis Group.
Falk, Richard (2000), The Decline of Citizenship in an Era of Globalization, Citizenship
Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1,
Fawaz, Mona (2009), Neoliberal Urbanity and the Right to the City: A View from
Beirut’s Periphery, Institute of Social Studies, and The Hague.
Fernandes, Edesio (2007), Constructing the `Right To the City' in Brazil, Social and
Legal Studies, Vol, 16(2), 201-209.
Friedmann, J. (1986) 'The World City Hypothesis', Development and Change 17(1): 6984.

229

Geschiere, P. & Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2000) Capitalism and autochthony: the seesaw of
mobility and belonging, Public Culture, 12(2), pp. 423–452.
Gibbon, P.; Bangura, Y. and Ofstad, A. (eds.) 1992. Authoritarianism, Democracy and
Adjustment: The Politics of Economic Reform in Africa. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika
institutet.
Gilbert, Lietter and Phillips, Catherine (2003), Practices of Urban Environmental
Citizenship: Rights to the city and Rights to nature in Toronto, Citizenship Studies, Vol.
7, No. 3, 2003
Harvey, David and Potter, Cuz (2009), The right to the Just City, in Searching for the
Just City: Debates in urban theory and practice, Ed. Peter Marcuse et al., Routledge,
Taylor and Francis Group.
Harvey, David (2003), The Right to the City, in International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research, Vol 27.4, pp936-41.
Harvey David, (1989), The Urban Experience, The John Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore.
Harvey David, (1985), Consciousness and the Urban Experience, The John Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore.
Herbst, Jeffery, Political Liberalization in Africa after Ten Years, Comparative Politics,
Vol. 33, No. 3 (Apr., 2001), pp. 357-375
Hill, Lisa (2000) The Two Republicae of the Roman Stoics: Can a Cosmopolite be a
Patriot? In Citizenship Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2000.

230

Holston, James, and Arjun Appadurai (1996) “Cities and citizenship”, Public Culture,
8(2): 187-204
Horowitz, D. 1994. "Democracy in Divided Societies", In Diamond, L. and Plattner, M.
(eds.) Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy. Baltimore and London: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Human Rights Watch (January 24, 2008), Kenya: Opposition Officials Helped Plan Rift
Valley Violence, http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/01/23.
Huntington, Samuel, 1991, “Democracy’s Third Wave”, Journal of Democracy, Vol 2,
No. 2,
Imbroscio, David (2010), Urban America Reconsidered: Alternatives for Governance
and Policy, Cornell University Press.
Isin, Engin F. (2002). City, democracy and citizenship: Historical images, contemporary
practices. In: Isin, Engin F. and Turner, Bryan S. eds. Handbook of citizenship studies.
London, UK: Sage, pp. 305–316.
Jacobsen, Karen (2002), Can refugees benefit the state? Refugee resources and African
State building, in the Journal of Modern African Studies, 40, 4 (2002), pp. 577-596,
Cambridge University Press
Jackson, R. and Roseburg, Carl 1983 Personal rule in Black Africa: prince, autocrat,
prophet, and tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press).
Joseph, Richard (1997), Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and
Theoretical Perspectives, Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3, Transitions to
Democracy: A Special Issue in Memory of Dankwart A. Rustow (Apr.), pp. 363-382.

231

Kagwanja, Peter, Kagwanja, Mwanji and Southhall, Roger (2010), Kenya’s Uncertain
Democracy: The Election Crisis of 2008, Routledge Publishers.
Kagwanja, Mwanji (2009), Corrupting power-sharing: democratic rollback and the
stalled war on corruption in Kenya, Africa Policy Institute.
Kasfir, Nelson (ed.) (1984), State and class in Africa (London: Frank Cass).
Kibreab Gaim(2003,)Displacement, host governments’ policies, and constraints on the
construction of sustainable livelihoods, in International Social Science Journal 175,
UNESCO, Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Kibreab Gaim(1996),Eritrean and Ethiopian Urban Refugees in Khartoum: What the Eye
Refuses to See, in African Studies Review, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 131-178
Kihato, Caroline Wanjiku (2007), Reconfiguring Citizenship in African Cities.
Lefevbre, Henry (1970) The Urban Revolution, Translated by Robert Bononno,
University of Minnesota Press (2003).
Lijphart A., (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Linklater, Andrew (1998) Cosmopolitan Citizenship, in Citizenship Studies, Vol. 2, No.
1, 1998
Mabogunjie, Akin L (2005), Global Urban Poverty Research Agenda: The African Case,
paper presented at a seminar by the Comparative Urban Studies Project of the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C.

232

Magnusson, Warren. (2011), Politics of Urbanism: Seeing Like a City, Routledge
Publishers.
Marcuse, Peter(2010), The Right to the City: Keys to Understand the Proposal for
“Another City is Possible” in cities for All, edited by Ana Sugranyes and Charlotte
Mathivet, Habitat International Coalition (HIC) First edition - Santiago, Chile, 2010
Marcuse, Peter (2009), Postscript: Beyond the Just city to the Right to the city, in
Searching for the Just City: Debates in urban theory and practice, Ed. Peter Marcuse
et al., Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
Mathivet, Charlotte(2010), The Right to the City: Keys to Understand the Proposal for “
Another City is Possible” , edited by Ana Sugranyes and Charlotte Mathivet, Habitat
International Coalition (HIC) First edition - Santiago, Chile, 2010
Mauthner Natasha S and Doucet Andrea (2003), Reflexive Accounts and Accounts of
Reflexivity in Qualitative Data Analysis, Vol 37(3):413-431BSA Publications Ltd.
Mkandawire, Thandika(2002), “The Terrible Toll of Post-Colonial 'Rebel Movements' in
Africa: Towards an Explanation of the Violence against the Peasantry, The Journal of
Modern African Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, Cambridge University Press.
Mkandawire, Thandika, (2001), “Thinking about Developmental States in Africa”,
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2001, 25,289-313
Mkandawire, T. and Olukoshi, A. (1995), Between Liberalization and Oppression:
The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA.
Munene, C. K. (2010), Report on Unstable Populations in Kenya, Unpublished Material.
Nyamnjoh, Francis B (2007), From Bounded to Flexible Citizenship: Lessons from
Africa, in Citizenship Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, 73–82, February 2007
233

Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2006) Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in
Contemporary Southern Africa (London: CODESRIA/Zed Books).
Nyaoro, Dulo(2010), Policing with prejudice: how policing exacerbates poverty among
urban refugees, The International Journal of Human Rights Vol. 14, No. 1, February
2010, 126–145
Olukoshi, Adebayo (2005), Changing Patterns of Politics in Africa, En libro: Politics
and Social Movements in an Hegemonic World: Lessons from Africa, Asia and
Latin America. Boron, Atilio A.; Lechini, Gladys. CLACSO, Consejo Latinoamericano
de Ciencias Sociales, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa, Addis Ababa, September, 1969.
Osaghae, E. (1999) 'Democratization in sub-Saharan Africa: Faltering prospects, new
hopes', Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 17: 1, 5 — 28
Parnell, Susan and Pieterse, Edgar (2010), The ‘Right to the City’: Institutional
Imperatives of a Developmental State, International Journal of Urban and Regional
Research, Volume 34.1, pp 146–62.
Pavanello, Sara, Samir Elhawary and Sara Pantuliano (March, 2010), Hidden and
Exposed: Urban Refugees in Nairobi, Kenya, Humanitarian Policy Group, Working
Paper.
Plyushteva, Anna. 2009. “The Right to the City and Struggles over Urban Citizenship:
Exploring the Links.” Amsterdam Social Science, Vol. 1(3): 81-97.

234

Poggi, Gianfranco (2003), Citizens and the state: retrospect and prospect, in States and
Citizens: History, Theory and Prospects, Cambridge University Press.
Portes, Alejandro and Jensen, Leif( Dec.,1989), The Enclave and the Entrants: Patterns of
Ethnic Enterprise in Miami before and after Mariel in American Sociological Review,
Vol. 54, No. 6,pp. 929-949
Prior, Lindsay (2008), Researching Documents: Emergent Methods, in the Handbook of
Emergent Methods, Ed. By Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber and Patricia Leavy, The Guilford
Press.
Purcell Mark (2003), Citizenship and the Right to the Global City: Reimagining the
Capitalist World Order, in International Journal for Urban and Regional Research,
Vol27.3, pp 564-90.
Purcell Mark (2002), Excavating Lefebvre: The right to the city and its urban politics of
the Inhabitant, GeoJournal 58: 99–108, Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Netherlands.
Refugee Act of Kenya (2006) enacted by the National Parliament of the Kenyan
Republic.
Ritchie, Jane and Lewis, Jane (2003), Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social
Science Students and Researchers, SAGE Publications, London.
Robinson, Jennifer (2004), A world of Cities, The British Journal of Sociology 2004
Volume 55 Issue 4
Rothschild, Donald and Chazan, Naomi (eds.) (1988), The precarious balance: the
state and society in Africa, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview).
235

Sarantakos, S. (1998), Social Research, Macmillan Press Limited.
Sassen, Saskia (1991), The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Sassen, Saskia (1995) 'On concentration and centrality in the global city', in P.L. Knox and P.J.
Taylor (eds) World Cities in a World-System, pp. 63-78. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.

Sassen, Saskia (2000), Cities in a World Economy. Thousand Oaks (CA), Pine Forge.

Sassen, Saskia (2006), Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global
Assemblages, Princeton University Press.
Schutt, Russell K (2009), Investigating the Social World: The Process and Practice of
Research, Pine Forge Press.
Siegel Fred (2005), The Prince of City, Encounter Books, San Francisco.
Sienkiewicz, Holly (2007), Asylum States and Urban Refugees: The Benefits of an
integrative approach, in Michigan Journal of Public Affairs, Volume 4.
Sideaway, James Derrick (1992) In other worlds: On politics of research by ‘First World’
geographers in the ‘Third World’, AREA 24(4), pp403-408.
Silverman, David (2001) Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analyzing Talk
Text, and Interaction, SAGE Publications, London.
Simone, A. (2001) African migration and the remaking of inner-city Johannesburg, in: A.
Morris & A. Bouillon (Eds) African Immigration to South Africa: Francophone
Migration of the 1990s, pp. 150–170 (Pretoria: Protea and IFAS).
236

Skinner, Quentin (2003), States and the freedom of citizens, in States and Citizens:
History, Theory and Prospects, Cambridge University Press.
Svasand and Randall(2001), Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Africa,
Paper for ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Grenoble, April 6-11, 2001, Workshop on
“Parties, party systems and democratic consolidation in the Third World.”

Taylor, P.J., G. Catalano and D.R.F. Walker (2002a) 'Measurement of the World City
Network', Urban Studies 39(13): 2367-76.

Taylor, P.J., G. Catalano and D.R.F. Walker (2002b) 'Exploratory Analysis of the World
City Network', Urban Studies 39(13): 2377-94.

United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Adopted on 28 July 1951
by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and
Stateless Persons convened under General Assembly resolution 429 (V) of 14 December
1950
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Adopted and proclaimed by
General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948
United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, was taken note of with
approval by the Economic and Social Council in resolution 1186 (XLI) of 18 November
1966 and entered into force on 4 October 1967.
UNHABITAT (2010), State of African Cities: Governance, Inequality and Land Markets,
UNON/Publishing Services Section/Nairobi, ISO 14001:2004.

237

UNHABITAT/UNESCO (2009), Urban Policies and the Right to the City: Rights,
Responsibilities and Citizenship, Ed. by Alison Brown and Annali Kristiansen.
UNHABITAT (2008), State of the World’s Cities, Earth scan Publishers in the UK and
USA, on behalf of the United Nations Human Settlements Program (UN-HABITAT).
UNHCR (2011), Global Report on the Status of Refugees.
UNHCR- Policy Development and Evaluation Service (PDES), Navigating Nairobi, A review of
the implementation of UNHCR’s urban refugee policy in Kenya’s capital city, (Eds.)Elizabeth
Campbell, Jeff Crisp and Esther Kiragu.
UNHCR (2010), Refugee and Asylum Seekers in Kenya, Statistical Summary, 28 February 2010

UNHCR (2009b) Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Kenya, Statistical Summary 31
December 2009
Varasnyi, Monica (2006),Interrogating “Urban Citizenship” vis-à-vis Undocumented
Migration, in Citizenship Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, 229–249, May 2006
Weaver, Jerry L (1988), Searching for Survival: Urban Ethiopian Refugees in Sudan, in
Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 457-476.
Young, Crawford and Turner, Thomas 1985, The rise and decline of the Zairean state
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press)

238

Appendix 1: Interview Questions for Ethiopian Refugees in Nairobi
Age______________________________
Gender___________________________
Location__________________________
I. Arrival
1. How long have you been living in Nairobi? What was the primary reason that
made you leave your country of origin?
2. Have you been living in Refugee camps before moving to Nairobi? If yes, why
did you move to Nairobi?
3. Did you have a host family or a relative who assisted you while arriving in
Nairobi? If yes, what kind of support did they provide you?
4. Do you rent your place of domicile in Nairobi? If yes, how did you contact the
land lords?
5. Were there any surprises or cultural shocks that you experienced when you first
landed in Nairobi? Can you share some of your anecdotes with us?
II. Economic Rights
6. What is your major source of income in Nairobi? How do you cover your monthly
expenses for food, clothing and shelter?
7. Do you have preferences when it comes to who you buy your basic essentials
(food, and clothing) from? If yes, please discuss?
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8. Are you engaged in any remunerative economic activity in Nairobi? If so, can you
tell us more about your occupation?
9.

If you have a job, do you work alongside Kenyans at your work place? If yes,
how do you evaluate the relationship between Kenyans and Ethiopian refugees at
your job?

10. Do you have a bank account in Nairobi? If yes, how easy is it for refugees to open
a bank account in Nairobi?
11. Do you have a business of your own in Nairobi? If yes, what do you sell? And
when did you establish your business?
12. Do you have particular preference about who you hire in your business (Kenyans,
Ethiopian Refugees or both)? In any of these cases, why?
13. Are you licensed by the city government? Can you tell us how the process works
for refugees that would like to open businesses in Nairobi?
14. Do you pay taxes to the city government, the national government, or both?
15. Are there practices of corruption and nepotism in relation to the licensing,
registration, and tax collection of small enterprises by the Kenyan authorities?
16. How is your business being viewed by Kenyans or other refugees in Nairobi?
17. Are you a member of any local saving and credit association in Nairobi?
18. In your opinion, do Ethiopian refugees play a key role in transforming the urban
neighborhoods of Nairobi? If so, how? If not, why not?
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III. Political Rights
19. Are you registered or ID’ed by the Kenyan government or the city council as a
refugee? If yes, which agency is responsible? And, what are the procedures
involved?
20. Do the Kenyan authorities specify your ‘rights’ as urban refugees? If yes, what
are the main rights and protections that you have while living in Nairobi?
21. Do the Kenyan authorities specify duties and restrictions on you as urban refugees?
If yes, what are these duties and restrictions that you have to abide by while living
in Nairobi?
22. How do you evaluate the relationship between the Nairobi police department and
urban refugees?
23. Do you think refugees are subjected to unfair scrutiny, harassment or abuse by the
Nairobi police? If yes, why do you think is this the case?
24. How do urban refugees handle such incidents? How do they negotiate rights ‘with’
the law enforcement officials?
25. What types of civil society organizations are involved in supporting and handling
legal and political matters of Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi?
26. In general, how do you evaluate the relationship between ordinary Kenyans and
Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi?
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IV. Social Capital
27. Do you or other Ethiopian refugees you know of attend schools or higher
education institutions in Nairobi? If yes, can you mention where?
28. Do refugees have preferences for study purposes? If yes, why? (School fees,
curricula, proximity, sense of community etc...) Do Ethiopian refugees have their own
community schools in Nairobi?
29. Do Ethiopian refugees have their own religious institutions (churches or mosques)
in Nairobi? If so, do you know how these institutions were established and managed?
30. Do you attend such religious services? If so, can you tell us the reasons why you
attend these services? How do these institutions impact both refugees and the host
community?
31. What other cultural associations do Ethiopian refugees have in Nairobi? How do
these institutions impact both refugees and the host community?
V. Urban Refugee Policy
32. In your opinion, what kind of legal or policy reforms can the Government of
Kenya (GoK) or the city of Nairobi introduce to address the conditions of urban
refugees?
33. Do you have any other comment?
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Appendix 2: Interview Questions for Community Representatives of
Ethiopian Refugees in Nairobi

Gender___________________________
Location__________________________

I. Arrival
1. When did Ethiopian refugees start to migrate into Kenya? Can we speak of
different phases of refugee inflow into Kenya from Ethiopia?
2. What are the primary reasons that instigated the outflow of people from Ethiopia
into Kenya?
3. Relatively speaking, are many of the Ethiopian refugees found in refugee camps
or in the city of Nairobi?
4. What are the pros and cons of staying in refugee camps?
5. Do many refugees travel into Nairobi from camps? If yes, why do they move into
Nairobi from these camps?
6. What are the pros and cons of staying in cities like Nairobi for refugees?
7. What kind of support system do refugees have when they settle in Nairobi? Can
we speak of different social (family, community or organizational) support
schemes for new people?
8. How do people access housing services in Nairobi? And how do they cover costs
related to housing?
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9. Do most Ethiopians experience cultural shocks when they first land in Nairobi?
Can you share some of your anecdotes with us?
II. Economic Rights
10. How do refugees support themselves financially? How do they cover their
monthly expenses for food, clothing and shelter?
11. Are there Ethiopian refugees engaged in any remunerative economic activity in
Nairobi? If so, can you tell us more about these occupations and economic
activities?
12. Are there businesses owned and run by Ethiopian refugees? If yes, can you tell us
more about the nature of these businesses?
13. Do these businesses have particular preference about who they hire as a worker
(Kenyans, Ethiopian Refugees or both)?
14. Do these businesses cater only for Ethiopians or both Kenyans and Ethiopians?
15. Do Ethiopian refugees have local saving and credit association in Nairobi?
16. Is Nairobi a business friendly city for urban refugees when it comes to the
registration, licensing and operation? If yes, why? If not, why not?
17. Are there practices of corruption and nepotism in relation to the licensing,
registration, and tax collection of small enterprises by the Kenyan authorities?
18. In your opinion, how do Kenyans view business owned and run by Ethiopians in
Nairobi?
19. In your opinion, do Ethiopian refugees play a key role in transforming the urban
neighborhoods of Nairobi? If so, how? If not, why not?
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III. Political Rights
20. Which government agencies are responsible for following up on refugee affairs
in Nairobi? What are their respective responsibilities?
21. Do Kenyan authorities specify the ‘rights’ of urban refugees? If yes, what are the
main rights and protections that you have while living in Nairobi?
22. Do the Kenyan authorities specify duties, or prohibitions on urban refugees? If
yes, what are these prohibitions that urban refugees need to abide by while living
in Nairobi?
23. How do you evaluate the relationship between the Nairobi police department and
urban refugees?
24. Do you think refugees are subjected to unfair scrutiny, harassment or abuse by the
Nairobi police? If yes, why do you think is this the case?
25. How do urban refugees handle such incidents? How do they negotiate rights ‘with’
the law enforcement officials?
26. What types of civil society organizations are involved in supporting and handling
legal and political matters of Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi?
27. In general, how do you evaluate the relationship between ordinary Kenyans and
Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi?
28. Do you think urban refugees should have some sort of political representation at
locations, division or Nairobi city level? If yes, why? If no, why not?
29. In your opinion, are urban Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi active in the production
of urban space? If so, how? If not, why not?
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IV. Social Capital
30. Do Ethiopian refugees have their own educational institutions (primary, middle or
high schools etc...)
31. Do Ethiopian refugees have preferences for school purposes? If yes, why?
(School fees, curricula, proximity, sense of community etc.)
32. Do Ethiopian refugees have their own religious institutions (churches or mosques)
in Nairobi? If so, do you know how these institutions were established and
managed?
33. In your opinion, do these religious institutions have other social functions than
organized worship? How do these institutions impact both refugees and the host
community?
34. What other cultural associations do Ethiopian refugees have in Nairobi? How do
these institutions impact both refugees and the host community?
V. Urban Refugee Policy
35. In your opinion, what kind of legal or policy reforms can the Government of
Kenya (GoK) or the city of Nairobi can introduce to address or improve the
conditions of urban refugees?
36. Do you have any other comment?
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Appendix 3: Interview Questions for Ethiopian Business leaders in
Nairobi
Gender___________________________
Location__________________________

I. Arrival
1. When did Ethiopian refugees start to migrate into Kenya? Can we speak of
different phases of refugee inflow into Kenya from Ethiopia?
2. What are the primary reasons that instigated the outflow of people from Ethiopia
into Kenya?
3. Relatively speaking, are many of the Ethiopian refugees found in refugee camps
or in the city of Nairobi?
4. What are the pros and cons of staying in refugee camps?
5. Do many refugees travel into Nairobi from camps? If yes, why do they move into
Nairobi from these camps?
6. What are the pros and cons of staying in cities like Nairobi for refugees?
7. What kind of support system do refugees have when they settle in Nairobi? Can
we speak of different social (family, community or organizational) support
schemes for new people?
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8. How do people access housing services in Nairobi? And how do they cover costs
related to housing?
9. Do most Ethiopians experience cultural shocks when they first land in Nairobi?
Can you share some of your anecdotes with us?
II. Economic Rights
10. How do refugees support themselves financially? How do they cover their
monthly expenses for food, clothing and shelter?
11. Are there Ethiopian refugees engaged in any remunerative economic activity in
Nairobi? If so, can you tell us more about these occupations and economic
activities?
12. Are there many businesses owned and run by Ethiopian refugees? If yes, can you
tell us more about the nature of these businesses?
13. Do these businesses have particular preference about who they hire as a worker
(Kenyans, Ethiopian Refugees or both)?
14. Do these businesses cater only for Ethiopians or both Kenyans and Ethiopians?
15. Do Ethiopian refugees have local saving and credit association in Nairobi?
16. Is Nairobi a business friendly city for urban refugees when it comes to the
registration, licensing and operation? If yes, why? If not, why not?
17. Are there practices of corruption and nepotism in relation to the licensing,
registration, and tax collection of small enterprises by the Kenyan authorities?
18. In your opinion, how do Kenyans view business owned and run by Ethiopians in
Nairobi?
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19. In your opinion, do Ethiopian refugees play a key role in transforming the urban
neighborhoods of Nairobi? If so, how? If not, why not?

III. Political Rights
20. Which government agencies are responsible for following up on refugee affairs
in Nairobi? What are their respective responsibilities?
21. Do Kenyan authorities specify the ‘rights’ of urban refugees? If yes, what are the
main rights and protections that you have while living in Nairobi?
22. Do the Kenyan authorities specify duties, or prohibitions on the businesses of
urban refugees? If yes, what are these prohibitions that urban refugees need to
abide by while living in Nairobi?
23. How do you evaluate the relationship between the Nairobi police department and
the businesses of urban refugees?
24. Do you think refugees are subjected to unfair scrutiny, harassment or abuse by the
Nairobi police? If yes, why do you think is this the case?
25. How do urban refugees handle such incidents? How do they negotiate rights ‘with’
the law enforcement officials?
26. What types of civil society organizations are involved in supporting and handling
legal and political matters of refugees owned businesses in Nairobi?
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IV. Urban Refugee Policy
27. In your opinion, what kind of legal or policy reforms can the Government of
Kenya (GoK) or the city of Nairobi can introduce to address or improve the
conditions of urban refugees?
28. Do you have any other comment?
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Appendix 4: Interview Questions for Kenyan Officials in Nairobi

Gender___________________________
Agency ______________________

I.

Laws, Policies and Political Rights

1. In your opinion, what are the reasons that make Ethiopian and other refugees
come to Nairobi?

2. Do you think refugees should be allowed to settle in cities like Nairobi? Or is it
more advisable to settle them in refugee camps? Why?
3. Do you think refugees should be registered or ID’ed by Kenyan officials before
moving into Nairobi’s neighborhoods? If so, why? If not, why not?
4. How do you evaluate Kenya’s adherence to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees
to which it is a signatory?
5. Are you familiar with Kenyan national laws and policy instruments on refugees?
If so, can you outline the basic provisions, policy goals and strategies of the
Kenyan government on refugees?
6. Which agencies are responsible for enforcing these national laws and policies?
And how successful has the Kenyan government been in implementing its policy?
7. How do you assess the role of your agency in implementing the national policy on
refugees? What are its major activities and achievements? What are its challenges
and obstacles?
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8. How do you evaluate the relationship between the law enforcement agencies
(such as the Nairobi police department) and urban refugees?
9. Do you think refugees are subjected to unfair scrutiny, harassment or abuse by the
Nairobi police? If yes, why do you think is this the case?
10. How do urban refugees handle such incidents? How do they negotiate rights ‘with’
law enforcement officials?
11. How do you assess the role and performance of local non-governmental
organizations working on the issue of urban refugees in Nairobi? What are the
strength and weaknesses of these organizations?
12. How do you view the role and performance of UNHCR and IOM working on the
issue of urban refugees in Nairobi? What are the strength and weaknesses of these
organizations?
13. Do you think urban refugees should have some sort of political representation at
locations, division or Nairobi city level? If yes, why? If no, why not?

II.

Economic Rights

14. Are there Ethiopian or other refugee businesses in Nairobi? If yes, how do
Kenyans view these businesses owned and run by refugees?
15. Do you think, Ethiopian or other refugees in Nairobi should be allowed to open
up businesses and trade alongside Kenyan counterparts? If so, why? If not, why
not?
16. Are businesses owned and run by refugees registered, licensed and taxed by
government? If so, which authority is in charge of these duties and prerogatives?
17. In your opinion, do refugees play a key role in transforming the urban
neighborhoods of Nairobi? If so, how? If not, why not?
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III.

Social Capital

18. Are you aware of Ethiopian or other urban refugees attending schools or higher
education institutions in Nairobi? If yes, can you mention where?
19. Are you aware of any community school founded and managed by Ethiopians or
other urban refugees in Nairobi? If so, why do you think refugees prefer their own
schools than the Kenyan public school system?
20. Are you aware of religious institutions (churches or mosques) in Nairobi founded
by Ethiopian refugees? If so, do you know how these institutions were established
and managed?
21. In your opinion, how do religious institutions impact both refugees and the host
community?
22. What other cultural associations do Ethiopian refugees have in Nairobi? How do
these institutions impact both refugees and the host community?
23. Is there concern/fear amongst Kenyans that refugees are not ‘integrating’ to
Kenyan ways of living and hence are creating isolated cultural enclaves in Nairobi?
If so, can you share us anecdotes or incidents where Kenyans expressed their
concern about the rising influx of urban refugees from neighboring countries?
24. In general, how do you evaluate the relationship between ordinary Kenyans and
Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi?
25. In your opinion, are urban Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi active in the production
of urban space? If so, how? If not, why not?
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IV.

Urban Refugee Policy

26. Do you think Kenyan laws and policies on urban refugees are right? If so why? If
not, why not?
27. Do you think Kenyan laws and policies on urban refugees are effectively enforced?
If so why? If not, why not?
28. In your opinion, what should the policy priorities of the Kenyan government be
when it comes to urban refugees in neighboring countries?
29. In your opinion, what should the policy priorities of local and international
organizations be when it comes to urban refugees in neighboring countries?
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Appendix 5: Sample Interview Questions for Representatives of Local
and International Organizations
Gender___________________________
Agency ______________________

I.

Background

1. How long have you been living in Nairobi?
2. Have you come across Ethiopian refugees in your neighborhood? If yes, since
when did you begin to notice these refugees?
3. Do you remember a particular year or period of time when a large number of
Ethiopians started to move into your neighborhood?
4. In your opinion, what are the reasons that make Ethiopian and other refugees
come to Nairobi?

II.
Laws, Policies and Political Rights
5. Do you think refugees should be allowed to settle in cities like Nairobi? Or is it
more advisable to settle them in refugee camps? Why?
6. Do you think refugees should be registered or ID’ed by Kenyan officials before
moving into Nairobi’s neighborhoods? If so, why? If not, why not?
7. How do you evaluate Kenya’s adherence to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees
to which it is a signatory?
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8. Are you familiar about Kenyan national laws and policy instruments on refugees?
If so, can you outline the basic provisions, policy goals and strategies of the
Kenyan government on refugees?
9. Which agencies are responsible for enforcing these national laws and policies?
And how successful has the Kenyan government been in implementing its policy?
10. How do you assess the role of your agency in with regards to urban refugees?
What are your agencies major activities and achievements? What are its
challenges and obstacles?
11. How do you evaluate the relationship between the law enforcement agencies
(such as the Nairobi police department) and urban refugees?
12. Do you think refugees are subjected to unfair scrutiny, harassment or abuse by the
Nairobi police? If yes, why do you think is this the case?
13. How do urban refugees handle such incidents? How do they negotiate rights and
resources from the law enforcement officials?
14. How do you assess the role and performance of government agencies working on
the issue of urban refugees in Nairobi? What are the strength and weaknesses of
these organizations?
15. How do you view the role and performance of other local and international
organizations working on the issue of urban refugees in Nairobi? What are the
strength and weaknesses of these organizations?
16. Do you think urban refugees should have some sort of political representation at
locations, division or Nairobi city level? If yes, why? If no, why not?
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III.

Economic Rights

17. Are there Ethiopian or other refugee businesses in Nairobi? If yes, how do
Kenyans view these businesses owned and run by refugees?
18. Do you think, Ethiopian or other refugees in Nairobi should be allowed to open
up businesses and trade alongside Kenyan counterparts? If so, why? If not, why
not?
19. Are businesses owned and run by refugees registered, licensed and taxed by
government? If so, which authority is in charge of these duties and prerogatives?
20. In your opinion, do refugees play a key role in transforming the urban
neighborhoods of Nairobi? If so, how? If not, why not?

IV.

Social Capital

21. Are you aware of Ethiopian or other urban refugees attending schools or higher
education institutions in Nairobi? If yes, can you mention where?
22. Are you aware of any community school founded and managed by Ethiopians or
other urban refugees in Nairobi? If so, why do you think refugees prefer their own
schools than the Kenyan public school system?
23. Are you aware of religious institutions (churches or mosques) in Nairobi founded
by Ethiopian refugees? If so, do you know how these institutions were established
and managed?
24. In your opinion, how do religious institutions impact both refugees and the host
community?
25. What other cultural associations do Ethiopian refugees have in Nairobi? How do
these institutions impact both refugees and the host community?
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26. Is there concern/fear amongst Kenyans that refugees are not ‘integrating’ to
Kenyan ways of living and hence are creating isolated cultural enclaves in Nairobi?
If so, can you share us anecdotes or incidents where Kenyans expressed their
concern about the rising influx of urban refugees from neighboring countries?
27. In general, how do you evaluate the relationship between ordinary Kenyans and
Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi?
28. In your opinion, are urban Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi active in the production
of urban space? If so, how? If not, why not?
V.

Urban Refugee Policy

29. Do you think Kenyan laws and policies on urban refugees are right? If so why? If
not, why not?
30. Do you think Kenyan laws and policies on urban refugees are effectively enforced?
If so why? If not, why not?
31. In your opinion, what should the policy priorities of the Kenyan government be
when it comes to urban refugees in neighboring countries?
32. In your opinion, what should the policy priorities of local and international
organizations be when it comes to urban refugees in neighboring countries?
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II.WORK EXPERIENCE
Teaching
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1996-2000

Lecturer with Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Addis Ababa
University (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) from 2001 to 2013. I am currently on study leave
beginning from August 2009.
Tasks and Achievements
I thought the following undergraduate courses: “Urban Sociology”, “Social
Development: Theories and Perspectives” and “Social Identities: Class, Ethnicity and
Nationalism.” I have also supervised students’ thesis and other research work in addition
to teaching.
Faculty Administration
Tasks and Achievements
I was actively involved in faculty related activities during my nine (9) years of tenure in
at Addis Ababa University. Accordingly,



I was elected as a representative (2006-2008) of the academic staff of the College
of Social Sciences (CSS) in the Academic Commission of the College which is
the highest decision making organ of the College. In the Commission, I took part
in the preparation of the Five Years Strategic Plan of the CSS; oversaw the hiring
of new academic staff in the College; managed student affairs of admission,
grading and graduation ceremonies. I also served as the Secretary of the
Commission in charge of the documenting the proceedings of the Commission
meetings.



In 2007, I was elected by the President of Addis Ababa University to chair and
lead a faculty-wide committee responsible for founding a Pan-African Studies
Centre, an independent and multi-disciplinary research institute, in Addis Ababa
University. As a chairperson of this body, I coordinated and led a faculty wide
initiative to develop a graduate program in African Studies. I also developed an
organizational development plan (ODP) which outlined the academic,
administrative and finance goals of this nascent centre over a five years period of
time.



Later in 2008, I also participated in the strategic planning process of developing a
five-year strategic plan for the Department of Sociology and Social
Anthropology.
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Research and Consultancy Projects
I have been involved in a number of research and consultancy endeavors which could
broadly be summarized in three thematic areas: 1) Urban development and the Right to
the City, 2) Strategic Planning and Development Management, and 3) Well-Being
and Development Interventions.

Tasks and Achievements
In each of these academic as well commissioned studies I served in 3 different capacities.
I was a principal researcher in some of them where I designed the research questions,
developed fitting methodological designs, oversaw the collection of field data and
fully participated in the write up of reports. In other instances, I co-managed such
research projects. Last but not least, I was also involved as a field coordinator and
research assistance for some of the studies. A complete list of these undertakings is
listed below under Section III.

Professional Associations and Non-Profits
Tasks and Achievements


I have served as the Deputy Head of the Research and Publications sub-committee
of the Ethiopian Society of Sociologists, Social Workers and Anthropologists
(ESSSWA)’s Executive Committee. The subcommittee was in charge of
soliciting research funds for ESSWA, assisting in the publication of Doctoral
and Masters level studies as books, and organizing monthly seminars for
discussions among Ethiopian academics and practitioners in the fields of
sociology, social work and anthropology. I served in this capacity for two years
(August 2007 - July 2009).



I have served as the Board Member of a national non-profit organization “Afro
Flag Youth Vision Association” founded by young sociology graduates of the
AAU in 2004 to promote youth participation in electoral politics, and offer a
youth platform for deliberating on issues of Pan-Africanism and good governance
in the continent.
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Newspaper Contributor
Aside from scholarly research and publications, I worked as free lance writer and
contributor of a famous Ethiopian weekly Newspaper which operated in Ethiopia from
2007 to 2009 known as “Addis Neger”. Up until 2009, “Addis Neger” ranked top in
terms of readership and sale in the fledgling private media of Ethiopia. From 2009 on, the
newspaper went online (www.addisnegeronline.com) where I served as a regular
blogger and commentator of current political issues unfolding in Ethiopia and the Horn of
Africa in general until August 2011.

III. RESEARCH AND CONSULTING EXPERIENCE


Principal Consultant for CIFF (Children’s Investment Fund Foundation)
evaluating the Rural health Initiative of the Clinton HIV Aids Initiative-Ethiopia
that CIIF has funded for over a period of three years. (November-December 2009)



Co- researcher and writer of a Three Years Strategic Planning document
developed for the Kembatta Women’s Association- Ethiopia, an indigenous Civil
Society Organization working on women related development issues in Ethiopia.
(October – December 2008)



Co-Researcher of a national research project entitled “The Impact of Productive
Safety Net Programs (PSNP) on Child Education” commissioned by Save the
Children UK (SCUK) (November 2007- November 2008).



Co- researcher in a research team commissioned by the Addis Ababa University
to conduct an in-house self evaluation (ISE) exercise (January- May 2008).



Editor of 5 occasional papers on “Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in
Ethiopia” written by Ethiopian academics commissioned by an Ethiopian NGO
namely “The Peace and Development Committee” (October - December, 2007).



Co-researcher in a research project entitled: Improving Planning of dam
Operation: Using decision support systems to optimize livelihood benefits,
safeguard health and protect the environment” commissioned by the International
Water Management Institute, the Ministry of Water Resources and Addis Ababa
University. (March-December 2007)
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Principal Researcher in a study entitled “The Status of Governance, Academic
Freedom and Teaching Personnel in Ethiopian Higher Education: A case study of
two private Ethiopian Higher Education Institutions” commissioned by the Forum
for Social Studies (FSS). (September, 2006- August 2007)



Principal Researcher for a policy review study commissioned by the Aklilu
Lemma Foundation on its scholarships and research grant schemes (August,
2006- January 2007)



Co- researcher and writer of a Three Years Strategic Planning document
developed for the Ethiopian Nile Basin Discourse Forum, an indigenous think
thank group founded by the CRDA, Inter Africa Group and Christian Aid
Ethiopia. (June – September 2006)



Field researcher on an evaluative research on UNDP-Ethiopia’s partnership with
local NGOs in southern Ethiopia on community based HIV/AIDS prevention and
control initiatives. [September 1st- December 15 2004]



Adjunct Researcher in the University of Bath [UK]based, Wellbeing In
Developing Countries [WED] Research Project which is an interdisciplinary
research group that explored the relationships between poverty , inequality and
the quality of life in Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Peru and Thailand( Oct,2004December 2005).



Research assistant in a study commissioned to the Christian Michelson Institute
[University of Bergen, Norway] by the Norwegian Parliament to study the project
activities, associational networks and achievements of Save the Children-Norway
in Ethiopia, March- April 2003.



Research assistant in a baseline survey launched by African Medical Researchers
Foundation [AMREF]-Ethiopia in the Liban and Afhder Zones of the Somali
Regional State from May the 28th 2001 to July the 20th 2001



Researcher in a mid-term evaluation of an urban development project in Addis
Ababa run by the Integrated Holistic Approach/Urban Development Project
[IHA/UDP], January 2001-March 2001.



Principal Researcher in an evaluative study of the Aklilu Lemma Fund for
Scholarship and Research Grants, September – December 2000.
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A student intern in a local NGO namely Alem Children Support Organisation
[ACSO], June- August 1999.

IV. PUBLICATIONS


Derese Getachew Kassa, Alp Ozerdem and Richard Bowd(2010), ‘A Theoretical
and Practical Exposition of “Participatory” Research Methods’, Participatory
Research Methodologies: Development and Post Conflict/Disaster
Reconstruction, edited by Richard Bowd and Alpasalan Ozerdem, Ashgate
Publishers.



Derese Getachew Kassa (2009) “Resettling the Discourse on “ Resettlement
Schemes” Towards a new approach”, In Proceedings of the 16th International
Conference of Ethiopian Studies, ed. by Svein Ege, Harald Aspen, Birhanu
Teferra and Shiferaw Bekele, Trondheim.



Derese Getachew Kassa (2007), “The Status of Governance, Academic
Freedom and Teaching Personnel in Ethiopia: The Case of Two Private
Higher Education Institutions in Ethiopia”, published by Forum For Social
Studies ( FSS), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.



Derese Getachew Kassa (June, 2004), “Peasant Reflections on Ethiopia’s
Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) Program”, Working
Paper, Wellbeing in Developing countries- Ethiopia (WED) project, University of
Bath, The United Kingdom. (Posted on the web)



Helland, Johan and Derese Getachew (October, 2004), “Study of the Impact of
program initiatives by Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil
Society”, published by Christian Michelsen Institute, University of Bergen,
Norway.

V. ARTICLES AND PRESENTATIONS


Derese Getachew Kassa (2012), “Cities of Refuge: African Refugees and the
struggle for Urban Citizenship”, Bergen Summer Research School 2012 PhD
conference, University of Bergen, Norway, held from 20-22 June, 2012.



Derese Getachew Kassa (2011), “The Right to the City in Africa: The quest to
theorize urban otherness in the South” in the Annual Conference of the American
Political Science Association held from September 1-4, 2011.
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Derese Getachew Kassa (2010), “An Old Wine in a New Bottle? Ethiopia’s
experiment with Urban and District Level Decentralization”, paper presented at
the 53rd International Conference of the African Studies Association, San Francisco,
Nov 18-21, 2010.



Derese Getachew Kassa (2008), “A Tragedy of the Urban Commons? A case
study of 2 Public Spaces in Addis Ababa”, paper presented at the 12th Biennial
International Conference, by the International Association for the Study of the
Commons (IASC) held at the University of Gloucestershire (UK), Cheltenham, from
14-18 July 2008.



Derese Getachew Kassa (2007), From OAU to AU: Relevance for Civil Society
Organizations in Africa/Ethiopia, occasional paper read at an International
Workshop Organized by African Centre for Humanitarian Action( ACHA), African
Rally for Peace and Democratization, Oxfam UK and the Afroflag Youth Vision,
November 22-23, 2007.



Derese Getachew Kassa (2007), African Citizenhood and the Challenges to
Realize the United States of Africa, occasional paper read at an International Civil
Society Forum organized by Afro Flag Youth Vision, Oxfam UK, May 26, 2007.



Ayalew Gebre (PhD), Derese Getachew, and Matthew McCartney (PhD),
“Stakeholder Analysis on the Chara Chara Weir Structure of the Blue Nile”,
commissioned by the International Water Management Institute, the Ministry of
Water Resources and Addis Ababa University, August 2007.



Ayalew Gebre (PhD), Derese Getachew and Matthew McCartney(PhD),
“Stakeholder Analysis of Koga Irrigation and Watershed Management Project
in the Amhara National Regional State, Ethiopia”, commissioned by the
International Water Management Institute, the Ministry of Water Resources and
Addis Ababa University, August 2007.



Derese Getachew Kassa (September, 2005) “Rethinking Ethiopia’s agriculture
extension program: A sociology of state-peasant relations”, Masters of Research
dissertation, Department of Economics and International Development, University of
Bath, the United Kingdom.



Derese Getachew et al (August 2003), “ A Systemic Analysis of the Rwandan
Genocide”, Paper presented for the Peace Research Institute of Oslo, International
Summer School, Oslo, Norway.
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Derese Getachew Kassa (June 2000), “Impact Assessment of Indigenous
Interventions on Child Welfare”, Bachelor of Arts Thesis, Department of sociology
and social anthropology, Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

VI.CAPABILITIES
Excellent Communication Skills
Experience in Program Development, Management and Evaluation
Experience in Organizing, and Managing Research and Consultancy Groups
Excellent Networking and Collaboration skills across and within Agencies

VII.TRAINING AND WORKSHOPS
Transnational Migration and Global Development

2012

Bergen Summer Research School PhD Conference, University of Bergen, Norway, 20-22
June

Developing Peace Research Skills in Africa

2007

United Nation’s University of Peace (UPEACE) and Organisation for Social Science
Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA)
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

The Market and the City: Commercialization and Urban Restructuring

2006

Central European University
Budapest, Hungary

Peace Research and Conflict Management
Peace Research Institute of Oslo [PRIO] and the University of Oslo
Oslo, Norway
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2004

Social Science Research Methodology

2001

Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa
Ababa, Ethiopia

Addis

Conflict Prevention and Reconciliation

1996

World Vision International
Taiwan

Taipei,

VIII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Member

American Political Science Association
African Studies Association
Afro Flag Youth Vision Association
The Ethiopian Society of Sociologists, Social Workers and Social
Anthropologists [ESSWA]
Organization of Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern
Africa [OSSREA]

Language

Amharic and Oromiyfaa (Local Languages) and English

REFERENCES

Professor Ronald K. Vogel
Email: ron.vogel@politics.ryerson.ca

Professor Vogel is Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the Department of Politics at
Ryerson University and the former Chairman of the Department of Political Science in
the University of Louisville. I have worked as his research assistant from August 2009 to
August 2011. He is currently the Chair of my PHD committee.
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Dr. Ayalew Gebre,
Assistant Professor
Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology (Addis Ababa University)
P.O.Box 1176
Tel.

011-1225948 (office)
091-1404742(mobile)

Email: ayalewg@yahoo.com

Professor Ayalew is a former colleague of mine and chairperson of the former
Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at the Addis Ababa University. He is
a now full time faculty member at the Department of Anthropology in the same
University.

Mr Workneh Denekew Getahun
Chief Executive Officer of WORKOD Consults
P.O.Box 150152
Tel

+251-11-1236247 (Home)
+251-091-1406936 (Mobile)

Email: workod@ethionet.et
Mr Workneh is an independent consultant and CEO of WORKOD Consults who has
done a lot of consulting and research work for civil society organizations, international
aid agencies and government bureaus in Ethiopia. I have had the chance to work with him
in more than one of such undertakings as an affiliate.
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